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The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary:
Towards a Peaceful Resolution
Ahmed Abdullah Saud A1-Ghamdi
Abstract
This thesis starts with the historical background to the Saudi-Yemeni boundary in
general, a study of the Treaty of Taif (1934), and the maritime boundary between the two
states. The main focus of the thesis then follows, namely an in-depth consideration of the
frontier between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen to the east of the Treaty of Taif
boundary, and the problems and issues surrounding its demarcation - one of the longest
running of present day unresolved boundary disputes, from its origin in 1914 when the
Violet line was rejected by Ibn Saud.
This thesis aims to facilitate a resolution by examining several of the factors which affect
the location of a Logical Boundary. The de facto Saudi-Yemen border currently in
operation provides a logical basis for settlement of the temtorial dispute. This thesis
describes in detail how the defacto border was identified and mapped, perhaps for the
first time ever. The border conforms, at least very broadly, with a number of
geographical and human divides, and can be regarded as a crucial point for a properly
adjusted and negotiated boundary.
This thesis considers seven major groups of factors in testing the authority of the
recommended boundary. Not all the factors carry the same weight. Some factors
(geographical,historical, behavioural and administrative) will be critical in the
delimitation process, and some (social, economic and tribal) will powerfully influence
the acceptability of any boundary compromise. All these factors are thoroughly
examined in the thesis which includes 40 maps and 16 plates. At the end of the thesis the
author recommends the alignment of a Logical Boundary.
The author does not ignore the boundary negotiations which began in Geneva on 5th July
1992, and resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on 26th February
1995. The author has used Prescott's 1987 model of boundary negotiations to predict the
outcome of these negotiations.
The author recommends the use of his framework model for the Saudi-Yemeni
boundary, and also as a route to the peaceful resolution of boundary disputes
elsewhere, for example at some points between Morocco and Algeria.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1	 Introduction
Boundaries and frontiers are important features which deservedly attract a great deal of
geographical study and which have the potential to create problems for all nations and
states. At times, boundaries have been the cause of friction and war, and such is their
direct effect on inter-state relationships, that international crises sometimes result. In 1924
Bowman wrote of international boundaries:
By reason of some of them war may come, not in a generation, but within a few
years. The danger spots of the world have been greatly increased in number, the
zones of friction lengthened. (Bowman, 1924: p.4 cited in Asadallah, 1971: p.2)
Since World War 11 the total length of boundaries has indeed increased, but the zones of
friction not necessarily so, although this seems to have been the case in the inter-war
period when Bowman wrote his book. Siegfried (1938: p.vii cited in Prescott, 1987:
p.13!) remarks:
The study of boundaries is dangerous for the scholar because it is thoroughly
charged with political passions and entirely encumbered with afterthoughts. The
people are too interested in the issues when they speak of boundaries to speak with
detachment the failing is permanent!
A subject of such potentially disastrous consequences occupies an important place in the
thinking of statesmen and scholars, especially those who are interested in political
geography and geopolitics.
There is much literature which confuses the meaning of the terms 'boundary' and
'frontier'. Kristof (1959 p.269) comments:
In common speech we use the words "boundary" and "frontier" with the implication
that these have not only a quite well-defined meaning but also that they are (or
almost) interchangeable.
17
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Another author, Goblet (1956), uses 'frontiers' for both meanings, which is linguistically
correct in French. Arab-Islamic authors made use of a number of Arabic terms to
designate a concept sometimes properly translated as 'boundary' (Brauer, 1995: pp.11-
12). Ibn Manzur (1894), for example, makes no distinction between boundaries and
frontiers by using term Had or Huduud.
However, a number of authors, for example Holdich (1916), Fawcett (1918), and
Prescott (1987: pp.12-14) began to distinguish between the terms, with a frontier being
regarded as a zone, and a boundary as a line dividing sovereignty. Prescott also regards
the term 'border' as indicating adjacent areas which fringe the boundary (Prescott, 1987:
p.12). In this thesis the author has used Prescott's definitions as a basis for his
terminology: 'boundary' is used for agreed and delimited lines between states (the Treaty
of Tail boundary), 'frontier' for the zone dividing sovereignty where no boundary has
been agreed (the Saudi-Yemeni frontier), and within a frontier, the margins of the area of
authority of a state are descibed as the defacto border (Saudi defacto border, Yemeni de
facto border) (see Figure 1.4 and Section 1.4).
Aside from the problems of terminology, there is also the question of boundary
classification. Many previous attempts have been made to classify boundary lines, from
an artificial and natural classification, to antecedent, subsequent, and relict types. The
distinction between artificial and natural boundaries is deceptive as it appears to indicate
that some boundaries are not man-made, which is clearly false. All boundaries axe
artificial lines and may divide one geographical region into two or more political units,
which may thereafter give rise to claims. Boggs's (1940) classification consisted of
physical boundaries including mountains, deserts, lakes, rivers, swamps, and contours;
geometrical boundaries including great circle sections parallels of latitude, rhumb lines,
arcs of circles, and lines equidistant from coasts and rivers; anthropogeometric boundaries
including tribal, linguistic, religious, economic, historical, and cultural boundaries; and
compound boundaries adapted to a multiplicity of factors.
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European boundaries were produced as a result of wars (Gilfillan, 1924: p.484
cited in Prescott, 1987: p.191), but the absence of colonial expansion distinguishes
boundaries evolved in Europe from those in other continents (Prescott, 1987: p.191). By
contrast with Europe, the boundaries of the Middle East and North Africa are youthful
and mainly created by colonial powers (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.lO4).
The present Middle Eastern borders and thus the whole of the modern Middle East
state system are products of this mandate period. ... Many of the borders were
linear, as if drawn with a ruler, determined by Europeans to further their own ends,
however well-intentioned and idealistic, and to expedite mandate administration
(Blake and Schofield, 1987: p.18).
The colonial powers in the Arab countries of the Middle East were the Ottoman Empire,
Britain, and France, whilst Italy, France, Spain, and Britain colonised the Arab countries
of North Africa (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.50-4). l'his explains why the majority of
Arab nations in the Middle East and North Africa share a language and the Islamic culture
whilst there are differences in ideology, political regime, military strength, and colonial
history. Most of these countries also follow the Islamic faith but belong to different sects.
Table 1.1 Length of the land boundaries of south-west Asia
Country	 Length	 of	 No. of Neighbours Average Length
Boundaries	 (1cm)	 of Sectors (kin)
lran	 5,440	 7	 777
Saudi Arabia	 4,532	 7	 647.4
Iraq	 3,576	 6	 596
Turkey	 2,627	 8	 328.4
Syria	 2,253	 5	 450.6
Yenn	 1,746	 2	 873
Israel	 1,600	 6	 266.7
Jordan	 1,586	 5	 317.2
€man	 1,374	 3	 458
UAE	 1,016	 2	 508
Kuwait	 462	 2	 231
Lebanon	 454	 2	 227
West Bank	 404	 2	 202
GazaStrip	 62	 2	 31Qatar	 60	 1	 60
Source: CIA World Factobook (1992)
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CHAPTER 1
Figure 1.1 shows the status of Middle East and North African boundaries in 1996. It is
clear that the only boundary Arabian Pen. Which has yet to be allocated is that between
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, with the exception of the 1934 Treaty of Tail Sector. It is this
frontier which is the subject of this thesis. Table 1.1 shows the total length of boundaries
of the countries of south-west Asia. The Saudi boundary (4,334km) is second in length
only to the total Iranian boundary.
1.2	 Delimitation of the Study Area
The area which is studied in this thesis is the frontier between Saudi Arabia and the
Republic of Yemen, to the east of the 1934 Treaty of Tail boundary (Figure 1.2). The
delimitation of the study area is based on various extreme Saudi, Yemeni, and British
temtorial claims.
Along the former Imamate of Yemen-Saudi Arabia non-Tail Treaty section (Figure
1.2) of the frontier, the study area is delimited by the line shown on the MSD-SAR, 1967
Yemen Arab Republic map (see Section 2.4.1 for more details about this line), which is
the extreme Yemeni claim, and the line shown on the Saudi MPMR-KSA (1983) Arabian
Peninsula map (see Section 2.4.1), which is the extreme Saudi claim in this section. The
area is approximately bounded by 17'30'N and 1530'N latitude, and 4400'E and
46°OO'E longitude (Figure 1.2).
Along the former Aden Protectorate-Saudi Arabia section of the frontier, the study
area is delimited by the 1955 British Declaration line (see Section 2.4.2.6), which is the
extreme British claim, and the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (see Section 2.4.2.7), which is
the extreme Saudi claim in this section. The area is approximately bounded by 1900'N
and 1530'N latitude,and 4600'E and 52°OO'E longitude (Figure 1.2).
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1.3	 Reasons for Choosing the Topic
There were a number of compelling reasons for choosing to study the Saudi-Yemeni
frontier to the east of the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary. Chief among these is the fact that
this boundary dispute remains a serious problem which has seriously damaged relations
between Saudi Arabia and Yemen for decades. The problem therefore urgently needs
resolving, and a geographical study such as this may help towards a peaceful solution by
adopting an approach never attempted before.
Having done a Master's thesis on the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary (see Section 2.3
for more details) and having enjoyed boundary research, one of the most productive areas
of political geography, the author wished to complete his study of the Saudi-Yemem land
boundary.
Academic theses based on geographical field surveys of the Saudi-Yemem frontier
are rare. Indeed, this is the first academic thesis to study the Saudi-Yemeni frontier
beyond the Treaty of Taif boundary.
1.4	 The Aim and Objectives of the Study
The aim of this thesis is to establish whether a 'Logical Boundary' can be identified
between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen along the land frontier east of the 1934
Treaty of Taif boundary. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines 'logical' as 'correctly
reasoned, deducible, defensible on ground of consistency'. If such a boundary can be
found, it ought to provide a sound basis for realistic discussions.
The location of the proposed Logical Boundary was reached by analysis and the
examination of a number of factors which have created the de facto border between the
two states. The 'defacto' concept is explained in international law:
Recognition de-facto implies that there is some doubt as to the long-term viability of
the government in question. Recognition de-jure usually follows where the
recognising state accepts that the effective control displayed by the government is
permanent and firmly rooted and that there are no legal reasons detracting from this,
23
CHAPTER 1
such as constitutional subservience to a foreign power. De-facto recognition
involves a hesitant assessment of the situation, an attitude of wait and see, to be
succeeded by de-jure recognition where the doubts are sufficiently overcome to
extend formal acceptance. (Shaw, 1991: p.254)
Ian Brownlie (1979: p.16) deltnes 'defacto frontiers':
'de facto' frontiers, meaning an alignment not based upon a formal agreement.
The phrase 'de facto' suggests a lack of legal status and a provisional character.
In order to distinguish between the entire frontier zone, and the margin of the area
currently under the authority of a state, the author has used the term de facto border to
describe the latter zone (see Figure 1.4, model of de facto border). The factors which
create the defacto border and which were examined are shown in the Model Framework
of the thesis (Figure 1.3).
In addition to its fundamental aim, this thesis has two supporting objectives.
Firstly, as stated above, the author hopes that by presenting the thesis to the Saudi and
Yemeni Governments, it will assist them towards the peaceful resolution of the boundary
dispute and the creation of a dejure boundary. Secondly, the author would like to create a
model for the study of boundaries similar to the Saudi-Yemeni frontier east of the Taif
Treaty boundary, which could be added to the means available for the resolution of
boundary disputes in the Middle East, North Africa, or elsewhere in the world.
The hypothesis which will be tested in the course of this thesis: the Saudi-Yemeni
defacro border in the study area is located far from the extreme claims of either state and
the Logical Boundary will be largely coincident with the de facto border along the length
of the frontier.
1.5	 Sources of Information and Methodology
Four main sources of information were used in this thesis:
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CHAFfER 1
1.5.1 DOCUMENTS AND FORMAL ARCHIVES
The researcher obtained an excellent (but expensive) collection of documents of relevance
to the Saudi-Yemeni boundary. Richard Schofield (1992) Arabian Boundary
Disputes (20 volumes), Schofield's (1993) Arabian Geopolitics Regional Documentary
Studies: South-West Arabia (six volumes), and the Saudi Foreign Ministry's (1934) The
Saudi Green Book: Relations between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen (see Section 1.8,
previous studies) which cost a total of £9,190. The author decided to buy these
publications as they were not available in the library, and it saved the author considerable
time visiting and searching the British Government archives at the Public Record Office
and the British Library (Oriental and India Office collections), both of which would have
required trips to London. The publications will also be indispensable for future studies of
boundaries in the Arabian Peninsula.
The Schofield and Blake (1988-9 1) and Schofield (1993) publications mentioned
above also used the following sources:
United Nations: documents relating, inter alia, to Saudi Arabia-Yemen, Iran-Iraq
and Iraq-Kuwait USA: Foreign Broadcasts Information Service; USA: State
Department Records at the National Archives; USA: State Department Office of the
Geographer, British Broadcasting Corporation: Summary of World Broadcasts
(Archive Editions, 1993: p.1).
The author found the document collections particularly useful as a source for the original
texts of historical boundary proposals, and other texts relating to his argument. Most of
these documents were used for Chapter 2 on the historical background of the Saudi-
Yemeni boundary (see Chapter 2 for more details). The methods used to examine the
documents were historical, comparative, and analytic.
1.5.2 SATELLITE IMAGES AND MAPS
The main reason for using satellite images was to clarify which geographical features lie
on the defacto border and the Logical Boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
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The satellite images used in this thesis were collected during the fieldwork period (1
June - 23 December 1994). The author explained the requirement for satellite images to
staff at the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) who deal with
remote sensing. The staff suggested that the author should use American Landsat images
at a scale of 1:1,000,000, each 10"xlO" print covering an area of approximately 180km2.
The author also requested imagery from the French SPOT satellite, as it is available at a
larger scale and shows more detail:
From the point of view of international boundaries applications, the most suitable
images are those obtained by the French satellite SPOT. (Adler, 1995: p40)
However, the author was told that SPOT images were not available and that it would take
more than a year to collect the images necessary to cover the study area.
Having determined which sort of imagery to use, it was calculated that 16 images
would be required to cover the study area. Two months later the author had received only
four images, and these he returned to KACST for marking up with lines of longitude and
latitude as these would be essential for defining the correct location of the de facto border
and Logical Boundary. Many attempts to acquire the images failed as a result of the
weather, but the author finally received all the images a week before he returned to Britain
on 23 December 1994.
Before they could be used in the thesis, the images were carefully assembled to
form a mosaic covering the study area, and the mosaic was reduced by 50% (to a scale of
1:2,000,000) so that it was a more convenient size to be reproduced on A3 and A4 paper.
The purpose of using maps was to show the location of relief, geology, towns and
villages, roads and tracks, territorial claims, and hydrocarbon activities on the frontier.
The author acquired an excellent collection of maps produced in Saudi Arabia, the
Republic of Yemen, Britain, the United States, and Switzerland:
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Saudi Maps
Bundagi, H. (1984) Geographical Map of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Scale
1:2,250,000
Military Survey Department [MSD-KSAI (1982) Al-Yemen. Scale 1:1,000,000
MSD-KSA (1984) Najran and Sharurah. Scale 1:500,000
MSD-KSA (1992) Republic of Yemen. Scale 1:1,000,000
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources [MPMR-KSA] (1983) Arabian Peninsula.
Scale 1:2,000,000
MPMR-KSA (1985) Jizan, Chart No. NE 38-SW. Scale l:500,000
MPMR-KSA (1990a) Tracing on MPMR-KSA (1983) Arabian Peninsula. Scale
1:2,000,000
MPMR-KSA (1990b) Tracing on British Survey (1927) Jaza'ir Farasan; Red Sea; Saudi
Arabia. Scale 1:200,000
Yemeni Maps
Al-Dhamari (no date) Yemeni Arab Republic. Scale 1:300,000
Al-Dhamari (no date) Yemeni Relief Map. Scale 1:250,000
General Tourism Corporation (1980) Tourism Map of the Yemen Arab Republic. Scale
1:1,000,000
Military Survey Department, Syrian Arab Republic [MSD-SAR] (1967) Yemen Arab
Republic. Scale 1:500,000
American Maps
US Geological Survey (1963a) [GMSCROJ Geologic Map of the South Central Rub Al-
Khali Quadrangle of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Scale 1:500,000
US Geological Survey (1963b) [GMSEROJ Geologic Map of the Southeastern Rub Al-
KhaIi Quadrangle of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Scale 1:500,000
US Geological Survey (1 963c) [GMWRQ] Geologic Map of the Western Rub Al-Khali
Quadrangle of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Scale 1:500,000
US Geological Survey (1979) [GMAOJ Geologic Map of the Asir Quadrangle of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Scale 1:500,000
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British Maps
British Survey (1927) Jaza'ir Farasan; Red Sea; Saudi Arabia. Scale 1:200,000
Director of Military Survey (1971) Joint Operations Graphic - Ground Chart No.
NE 38-10. Scale 1:250,000
Director of Military Survey (1971) Joint Operations Graphic - Ground Chart No.
NE 38-13. Scale 1:250,000
Swiss Map
Foreign Scouting Service Petroleum Activity [FSSPAI] (1994) Yemen. Scale 1: 1,000,000
For more details about maps see the Bibliography, Maps section.
1.5.3 BOOKS, THESES, JOURNALS, AND NEWSPAPERS
There was material available to the author in all of the above media (see Section 1.8,.
Previous Studies), and the author has quoted many of these sources in this thesis. The
sources used are both in Arabic and English, and have been collected from Saudi Arabia,
the Republic of Yemen, Britain, and the Egyptian Arab Republic.
1.5.4 TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES
Transliteration of Arabic authors' names was one of the problems faced. The spelling, for
example, of Abu-Dawood, Al-Muwaled, and Al-Saab could not be changed as that was
the form in which they were represented in the library computer, and thus featured in
this way in the library bibliography. Consequently, authors' names have been accepted
unchanged.A second problem arose from the interpretation of vowel sounds,
particularly for tribal and place names. For example, A1-Sayar, Sei'ar, Sa'r, and Saar
are all spellings used to identify one tribe; the problem arises from the different vowel
sounds in use in different parts of the Arabian peninsula. The same variety occurs with
place names. In this thesis the transliterations printed on the MSD-KSA (1992) Republic
of Yemen map has been used both for tribes and places, on the basis that those most
closely approximate to those used locally - though the map itself gives no indication of
the actual transliteration system which it is following.
For the tribal genealogical trees the system recommended by Niblock and Dick i'ns
(1994, see Appendix 5) of the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies in the
University of Durham has been used, with a few minor modifications; Dr. Dickins
was kind enough to check the text and has approved of the format here.
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1.5.5	 FIELDWORK
The aim of this thesis, the proposal of a Logical Boundary, would have been impossible
without fieldwork to determine the location of the de facto border between Saudi Arabia
and Yemen.
The fieldwork carried out for this thesis had four objectives:
I	 identifying and delimiting the defacto border;
2	 interviews with samples of people crossing the frontier at checkpoints;
3	 interviews with a number of key informants;
4	 the opportunity for the author to make direct observation and take photographs.
It is important to mention that all the fieldwork took place on the Saudi side of the
frontier. This is because the author thought it highly unlikely that the Yemeni Government
would give him permission to carry out research of this sort on the Yemeni side, and in
any case, such a venture would be hazardous. In order to redress the balance of
information to some extent, the author compared the location of the de facto border as
shown on the MPMR-KSA (1990a) Arabian Peninsula Tracing map with a sketch map
drawn up using information from key Yemeni informants who were interviewed on the
Saudi side of the frontier.
In June 1994 the author was granted the necessary permission from the Saudi
Ministries and the relevant local government administrators to carry out fieldwork. The
field survey took place between 1 July and 10 December 1994 (see the following Section
1.6 for more details). Because of the importance of the fieldwork to this thesis the
author's methods are given in detail in the following section.
1.6	 Fieldwork Methods
The methods used to achieve the four objectives of the fieldwork mentioned in Section
1.5.4, above will be detailed in the following sections:
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1.6.1	 RECOGNISING AND DELIMITING THE DE FACTO BORDER
The recognition and delimitation of the de facto border (see Section 1.4 for a definition)
was done by the author between 1 July and 10 December 1994 whilst travelling between
the checkpoints to interview samples of people crossing the frontier and key informants.
The delimitation of the defacto border was completed in four stages. On the Saudi side of
the frontier, the border guard posts were visited and then located on a map using the
names of the posts and locations marked with the same names on the MSD-KSA (1992)
Republic of Yemen map. The de facto border was then delimited by drawing lines from
one border guard post to the next (see the de facto border sections in Chapters 3, 4, and
5). The final stage was to compare this line with the MPMR-KSA (1990a) Arabian
Peninsula Tracing map to see if there were any differences.
On the Yemeni side of the frontier, the defacto border was delimited using the same
stages as were used for the Saudi side, with the exception of visiting guard posts. Instead
of visiting the Yemeni Border Guard, the author asked key informants about the location
of the Yemeni guard posts (see the e facto border sections in Chapters 3, 4, and 5).
Within the defacto border area the author also approximately delimited the no man's
land area (see the de facto border sections in Chapters 3, 4, and 5). This is the area
between the Saudi and Yemeni de facto borders which is clearly not under the control of
either country. No man's land areas are described by Prescott (1987: p.60):
The presence of no-man's-land between states facilitated escape by individuals from
financial and juridicial responsibilities, and sometimes such areas became refuges
for brigands. Counthes often acted quickly to eliminate such inconvenient areas.
The no man's land area is bounded by the Saudi and Yemeni de facto borders (see model
of the de facto border, Figure 1.4), and its identification was the author's final task
regarding the delimitation of the defacto border.
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1.6.2	 CHECKPOINT SAMPLE INTERVIEWS
The ultimate aim of this research is to propose a Logical Boundary. The location of this
line is affected by a number of issues, including social factors and the behaviour of the
population on the frontier, as the framework model (Figure 1.3) shows. There were three
objectives to the interviews with samples of individuals crossing the frontier at the
checkpoints:
1 To ascertain the degree of interaction across the frontier of the local population with
respect to visits to relatives, properties, markets, and grazing and wells (if any
exist).
2	 To assess various aspects of the behaviour of the local population towards the
frontier, such as perceptions of the frontier including the features regarded as
indicating its location and changes in it, and the level of satisfaction with the
location of the defacto border. Where possible, the author attempted to incorporate
into the proposed Logical Boundary those features perceived by the frontier tribes
as indicating the frontier.
3 To discover the status of the checkpoints and the function which they perform with
regard to those using them as crossing points. Also, to determine the effect which
the checkpoints currently have on cross-frontier interaction, and might have on the
location of the proposed Logical Boundary.
The following sections will detail the methods of sampling and interview.
1.6.2.1	 The Sampling Design
The study area is the frontier between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen beyond
the 1934 Treaty of Taif Sector (see Section 1.2). As has been mentioned in Section 1.5.4,
the author could not carry out fieldwork on the Yemeni side of the frontier for political
reasons. All fieldwork was therefore carried out on the Saudi side of the frontier.
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On the Saudi side of the study area there is one formal checkpoint at Al-Khadra in
the Western Study Sector (Figure 1.5(A)), where the author was able to meet people
living on both the Saudi and Yemeru sides of the frontier. The other checkpoint on the
Saudi side is the informal checkpoint at Al-Kharkhir in the Eastern Study Sector (Figure
1.5(A)), also visited by the author.
Formal international boundary crossing points typically have representatives of
Customs, Immigration, and the Border Guard, as well as health officials. There are also,
almost always, corresponding facilities on the opposite side of the frontier. Informal
checkpoints, on the other hand, may have none of the above officials except the Border
Guard, and there are usually no corresponding checkpoints.
Table 1.2 Sample sizes for A1-Kharkhir and A1-Khadra checkpoint interviews
t's
Nationality	 Al-Khadra Checkpoint 	 Al-Kharkhir Checkpoint
No. Crossing	 Sample Size	 No. Crossing	 Sample Size
Oct-Dec 1993	 Jul-Sep 1993
Saudi	 6,185	 361	 800	 260
Yemeni	 5,679	 357	 150	 108
UAE	 80	 66	 100	 80
Qatan	 50	 44	 60	 50
TGFAL	 11,994	 828	 1,100	 498
Source: Author's Field Survey, July-Dec 1994. Al-Khadra data quoted from the Immigration registers and
the A1-Kharkhir data estimated by the Saudi Border Guard at A1-Kharkhir checkpoint
Sample sizes derived from TabLe 1.3.
As A1-Khadra formal checkpoint and A1-Kharkhir informal checkpoint were the only two
checkpoints on the Saudi side of the frontier in the study area, the author had no
alternative locations to interview people crossing the frontier.
Table 1.2 shows the number of people crossing the frontier at Al-Kharkhir
checkpoint during July, August, and September 1993, and at Al-Khadra checkpoint
during October, November, and December 1993. It was during these same periods in
1994 that the author carried out the checkpoint sample interviews.
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Table 1.3 Determining the size of a random sample
	
N	 S	 N	 S	 N	 S
	
10	 10	 220	 140	 1200	 291
	
15	 14	 230	 144	 1300	 297
	
20	 19	 240	 148	 1400	 302
	
25	 24	 250	 152	 1500	 306
	
30	 28	 260	 155	 1600	 310
	
35	 32	 270	 159	 1700	 313
	
40	 36	 280	 162	 1800	 317
	
45	 40	 290	 165	 1900	 320
	
50	 44	 300	 169	 2000	 322
	
55	 48	 320	 175	 2200	 327
	
60	 50	 340	 181	 2400	 331
	
65	 56	 360	 186	 2600	 335
	
70	 59	 380	 191	 2800	 338
	
75	 63	 400	 1%	 3000	 341
	
80	 66	 420	 201	 3500	 346
	
85	 70	 440	 205	 4000	 351
	
90	 73	 460	 210	 4500	 354
	
95	 76	 480	 214	 5000	 357
	
100	 80	 500	 217	 6000	 361
	110	 86	 550	 226	 7000	 364
	
120	 92	 600	 234	 8000	 367
	
130	 97	 650	 242	 9000	 368
	
140	 103	 700	 248	 10000	 370
	
150	 108	 750	 254	 15000	 375
	
160	 113	 800	 260	 20000	 377
	
170	 118	 850	 265	 30000	 379
	
180	 123	 900	 269	 40000	 380
	
190	 127	 950	 274	 50000	 381
	
200	 132	 1000	 278	 75000	 382
	
210	 136	 1100	 285	 100000	 384
N is population size and S is sample sample size.
Figures extracted to determine size of checkpoint interview samples (Table 1.2), shown in buld.
Source: Krejcie and Morgan (1970: pp.607-10)
The sample sizes in Table 1.2 are derived from Table 1.3 which determines the
scientifically acceptable size of a random sample from the population size:
The size of a probability (random) sample can be determined in two ways, ... or by
using a table which, from a mathematical formula, suggests the appropriate size of a
random sample for a given number of the wider population. One such example is
provided by Krejcie and Morgan (1970). (Morrison, 1993: pp.1 16-17)
The data given in Table 1.2 for people crossing the frontier includes both departures and
arrivals. The Immigration Office confirmed that the number of people departing was the
same as the number of people arriving, in other words those arriving from Yemen would
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depart within a few days and vice versa In addition, the principle reason for crossing the
frontier remains the same whether those crossing are arriving or departing from Saudi
Arabia, and this was the matter of most concern to the author..
The data in Table 1.2 includes men, women, and children. However, the author did
not interview any women as it would have been unacceptable for him to speak with them
for cultural and religious reasons, and in any event, for the same reasons women never
travel alone in Saudi Arabia Children were not interviewed for practical reasons.
1.6.2.2	 Structured interview
In locations such as the Saudi-Yemeni frontier checkpoints where it is expected that many
of those crossing the frontier cannot read or write, the only suitable method for collecting
data is a face to face structured interview. In fact, this type of data collection has several
advantages:
face-to-face forms of data collection ... offer the opportunity for the evaluator to
gather data in detail and in depth, they build in the attraction of the respondents
putting a human face on to what might otherwise be an impersonal activity
(Morrison, 1993: p.62).
A structured interview requires that every question is worked out in advance and the
wording and sequence of the question is the same for all the respondents.
The structured interview compiled by the author (Appendix 6) contained four parts.
Part One (Questions 1 to 10) concerned the reasons for choosing the checkpoint, the
distance and time taken to travel between the checkpoint and residence, the route and
method of transport taken to the checkpoint, and the attitude towards the length of time
spent waiting at the checkpoint, and the adequacy of the waiting places provided.
Part Two (Questions 11 to 13) and Part Three (Questions 14 to 32) concerned
personal information about the respondent, such as his job, education, and income, and
the respondent's activities across the frontier with respect to relatives, properties,
markets, and grazing and wells.
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Part Four (Questions 33 to 37) was concerned with behavioural aspects: physical
features which the respondent perceived as indicating the frontier, the level of satisfaction
with the defacto border, and perceptions of change of the location of the frontier.
Most of the questions in the interview were deliberately structured so as to be open
ended, as this was more appropriate and interesting for purposes of this study:
if it is more fitting that a rich description be presented in the respondents own terms,
then devising the instruments will consist of outlining areas of interest to the
evaluator and a series of points noted - a schedule of open-ended questions or
observations. (Morrison, 1993: p.64)
The author ran a series of pilot interviews before beginning the real study, and as a result
one question was added to the interview and another cancelled.
1.6.2.3	 interview Procedures
Once the author had obtained permission to cany out the interviews he travelled to both
checkpoints. The author stayed at Al-Kharkhir informal checkpoint between 1 July and 10
September 1994 and at Al-Khadm checkpoint between 1 October and 10 December 1994,
a total of 70 days at each checkpoint
The author began the interviews at Al-Kharkhir, the more difficult checkpoint, both
in terms of accessibility and the informal status of the checkpoint. The journey to Al-
Kharkhir from the town of Sharurah (Figure 5.12(A)) was approximately 500km and
took 12 hours of travelling with an experienced desert driver along a sandy track and over•
dunes.
The interviews at both checkpoints were carried out at the checkpoint itself between
the hours of 9.00am to 12 noon and again in the afternoons between 2.00pm and
4.00pm, after which time no one is allowed to cross the frontier until 9.00am the
following morning. During the evenings the author met and interviewed key informants
(see Section 1.6.3 on interviews with key people).
At A1-Kharkhir informal checkpoint conditions for interviewing were very difficult
indeed. The number of people crossing the frontier was very irregular with, for example,
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10 people crossing one day and three people crossing the next. Furthermore, the estimate
of the numbers of people crossing the frontier during the July-September 1993 period,
upon which the sample sizes were based (Table 1.2), were exaggerated. There was
therefore no opportunity to apply the random sample accurately, as there was at Al-.
Khadra checkpoint. The author therefore interviewed every man passing through the
checkpoint who had not been previously interviewed. No respondent was interviewed
more than once during the field survey at either Al-Khadra or Al-Kharkhir checkpoints,
regardless of the number of times they crossed the frontier during that period.
At Al-Khadra checkpoint the situation was easier. The interviews were conducted in
the Immigration Office. Once an interviewee had been selected, between three and five
people might pass through Immigration without being interviewed, and the author would
then choose the next person in the Immigration queue.
During the first week each interview lasted an average of 30 minutes. Once the
author became familiar with the respondents' tribes and the names of the places in which
most of them lived, the interviews were completed in an average of 10 to 15 minutes. At
the start of the fieldwork at A1-Khadra checkpoint, 10 people were being interviewed
during the five hours a day previously mentioned. After a fortnight this had risen to
between 15 and 20 people a day.
No other interviewers assisted the author in this task. This was because the author
believed that the questions were sufficiently sensitive that he felt unable to entrust the task
to anyone else, even if an assistant could be found. The interviews required experience,
humour, and perception. On many occasions the author observed that respondents were
nervous, but he tried to put people at their ease by conducting the interview in an informal
and friendly way with the interviewee being given a comfortable scat and offered tea,
water, and cigarettes.
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1.6.2.4	 Treatment of the Data
Once the structured interviews were completed the author returned to England on 23
December 1994. The first stage of data treatment was to code the respondents' responses
numerically to prepare them for statistical processing. This stage took the author three
months, from January to March 1995. A total of 1,326 interviews had been carried out
and all of the responses from these interviews were coded onto greensheet forms. This
was the most difficult stage of the data treatment requiring patience, concentration, and
accuracy.
The second stage involved the selection of a suitable statistical package. The
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was chosen and the author was trained
in its use by the Computer Centre at the University of Durham. Two weeks were then
spent correcting the coded data before the frequency data showed without entry errors.
The author had problems with the command which 'split' and 'sort' the frequency data
such as nationalities (Saudi, Yemeni, UAE, and Qatari) between the two checkpoints (Al-
Khadra and Al-Kharkhir).
The third stage was to select appropriate statistical tests which would enable the
author to interpret the data.
The data which was being processed in this research was a mixture of nominal and
ordinal data:
A nominal scale is the most elementary scale, giving categories a name or label.
An ordinal scale can be used when we are able to put items in rank order or where
we can say that one person or some people display a characteristic greater than or
lesser than another person. (Morrison, 1993: p.130).
Where there is a mixture of nominal and ordinal data, statistics references recommend the
use of non-parametric statistics:
if data are inherently in ranks, or even if they can only be categorised as plus or
minus (more of less, better or worse) they can be treated by non-parametric
methods, whereas they can not be treated by parametric methods unless precarious
and perhaps unrealistic assumptions are made about the underlying distributions.
(Siegel, 1956: p.13)
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Keith Morrison (1993: p.130) also mentions that the non-parametric method is frequently
used for nominal and ordinal scales.
The statistical test which was chosen had therefore to be non-parametric, suitable
for use with nominal and ordinal data, and suitable for use with four independent
samples: Saudi, Yemeni, UAE, and Qatari.
The aim of using a statistical test was to see if there were any significant differences
between the four nationalities regarding the main aim for crossing the frontier (visits to
relatives, properties, markets, grazing and wells).
There are very few statistical tests which are capable of achieving the aim set out
above with the type of data which had been collected. The test which was finally selected
was the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of vanance:
The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance (the non-parametric equivalent of
the parametric analysis of variance) enables the evaluator to see if there are any
statistically significant differences between two or more independent samples.
the Kruskal-WaUis statistic has to be taken in conjunction with the frequencies to
provide the detail about the significance of the frequencies. (Morrison, 1993: p.141)
Frequency tables were used to present the percentage distributions of respondents by
nationality in relation to personal information, behavioural factors, and administrative
factors at the checkpoint (see the framework model, Figure. 1.3, for a complete list of
variables). Cross-tabulations were used to present the percentage distributions of
respondents at each checkpoint in relation to the numbers of people crossing the frontier,
and were also used to show any relationship between variables.
In nearly all cases where differences exist, the difference is clear from the data
without the application of a statistical test. The author has therefore only used the Kruscal-
Wallis test in a small number of examples in Chapter 5 to demonstrate the application of
statistics to the data.
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1.6.3	 INTERVIEWS WITH KEY PEOPLE
In the evenings during the checkpoint interview period (see Section 1.6.2.3, Interview
Procedures) and between 20 and 30 September 1994 the author completed a schedule of
interviews with key informants. These interviews were carried out in a different way to
the checkpoint interviews:
Alternatively, a semi-structured interview may be more open ... wherein the
evaluator has a checklist schedule of points or topics to be covered, but does not
adhere to the exact, same wording or sequence for each respondent but tailors the
questions and their order to individual respondents who can answer in their own
words and follow up their own comments in their own ways. (Morrison, 1993:
p.66)
The aim of conducting interviews with the tribal sheikhs was to discover more
information about the frontier tribes including the location of the tribal boundary, the
tribe's loyalty, the genealogy of the tribe, and the location of Yemeni Border Guard posts
in the area. Twenty tribal sheikhs from the study area were interviewed by the author
using a checklist of points to be covered which was drawn up prior to the interview.
Delimiting the tribal boundaries in the study area was completed in four stages
(Figures 3.14(A), 4.8(A), and 5.15(A)). Firstly, during the interviews the tribal sheikhs
were asked to describe their tribal territory and boundary using the names of towns and
villages and other geographical features which the author noted down. This information
was then transferred onto the MSD-KSA (1992) Republic of Yemen map. The map with
the tribal boundaries marked onto it was then shown to the sheikhs, and their comments
recorded. Finally, the areas of apparent overlapping tribal claims were marked on the map
(see Figures 3.14(A), 4.8(A), and 5.15(A)).
The genealogical trees of the thbes, as described to the author by the sheikhs (see
Appendix 2), were transliterated into English using the Niblock and Dickens system (see
Appendix 5).
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As one moves away from an interview schedule the interview takes on a
conversational style:
an interview which is completely informal, where the agenda of items for the
interview are not fixed and where there is the minimum of control or direction from
the evaluator. (Morrison, 1993: p.67)
This was the type of interview which was used with 15 checkpoint officials working both
at the checkpoints themselves and in the town of Sharurah. The objective of these
interviews was to pick up any useful information relating to the study area.
1.6.4	 DIRECT OBSERVATION AND PHOTOGRAPHS
The author's direct observation was extremely useful to the research, especially during the
survey of the defacto bordec
Observational data are very attractive as they afford the evaluator the chance to
gather 'live' data from 'live' situations. (Morrison, 1993: p.'79)
The author used a diary and field notes to write up his observations during the fieldwork
phase. The author's field observations have been used throughout the thesis where
appropriate. Photographic evidence has also been used by the author in a number of
cases.
1.7	 Research Problems
The author faced many problems relating to the subject in general and the fieldwork in
particular, the most important of which are summarized below.
The dramatic improvement of Saudi-Yemeni relations with regard to the boundary
issue during the study period (October 1993 to the time of writing in 1996) has put the
author under considerable time pressure. This is because the author believes that if this
thesis can be presented to the Saudi and Yemem Governments before they reach an
agreement, there will be significant advantages for both countries.
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During the fieldwork the author's personal safety was at risk on a number of
occasions. During the survey of the defacto border the author lost his way in the desert,
despite the fact that he was travelling with experienced guides. There was also a constant
risk of kidnap and attack by smugglers.
Travel to the Eastern Study Sector and through it was extremely difficult (see
Section 5.3.2.3). Only one type of vehicle (Toyota four-wheel drive) is able to make the
journey to Al-Kharkhir informal checkpoint.
The amount of information which exists about the study area is very limited, and as
with most frontier regions there is an environment of secrecy and suspicion. There are no
known geographical studies of the study area based on fieldwork, and even general
studies of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier are scarce.
1.8	 Previous Studies
Although a considerable contribution has already been made to boundary studies in
English literature, even in this language there is still a need for further case studies. A
great amount of work has been carried out on boundary studies in Europe and the
Americas, but only a limited amount on the boundaries of Asia and Africa. In this section
the author will attempt to review the important references to boundaries that have been
written during the 20th century.
1.8.1	 BOUNDARY STUDIES IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY
In 1897 Ratzel wrote a study on the concept of boundaries, proposing a view of the state
as a living organism and the boundary as the skin of the living state. Before World War I
there were several contributions to the subject from Russell (1903), Curzon (1907), and
Geddes (1908).
Between the wars the main interest was categorizing boundaries into 'good' and
'bad' from a military point of view. A majority of the writers were German: Siege (1925),
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Vogel (1926), Haushofer (1927), Maul! (1928), and Durach (1930) (all cited in Hijazi,
1980: pp. 139-99).
Later, after World War II, literature was produced to study boundaries from the
point of view of their classification, terminology, function, and their definition, among
them Boggs (1940), Norman (1963) Douglas (1964), Kasperson and Minghi (1969),
Saul (1975), and Prescott (1987).
Minghi in his paper 'Boundary studies in political geography' (1963) distinguished
eight types of boundary study, a categorisation which still provides a helpful guide to
boundary scholars. His eight categories were:
-	 Studies of disputed areas
-	 Studies of the effect of boundary changes
-	 Studies of the evolution of boundary changes
-	 Studies of boundary delimitation and demarcation
-	 Studies of enclaves and tiny states
-	 Studies of offshore boundaries
-	 Studies of boundaries in dispute over natural resources
-	 Studies of internal boundaries.
Minghi did not mention social aspects such as studies of population movement and
boundary crossings by people who live on frontiers.
In recent years many studies have been done on the subject of boundaries. Most
notable is Brownlie's great work African Boundaries: a Legal and Diplomatic
Encyclopedia (1979). It is the definitive reference for legal and diplomatic boundary
questions for the entire continent. The distinguishing feature of other recent studies has
been the identification of disputed boundaries and their study in a geopolitical context.
Such studies include Allcock et al. (1992), Glassner (1993), Burdett (1995),
Swietochowski (1995), and Anderson (1995). There have also been a number of books
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on maritime boundaries such as Blake (1987), Charney (1993), Brown (1994), Blake et
a! (1995), and Forbes (1995).
There are also a number of articles which have considered world boundaries.
Hartshorne (1938) considered the significance of sociological, economic, and political
boundaries, and that geographers ought to be able to contribute to their understanding,
particularly where there are problems concerning determination and demarcation.
Hartshorne makes a number of crucial points, including the fact that there is no difference
between artificial and natural boundaries as all are decided by people. Hartshorne also
points out that as there is always the possibility, without exception, of a boundary dispute
occurring at some time between neighbouring states because of the changeable nature of
states and their relationships, disputes are therefore relatively frequent and risky
occurrences.
Many academic journals have also been published on various aspects of boundary
and frontier studies, including:
-	 Boundary and Security Bulletin (International Boundaries Research Unit)
-	 Contemporary Strategic Issues in the Arab Gulf
-	 Geographical Review
-	 Middle East Business (MEED)
-	 Middle East Economic Survey (MEES)
-	 Middle Eastern Studies
-	 Political Geography Quarterly
-	 Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC SWB)
1.8.2	 BOUNDARY STUDY THESES
Relatively few theses have been written on boundaries. For example, the author obtained
a list of post-graduate theses written between 1957 and 1991 held in the geography
section of Durham University library. Of a total of 355 geographical theses, only five
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were on land boundaries and one on maritime boundaries. This ratio is, of course, only
an example of the work of British universities. Even amongst researchers Interested in
political geography, the subject of boundaries is not a popular one, especially where the
boundary is in dispute. One of the reasons for this is that many states, and especially
those in the Middle East are unwilling to give information about their boundaries for
political reasons.
1.8.2.1	 Theses Concerning Saudi Arabia's Land Boundaries
Of the theses concerning land boundaries which have been written in English and Arabic,
a number relate to the land boundaries of Saudi Arabia. Asadallah's (1971) Land and
Maritime Boundaries of North and North Eastern Saudi Arabia is a study in political
geography. No questionnaire survey of the northern frontier tribes was used in the course
of this research, and as a result his thesis is more one of general geography rather than a
true boundary study. Four years later Saleh (1975) considered The Emergence of Saudi
Arabian Administrative Areas, using historical analysis as the basis for his study. This
was the first thesis to study the administrative boundaries of Saudi Arabia. Abu-
Dawood's (1984) political geography thesis, The Political Boundaries of Saudi Arabia;
Their Evolution and Functions, deals with the historical development of Saudi Arabia's
boundaries, their functions, and the movement of people across them. Abu-Dawood
interviewed samples of people crossing all of Saudi Arabia's boundaries to examine the
boundary functions, and he used statistical methods to analyse his results. There is also a
historical thesis by Al-Shamlan (1987), The Evolution of National Boundaries in the
Southeastern Arabian Peninsula; 1 934-1 955. This study gives a comprehensive
background to proposed boundary lines in the Arabian peninsula. In addition to the
above, a number of other theses mention Saudi Arabia's land boundaries in the course of
looking at other issues. These include Brian's (197!) thesis, The Saudi-Yemeni War,
1934, and a number of theses written in Arabic, including those by Mashary (1981),
Hamadi (1981), Al-Khatrash (1983), Al-Hisamy (1983), and Al-Asiry (1988). All these
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political science theses considered the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
These studies of the boundary were based on political activity between Saudi Arabia and
Yemen using historical methods. Most recently, the author (Al-Ghamdi, 199!) studied
The Saudi-Yemeni boundary according to the 1934 Treaty of Tajf for his Master's thesis
(see Section 2.3 for more details).
1.8.2.2	 Theses Concerning Saudi Arabia's Maritime Boundaries
In addition to Asadallah's (1971) Land and Maritime Boundaries of North and North
Eastern Saudi Arabia mentioned above, Al-Muwaled completed his thesis, Maritime
Boundary Delimitation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: A Study in Political Geography
in 1993. It is therefore an up to date study including the Saudi Arabia-Yemen maritime
boundary in the Red Sea. Al-Muwaled used historical and descriptive methods to study
the current situation of the maritime boundary and he recommended new comprehensive
Saudi legislation to deal with the delimitation of Saudi's territorial waters, including the
use of straight baselines and the creation of a Saudi exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The
most recent thesis on Saudi Arabia's maritime boundaries is Al-Saab's (1995) Integrated
Marine Policy on Management: A Case Study of Problems and Prospects in the Saudi
Southern Red Sea in the Context of New Concepts to Saudi Arabia.
1.8.3	 BOOKS CONCERNING THE SAUDI-YEMEN! BOUNDARY
In addition to the theses mentioned above, there are a number of books, articles, and
documents which deal with the Saudi-Yemeni boundary. The majority of these studies
focus on historical background using the descriptive method. The author will only
mention the books here as the articles are covered in Section 1.8.4 below.
An important source is the Saudi Green Book, also known as Relations Between
Saudi Arabia and theYemen, issued by the Saudi Foreign Ministry (1934). It contains 116
documents relating to meetings, negotiations, communications, and border incidents
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(unpublished).
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1:500,000. Syria, Damascus (unpublished).
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The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary:
Historical Background
2.1 Introduction
From earliest times the geographical area which is now the Yemen has been a
distinct cultural area and separate civilisation. The vigorous state of Sheba (Saba)
is referred to both in the Bible and the Koran. Still standing are the remains of the
remarkable irrigation system based on the huge dam at Ma'rib. A distinct Yemeni
identity has its roots in the ancient division of the Arabs who lived in the peninsula
into descendants of the 'Adnan and Qahtan tribes. This distinguishes the people
of the area from their neighbours. The separation of the area into North and South
Yemen stems from the imperial policies of the British and Ottoman administrations
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, even though the area was rarely
wholly under one single administration for any length of time. (Gause, 1990 p1)
However, the development of the area which is now Saudia was quite different.
The first Saudi state was not established until 1745, that being the first occasion
when the family of Saud emerged into a position of political dominance; before
that the centre of the Arabian peninsula was patchily populated by various
frequently warring tribes. The first Saudi state lasted until 1818; a second,
established in 1840, lasted until 1891. The third, modern, state was established by
'Abdul 'Aziz (ibn Saud) in 1902 and continues to the present. (Al-Qabaa 1992 pp.42-5l)
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Yemen can therefore be seen as a classic example of a state with its identity based
round a concept of tethtoiy, whilst Saudi Arabia has developed a strong sense of
nationality linked to the Islamic cultural traditions fostered by the family of Saud.
Their very different political histories may reasonably be held to account for
differing viewpoints on the boundary issue, and give rise to alternative ideological
approaches. The important historical background is therefore studied in Chapter 2.
The first attempt to delimit a section of the present boundary between Saudi Arabia
and Yemen was the 1934 Treaty of TaiL This treaty was the third in a series which
established most of the boundaries of Saudi Arabia, as Table 2.1 shows. The
boundaries total 4,334km in length and separate the state from its seven neighbours:
Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1(A)).
Most of the treaties were signed by Britain, or under British supervision:
In the south (of the Middle East) most of the bilateral boundaries were
negotiated between external powers or by one external and one indigenous
authority. Only short sections of the boundary have been delimited through
bilateral negotiations between two indigenous parties and, with the exception
of the boundary between Yemen (Sana?a) and Saudi Arabia, they were all
settled after World War 11. (Prescott, 1987: p.269)
The Saudi boundaries with Kuwait and Iraq were negotiated and signed in 1922
under British supervision, followed by the boundary with Jordan which was signed
by Britain in 1925. The boundaries with Qatar (agreed 1965), the UAE (agreed 1974),
and Oman (agreed 1990) were signed by the countries themselves. In the case of the
UAE and Oman boundaries, the agreements were signed after the end of the period
of British supervision (1798-197 1) (MFA-KSA, 1977a: pp. 1-8 and 1977b:
pp.467-9; Harnzah, 1934: pp.367-400 and 1936: p.27; Al-Mangor, 1988: pp.22-37;
Al-Ashal, 1978: 1-50).
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CHAPTER 2
Table 2.1 also includes the 1990 treaty between Yemen and Oman which confirmed
as the boundary an administrative Line which was originally established by the British and
agreed between the Sultan of Oman and the Aden Protectorate (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20,
p.753; Wilkinson, 1991: p.34.5). The only treaty negotiated and signed by the countries
concerned on their own behalf was the 1934 Treaty of Taif between Saudi Arabia and the
former Imamate of Yemen (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1(A)).
The Saudi-Yemeni frontier is approximately 1,240km in length. For the purposes of
historical study in this thesis, the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier will be divided into three
parts; firstly, the land boundary delimited by the 1934 Treaty of Taif, secondly, the land
frontier not delimited by the Taif Treaty, and thirdly, the maritime boundary.
The boundary created by the 1934 Treaty of Taif is 293.6km in length (Figure
2.2(A)), beginning at the Red Sea shore at Duwayyimah Island and running inland to
Jabal Al-Thar in the Najran area (Figure 2.2(A)) (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, pp.648-70).
To the east of the Treaty of Taif boundary lies the remainder of the Saudi-Yemeni
frontier which was not delimited by the Treaty of Taif, and which is the main focus of this
thesis. It may be further divided into two sections for the purposes of historical study.
The first section, which is mentioned in the Treaty of Taif, is 246.4km length (Figure
2.2(A)) and begins at Jabal Al-Thar in the Najran area from where it runs south-east until
it meets the former North Yemen-South Yemen-Saudi Arabia tnpoint at Radm Al-Amir
(Figure 2.2(A)). The second section covers the frontier which was created by Saudi and
British claims (Figure 2.2(A)) and which begins at Radm Al-Amir and runs
approximately 700km east until it meets the Oman boundary.
The Saudi-Yemeni maritime boundary was not mentioned in the 1934 Treaty of Taif
and has yet to be delimited. However, both countries lay claim to a number of islands that
lie off their coasts.
The 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary, the frontier created by Saudi and British claims,
and the maritime boundary will all be examined in this chapter from a historical
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perspective as an introduction to this thesis which then goes on to focus on that part
of the land frontier not delimited by the 1934 Treaty of Taif.
2.2	 Before the 1934 Treaty of Taif
The first contact between the rulers of Nejd and 'Asir was in 192 1-2 when the Sultan of
Nejd, King Abdul'Aziz, signed a treaty with the Imam of 'Asir, Muhammad Ibn All Ibn
Idrisi. The treaty had two goals; firstly King Abdul'Aziz needed to win Al-Idrisi's loyalty
and his collaboration on defence from any enemies; secondly it established a frontier
between the territories of the two rulers based on tribal frontiers (A1-Khatrash, 1983:
pp.45-6; Al-S aid, 1989: p.56; Al-ZaIIah, 1991: p.73). The tribes concerned are
mentioned by name in the treaty:
So the tribes of all Yam, Wada'a and those which belong to them of Bern Jama'a,
Sahar, Sharif, Qahtan, Rufeyda and Ubeyda, including Bern Bishr, Bern Talq,
Shahran, Bern Shehr, Ghamid, 'Asir Ghamid, and all "Qadha" (province) of
Mahayel including Bern Thu'a people of Bareq and Tarqash, people of Ar-Rish and
others who belong to them and all the tribes of Hall mentioned are all under the
Imam 'Abdul-'Aziz. Those belonging to the Imam Muhammad Ibn Au al-Idrisi are:
Tehama except what is above mentioned, and other (belongings) in his possession.
Rigal al-Ma' of 'Asir is his own property. (Saudi Foreign Ministry, 1934: p.440)
Figure 2.1(A) shows how the region was divided, with King Abdul'Aziz controlling the
areas of Surowat (the 'Asir) and Najran (the Yam) and Al-Idrisi controlling the 'Asir of
Tehama. Four years later in 1926 another agreement was signed in Mecca between King
Abdul'Aziz and Al-Idrisi:
When the agreement of Mecca, the holy was concluded between H.M. the King and
As-Seyed al-Hasan Al-Idrisi on 14th Rabi' ath-Thani 1348 (21st October 1926) and
in accordance with which protection has been spread over the portion which the
Idrisis were ruling in Tehama ...(Saudi Foreign Ministry, 1934: p.412).
Under the 1926 Mecca agreement, Tehama also came under Saudi protection and control
(Figure 2.1(A)). This expansion by Ibn Saud was not to the liking of Irnam Yahya of
Yemen (Al-Khairash, 1983: p.162; Al-S aid, 1989: pp.1 11-2; Brian, 1971: p.63).
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In the years following the 1926 Mecca agreement relations between King
Abdul'Aziz and the Imam of Yemen were tense in the southern 'Asir and Najran areas
(Saudi Foreign Ministry, 1934: p.446; Al-Khatrash, 1983: pp.14.9-89). Events developed
and on 5 April 1934 war broke out between lbn Saud and Imam Yahya. The main reasons
for the outbreak of war at this time were:
1	 In May 1933 the forces of Emir Ahmed, son of Imam Yahya, advanced towards
Najran.
2	 At the same time Imam Yahya took hostages from the tribes in 'Asir and Najran
which had been allocated to Ibn Saud.
3 Imam Yahya had encouraged and supported Al-Idrisi to lead a revolt against Ibn
Saud in the 'Asir region in 1932. The Imam also encouraged Al-Idrisi to make
problems for Ibn Saud in 'Asir from time to time (Saudi Foreign Ministry, 1934:
p.446; Al-S aid, 1989: pp.24.1-7; Al-Khatrash, 1983: pp.234-77).
2.3	 The 1934 Treaty of Taif Boundary
As a result of the war which began on 5 April 1934 Saudi Arabia and Yemen wanted to
cease fighting and make a comprehensive peace. The two countries reached an agreement
on 6 Safar 1353 (19 May 1934) at Taif city in Saudi Arabia and the Treaty and all its
appendices were ratified on 2 Ramadhan 1356 (5 December 1937) (Al-Ghamdi, 1991:
p.4'7).
In this section the researcher will translate and expand upon sections of his 1991
Master's thesis, The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary according to the Treaty of Taif 1934: a
Study
 in Political Geography, which was submitted to King Saud University (Al-
Ghamdi, 1991: pp.50-100).
The most important outcomes of the 1934 Treaty of Taif were as follows:
1	 The war between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen ceased;
2	 The Yemeni army withdrew from the Najran area;
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The Saudi army withdrew from AI-Hudaydah;
4	 The Yemeni Government handed Al-Idrisi over to the Saudi Government:
5	 The Yemeni Government released the hostages;
6	 Both countries agreed to establish a mutual boundary;
7	 The beginning of a good neighbourly and Islamic relationship between the two
countries (Al-Ghamdi, 1991: p.5!).
2.3.1	 SUMMARY OFTHETREATY
An annotated summary of the Saudi-Yemeni peace treaty concluded at Taif on 6 Safar
1353 (20 May 1934) was sent from Sir Andrew Ryan, British Minister in Jiddah, to Sir
John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 27 June 1934:
Article 1. State of war ends as from the date of signature of the treaty; perpetual
peace and firm and everlasting Moslem Arab brotherhood. Disputes to be settled in
the spirit of friendship and all relations to be governed by the spirit of the same
brotherhood. God called upon to witness the good intentions of the parties. Prayer
for His blessing.
Art. 2. Mutual recognition by each party of the complete independence and
sovereignty of the other and his lawful successors. Abandonment of past claims by
either to territory on the other side of the frontier now established.
Art. 3. Neither party to concede to the other less than he concedes to any third
party. Neither bound to concede more to the other than he gets in return.
Art. 4. Description of agreed frontier [see Figure 2.2(A)1.
Art. 5. No fortifications to be erected within 5 kilom. of the frontier.
Art. 6 Occupying forces of each party to be withdrawn forthwith from the territory
of the other and protection to be afforded to the inhabitants and troops.
Art. 7 Each party to restrain his people from hostile action against those of the other
and to prevent raiding. Captured property to be restored in accordance with legal
investigation after the ratification of the treaty; legal damages to be guaranteed in
cases of murder &c.. and hostile acts to be punished upon proof of them. This
provision to operate pending a further agreement on the mode of assessing and
investigating claims.
Art. 8. Parties not to resort to force for settlement of disputes arising between them
under this treaty or otherwise. Failing settlement by friendly negotiations, such
disputes shall be referred to arbitrations to be conducted in accordance with the
annexed agreement, which will be deemed an integral part of the treaty.
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Art. 9. Each party to prevent action or preparations in his territory directed against
the other party and to take actions defined in this article against their authors on
receipt of a written demand.
Art. 10. Fugitives from the jurisdiction of either party not to be admitted by the
other. Entrance to be prevented and persons circumventing measures to prevent it
to be disarmed, arrested and surrendered, or if they cannot be arrested to be driven
back to the country to which they belong.
Mt 11. Governors and officials of either party to be prevented from interfering
with the subjects of the other. Measures to be taken to obviate disturbance or
misunderstanding as a result of such action
Art. 12. People of areas assigned to each party under this treaty to be the subject of
that party. Neither party to accept as his subjects the subjects of the other party
without the latter's consent Subjects of either party in the territory of the other to
be dealt with in accordance with the local law.
Art 13. Amnesty to be granted by each party to the subjects of the other residing
in his territory to his own subjects who have taken refuge with or joined the other
party, both as regards crimes and as regards property taken from the time of their
doing so to the time of their return. In the case of doubt on the part of either party
as to the fulfilment of this clause, he may call upon the other party to convoke a
meeting of the representatives who have signed this treaty, failing either of whom
he may be replaced by a person having stated qualifications. Their decision to be
binding.
Art 14. Property of persons benefiting by the amnesty to be restored to them on
their return to their country or to their heirs. Goods of the subjects of either part
not to be sequestrated by the other party.
Art 15. Neither party to meddle with or come to any agreement with any third
party, whether an individual, a group of persons or a Government in any manner
prejudicial to the interests of the other party.
Art. 16. The parties, who are bound by the ties of Islamic brotherhood and Arab
origin, declare that their nations are one nation, that they wish no one evil and that
they will endeavour to promote the interests of their nation in tranquillity and seek
the good of their countries and their nation, without intending enmity to any nation
whatsoever.
Art. 17. In the event of external aggression against the country of either party,
the other shall,
(i) Observe complete neutrality secretly and publicly.
(ii) Practice all "possible moral and spiritual co-operation."
(iii) Negotiate with the other party with a view to discovering the
means of guaranteeing the security of the country of such other party and
preventing hann thereto and refraining from any action which might be
interpreted as contributing assistance to the external enemy.
Mt 18. Measures to be taken by each party in the event of rebellion or internal
hostilities in the country of the other.
Mt 19. Both parties to collaborate as regards postal and telegraphic
communication, economic matters, &c., and to negotiate a customs agreement
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Art. 20. Representatives abroad of either party to represent the other party, if the
Latter so wishes. Representatives of both parties in the same place abroad to
collaborate in order to secure unity of policy and promote the interests of both
countries which are one nation. Neither party restricted in its freedom of action by
this article.
Art. 21. Abrogation of treaty of the 15th December, 1931.
Art. 22. Ratifications to be exchanged as soon as possible, whereupon the treaty
will come into force forthwith, saving the provision in article I regarding the
termination of the state of war. The treaty shall remain in force for twenty lunar
years and may be amended or renewed during the six months preceding its expiry,
failing which it shall remain in force for six months from notification of the wish of
either party to alter it.
Art. 23. Treaty to be called the Treaty of Taif. Drawn up in two copies in the noble
Arabic language.(Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, pp.4 I7-9; see Appendix 1 for the full text
of the treaty)
In addition, the Treaty has four appendices. The five articles of Annex 1 explain the
arbitration procedure for use in the event of either party having difficulty in interpreting
any of the articles of the Treaty of Taif. The selection of the arbitration committee and the
chief arbitrator, and the time of arbitration are all prescribed.
Annex 2 is the most important annex of the Treaty because it consists of the border
demarcation reports. Two joint committees were set up, one to demarcate the boundary in
the Tehama region and the other to demarcate the boundary in the mountains and beyond.
The Tehama committee prepared three reports which were signed by representatives of
both parties in Ramadhan 1354 (December 1935), on 27 Shawwal 1354 (21 January
1936), and on 21 Alqida 1345 (14 February 1936). The committee demarcating the
boundary in the mountains prepared one report which was signed on 21 Shawwal 1354
(15 January 1936) (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.438).
Annex 3 corrected an error in one of the border marks between the two kingdoms.
Finally, the 12 articles of Annex 4 are a general agreement concerning the resolution of
issues which might face the people of the two kingdoms (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2,
pp.428-64; MFA-KSA, 1977a: pp.161-94.) (see Appendix 1 for the full text of the 1934
Treaty of Taif and its appendices).
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2.3.2	 EUROPEAN AND ARAB REACTION TO THE TREATY
In 1934 Britain, Italy, and France all had naval units stationed off the coast at Al-
Hudaydah to enable them to monitor the war being fought on the southern Arabian
Peninsula between the troops of Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (Al-S aid, 1989: p.285).
When the two kingdoms reached an agreement in 1934 in the form of the Treaty of Taif
many commentators wrote about the Treaty.
Sir Andrew Ryan, British Minister in Jiddah, sent an annotated summary of the
Treaty to Sir John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 27 June 1934. Ryan
commented:
the treaty may be regarded as a fairly workmanlike document. It is in European
form and the pious formulae, which have done so much to obscure Saudi-Yemen
relations in the past, have been reduced to a minimum. ...On the whole, however, it
would probably have been impossible to do much better in dealing with regions of
which there are no accurate maps and where tribal considerations are more
important the geography. ...Great play is made with the doctrine that the people of
the two "countries," which are carefully distinguished, are one "nation," but the
word which, for want of a better equivalent, has been translated "nation" is not used
so as to imply any political unity. It refers rather to that ideal unity of Moslems and
Arabs which it is the present fashion to acclaim. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, pp.416-
7).
In 1934 The Times also commented on the fact that the Treaty of Taif laid emphasis on
Arab friendship and brotherhood and that European politicians should model their treaties
on the Treaty of Taif. Salvador Anty writing in Italy in 1934 described the Treaty of Taif
as an anthem to Arab unity (cited in Salam, 1984: p.4.25). Arab commentators
concentrated on the fact that the Treaty provided a blueprint for Arab and Islamic
relationships for the future (Al-Ahram, 1934: p.4; Al-Manar, 1934: pp. I25-8).
Although the form of the Treaty of Taif had its admirers, there are also a number of
problems with it. Firstly, the Treaty covered a number of subjects which should have
been in separate annexes; for example, Article 4 which describes the direction of the
boundary; Articles 8 and 9 which describe the security procedures for dealing with
criminals between the two states; and Article 19 which discusses communications,
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transportation, and economic matters. Secondly, Article 22, which requires the Treaty to
be renewed every 20 years, has caused difficulties (see Section 2.3.4). Thirdly, there are
a number of problems with Annex 2 which is the most important annex of the Treaty as it
describes the 294 border mark locations, the distance between the border marks and the
names of the local tribes. No maps accompany this annex and no latitude and longitude
are given for the border marks, making it impossible to delimit the border accurately and
therefore creating the opportunity for problems to arise between the two countries at a
later date.
2.3.3	 DEVELOPMENT STAGES OF THE TREATY BOUNDARY
The only study which examines the stages of development (as suggested by political
geographers) of the Treaty of Taif boundary is the author's currently unpublished
master's thesis (Al-Ghamdi, 1991).
The boundaries of a state evolve through various stages before reaching full
maturity, but not every boundary necessarily passes through every stage;
S.B. Jones suggested that boundaries may pass three stages in their development;
allocation, delimitation, and demarcation ... some political geographers have
proposed the addition of a fourth stage called ad,nmi.stration (Drysdale and Blake,
1985: p.'7'7).
This section will compare these four stages of boundary evolution with the stages of
evolution of the Treaty of Taif boundary.
First Stage: Allocation
Allocation represents the initial understanding between states as to their territorial
claims. Lines may be crudely drawn on maps, but no accurate field survey has been
attempted (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.77).
Article 4 of the Treaty of Taif achieved this stage in the boundary's evolution by
describing the general direction of the boundary line without reference to maps or field
surveys.
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Second Stage: Delimitation
When ... delimitation occurs, the boundary line is defined with precision and
formally agreed to by the parties. If it is not a geometric line, field surveys will be
conducted to site the boundary with reference to physical features (Drysdale and
Blake. 1985: p.77).
The Treaty of Taif achieved this second stage in the evolution of the boundary by defining
the border mark locations and the distance between them and naming the tribes involved.
Agreement was reached between the countries on these points:
The above-mentioned committees held several meetings until this report was
prepared. The meetings were attended by the chiefs of the adjacent tribes. After
investigations and with the approval of the chiefs of tribes and without any coercion
the border demarcation process was carried out. The borders were determined,
defined and distinguished by the famous and unchangeable names of mountains,
hills and valleys (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, pp.439-40; see Annex 2 of the Treaty,
Appendix 1).
Physical features were used to define the boundary between the two countries. The
shiekhs of the adjacent tribes attended the boundary committees' meetings to contribute to
the establishment of the boundary. This participation by the shiekhs made the Treaty a
very practical document Indeed it is the only Saudi boundary treaty in which shiekhs
have had any participation.
However, the boundary committees made a grave error by not using maps and
relying only on report minutes to clarify the location of the boundary marks at this stage
Third Stage: Demarcation
Boundary demarcation may be carried out, marking the boundary on the ground
(Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.70).
The Treaty of Taif achieved this third stage in the evolution of the boundary by marking
the boundary on the ground, but this was only done with temporary markers (Plate 2.8):
the two committees appointed trusted men who went to put stone marks along
the border line every other kilometer [this should be translated as 'every kilometer,
and others'l pending the erection of posts at a time to be specified by Their
Majesties the two kings. They also will appoint the persons who would carry out
the work and the expenses involved (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.440; see Annex 2 of
the Treaty, Appendix 1).
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Unfortunately the two countries did not complete this stage and failed to build the
permanent markers along the boundary, creating problems for both countries today (see
Section 2.3.5.2)
Fourth Stage: Administration
At this stage the states concerned should agree about the location of checkpoints along the
boundary line and define the procedures governing the movement of people, especially
where population densities along the frontier are high (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.70;
Al-Deeb, 1987: p.349).
Annex 4 of the Treaty of Taif, the 'general agreement between the two kingdoms',
achieved this fourth stage in the evolution of the boundary. The 12 articles of the
agreement outlined the manner in which damage and loss between the people of the
frontier should be investigated and estimated. There was, however, no discussion about
checkpoints in the Treaty.
In general terms therefore, the Treaty of Taif enabled the 293.6km of the Saudi-
Yemeni boundary which it established to achieve all four stages of boundary
development. However, two important procedures were omitted. The lack of use of any
maps during the delimitation of the boundary was presumably because the committees
concerned were unaware of the importance of using maps to help define the location of
the boundary markers, or because maps were unavailable for the frontier area in 1934.
The two states failed to complete the process of demarcating the boundary by replacing
the stone markers (Plate 2.8) with more permanent boundary markers. This may have
either been due to the fact that the states were preoccupied with internal problems, or
because of financial constraints. This particular oversight has greatly complicated
boundary issues in later years (see Section 2.3.5.2).
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2.3.4	 VALIDATION OF THE TREATY
A further weakness of the Treaty of Taif was its revalidation requirement. outlined in
Article 22:
It shall remain in force for a period of twenty (20) complete lunar years. It may be
renewed or modified during the six months preceding its expiry. If not so renewed
and modified by that date, it shall remain in force until six months after such time as
one party has given notice to the other party of his desire to modify it. (Schofield,
1993: Vol.2, p.428)
This Article, requiring the Treaty to be renewed every 20 years, has proved very
troublesome. Informal Yemeni comments concerning the validation of the Treaty fall into
two categories. One group of commentators, among them Al-Hisamy (1983), Matwaly
and Abu-Alalla (1978), and Al-Thawr (1985) regard the 1934 Treaty of Taif as invalid
after 1954, after the first 20 years had elapsed, leaving the issue of the boundary pending.
However, a second group, including Al-Shahary (1979) and A1-Haajan (1988) consider
the Treaty as having been renewed twice, once in 1953 by Imam Ahmed of Yemen, and
again twenty years later after a visit of the Prime Minister of Yemen, Abdullah Ahmed Al-
Hajary to Saudi Arabia on 10 March 1973. A joint Saudi-Yemeni statement published on
17 March 1973 following the visit renewed the boundary established by Articles 2 and 4
of the Treaty of Taif (Appendix 1). However, Al-Shahary and A1-Haajari regard this
statement as illegal because they consider the members of the delegation who signed the
statement as unauthorized to do so.
The observation of the first group of commentators that the boundary issue is
pending may be discounted in the light of the remarks of the second group regarding the
Treaty's renewal. The latter's comments in connection with the validity of the Treaty are
very important indeed. The opinion of Al-Shahary and Al-Haajan regarding the authority
of Prime Minister Al-Hajary and the other members of the delegation who visited Saudi
Arabia in 1973 can also be called into question.
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It is useful, in this context, to look at the positions held by the members of the
delegation: they were Abdullah Al-Hajary, Prime Minister of Yemen, Ahmed Naman,
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Colonel Mohammed Al-Sooty,
Commander in Chief. Mohammed Al-Jneed. Minister of the Treasury, Abdullah Al-
Saydi. Minister of Labour. Abdaijabar Al-Mjand. Minister of Agriculture. Abdul'Aziz
Abdalgny. Chief of the Central Bank, Au Al-Matiry. Manager of the Prime Ministers
Office. Ghaleb Jamil. Agent of the Foreign Office, and Esmail Al-Jrrafy, Ambassador for
Yemen in Saudi Arabia.
The names of all these official representatives of the Yemeni Government who
comprised the delegation to Saudi Arabia appear on the statement agreeing that the Treaty
of Taif should be renewed in perpetuity. Their positions in the government speak for
themselves; it is clear that this was a high-ranking delegation with the necessary authority
to act on behalf of the government (Al-Ghamdi, 1991: pp.59-61).
On 26 February 1995, after a further 22 years, the Saudi and Yemeni states signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (Appendix 3) renewing the Treaty again. Clause 1 states:
The two sides affirm their commitment to the legitimacy and binding nature of the
Taif accord signed on 6th Safar 1353 AH, corresponding to 20th May 1934; its
appendices, known as the Taif accord, which will be referred to hereafter as the
accord (SWB, 1995: p.15).
In the event of a final boundary agreement between the two states, the permanence of the
1934 Treaty of Taif should be made absolutely clear and Article 22, which requires the
Treaty to be revalidated every 20 years, should be cancelled to prevent the problem
recurring in the year 2015.
2.3.5	 COMMITMENT TO THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY
There are many cases of treaties which have annexes appended to them which are as
important in law as the treaties themselves (Abu-Hiaf, 1973: p. 138).
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The author has selected a number of articles from the the Treaty of Taif and its four
annexes which are the most important of those dealing with the people of the frontier
region and the boundary marks (Al-Ghamdi. 1991: pp.62-92).
2.3.5.1	 Commitment to Articles Dealing with People
In order to examine Saudi and Yemeni commitment to the Treaty of Taif articles which
deal with the people of the frontier region, a comparison was made by the author between
the content of a number of articles and the defacto situation in 1991. The comparison was
made by interviewing key people who were working at the Saudi checkpoints of Al-
Tawal, 'Alib, and Al-Khadra (Figure 2.3(A)) and comparing their information with the
following articles.
Annex 4, Articles 7 and 8
Article 7
Any person who wants to cross the boundary must obtain formal documents. Any
person who does not get the permission of the Emir or Governor of his area will be
arrested, and he may be sent back to where he came from. The rules governing the
formal documents are as follows:
(1) People who have business on the frontier such as those crossing the
boundary for grazing, agriculture, and visits to markets may continue as usual
until an arrangement is made in the future. In an emergency it is possible to
restrict crossing by requiring formal documents.
(2) People who cross the boundary to visit the Central Government or other
places far from the frontier in either country must obtain formal documents.
(3) Pilgrims, tourists, and traders who cross the boundary must obtain the formal
documents or they will be arrested and sent back.
Article 8
The formal documents which are mentioned in Article 7, Clauses 2 and 3 are as
follows:
(1) Valid passport from Saudi Arabia or Yemen.
(2) Document from the Emir.
(3) Identity paper from any governor stating destination.
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(4) Letter of introduction from the traveller's local Emir to the Emir of the
destination.
(MFA-KSA. 1977a. p.196, translated by the author)
Clauses (1) to (4) above indicate the form of identity which people should use at the
checkpoints. For those who cross the boundary regularly the arrangement' mentioned in
Article 7.1 is a document commonly known as a statement' (Plate 3.1). Those who cross
rarely and want to visit central Government posts far from the frontier should obtain the
formal documents. When these requirements are compared with the forms of identity
which were being required at checkpoints in 1991, the following picture emerges.
At Al-Tawal checkpoint both Saudis and Yemenis crossing the frontier are asked to
show a passport. regardless of how often they cross the frontier or what their destination
is. This is in contravention of Article 7 of Annex 4 of the Treaty of Taif. However. atJlb
and Al-Khadra checkpoints Yemenis who cross the frontier regularly and whose business
is in the frontier area are only required to produce statements, whilst those whose
destination is far from the frontier have to show passports. By comparison, Saudis
crossing to the Yemeni side have to produce passports at the Yemeni checkpoints
regardless of their destination (Saudi Immigration Officers statement, 1991).
Comparing Articles 7 and 8, Annex 4 of the Treaty and the de facto situation in
1991 it is clear that the requirement for the three documents mentioned in Clauses 8.2,
8.3, and 8.4 has been abandoned by both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. However, in general,
the Saudis are committed to the spirit of this article by allowing the Yemeni tribes who
cross the boundary frequently to use only statements. The exception is for those crossing
at Al-Tawal checkpoint where all Yemenis are asked to show passports although the
Saudi Immigration Office stated that there was no good reason for this.
The fact that at Yemeni checkpoints both Saudis and Yemenis with any destination
are asked to produce passports (Saudi Immigration Officer at Al-Khadra checkpoint.
1991) indicates that the Yemenis are not committed to the content of Article 7.
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In general terms, both Saudi Arabia and Yemen need to reorganize their
requirements for forms of identity for those crossing the frontier to conform with Article
7. Annex 4 of the 1934 Treaty of Taif.
Annex 4, Article 10
Because the carrying of weapons in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is forbidden
according to the Rule of Organization published on 13/7/1354 (10 October 1935),
Yemenis wanting to cross the boundary must hand over their weapons, whether
t'irearms or knives, to the customs point or the Emirs on the frontier. On returning
to their country their weapons will be returned to them. When those crossing hand
their weapons to the customs officials they should be given a receipt so that their
weapons may be returned to them on their return ... (MFA-KSA, l977a, p.198,
translated by the author).
In Yemen people are allowed to carry weapons, but in Saudi Arabia it is forbidden. The
defacto situation in 1991 was that Yemenis crossing the frontier at Al-Tawal, AlIb, and
Al-Khadra checkpoints handed their weapons over to Saudi Customs (Saudi Immigration
Officer at Al-Khadra checkpoint, 1991). It can be concluded therefore that both countries
are committed to Article 10, Annex 4 of the Treaty of Taif.
Article 6, Annex 4
Because of the advantages of warm relations between the Emirs and Governors,
which will satisfy both God and their Kings, they agree to have a meeting
(according to Article I from the General Agreement) at least once a year (more
frequently if necessary) to examine the issues and collaborate to find solutions to
administrative problems as mentioned in Article 5 of this Annex. The meetings will
take place alternately on the Saudi and Yemeni sides of the frontier ... (MFA-KSA,
1977a: p.196, translated by the author).
In reality the countries need to meet a minimum of once a year to look at the various
issues between their peoples on the frontier. Comparing Article 6 with the de facto
situation in 1991, the author found that warm relations between the two states developed
over the years until the Saudi-Yemeni Co-ordination Council (SYCC) was established in
1972. This was responsible for a wide range of issues between the two states, not only
matters relating to the people of the frontier. It was also established to enable Saudi Arabia
to make an active contribution to the development plans of the former Yemen Arab
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Republic in various aspects such as health, education, mosques, transport, and agriculture
(SYCC. 1981: p.13).
The SYCC continued its meetings until Yemen took its stance during the Gulf War
in 1990. at which point most Saudi-Yemeni co-operation ceased. Tension between the
two states increased until a Saudi-Yemeni Memorandum of Understanding was signed on
26 February 1995. the main provisions of which were to renew the 1934 Treaty of Taif
and to set up two joint committees to deal with the boundary, including re-establishing the
Treaty of Taif border marks (see Appendix 3 for the full text of the Memorandum of
Understanding). A spirit of cooperation and collaboration between the two states then
returned.
In general. both states are committed to Article 6, Annex 4 of the 1934 Treaty of
Ta if.
2.3.5.2	 commitment to Articles Dealing with Boundary Marks
The author used a combination of interviews with key informants and field surveys to
examine the commitment of Saudi Arabia and Yemen to the articles of the Treaty of Taif
which deal with boundary marks. The important parts of the Treaty in this regard are
Article 4 which describes the direction of the boundary between the two countries and
Annex 2 which is the most important annex of the Treaty because it describes the position
of the border marks along the Treaty boundary.
A field survey of four sections of the Treaty boundary was carried out in 1990 as a
sample to compare the defacto situation with the position of those marks as described in
Annex 2. The sections surveyed were those which bordered the Emirate of Al-Tawai on
the coastal plain, the Emirate of Al-Khubah in the coastal mountains, the Emirate of
Zahran Al-Janub in the Surowat mountains, and the Emirate of Al-Khadra on the plateau
of Najran (Figure 2.3(A)).
Experienced local guides and members of the Saudi Border Guard from each
Emirate joined the author during his survey in 1990 in order to guide him to the position
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of marks which it was still possible to recognise at that time. The results of the
comparison were as follows:
Emirate of Al-Tawal on the coastal plain
The len gth of Saudi-Yemeni boundary within Al-Tawal Emirate is approximately 25km
Figure 2.3(A)). According to Annex 2, there should therefore be 25 position marks at
l.000m intervals. However only one mark was found, that is (31) located at Zibarat
Alsir' as Annex 2 calls it (Appendix 1. Annex 2, First Report of the Tehama Committee).
This mark is clear in Plate 2.1. and the area is still called Zibarat Alsir as it was described
in 1934. No further marks were found along the boundary in Al-Tawal Emirate, and the
remaining marks named in the Treaty were not recognised by those interviewed.
Emirate of Al-Khubah in the coastal mountains
The length of of Saudi-Yemeni boundary within the Emirate of Al-Khubah is
approximately 65km (Figure 2.3(A)), and there should therefore be 65 border marks at
I .000m intervals. However, the only remnant of a mark found along the boundary in this
Emirate was (31) Eshat Sir Mijda'a' (Appendix 1, Annex 2, Second Report of the
Tehama Committee). The general location of the border mark is the village of Mijdaa,
which today covers an area greater than 5km. The mark itself used by the Treaty
committee,'Ishat', was no longer to be found, as this translates as a one-roomed thatched
hut', and this had clearly disappeared in the intervening 56 years.
Emirate of Zahran Al-Janub in the Surowat mountains
The length of Saudi-Yemeni boundary within the Zahran Al-Janub Emirate is 50km in
length (Figure 2.3(A)), and according to Annex 2 of the Treaty there should therefore be
50 border marks within this emirate at 1,000m intervals.
During the field survey, eight marks were found and recognised as they had been
named in the Treaty in 1934 (Appendix 1. Annex 2, Report of the Mountains Committee).
The positions of these marks were (25) Ras Alhanka, (38) Sha'ab Alqoum, (39) Ras
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Jabal Alab. (40) Alshatha, (41) Madfa Alhinka, (42) Alsabsab, (43) Naleed Alkaal, (44)
Jabal Al Mahadh, and (45) Wadi Alrabidh in Almasna (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2. pp.44 I-2)
(see Plates 2.2, 2.3, 2.4. and 2.5).
The border marks used in this area were mainly mountain peaks which are
obviously better suited to stand the test of time than many other features.
Emirate of Al-Khadra on the plateau of Najran
Approximately 11km of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary lies within Al-Khadra Emirate, and
there should therefore be 11 border marks within this emirate at 1,000m intervals.
However, only two border mark positions named in the Treaty were found during the
field survey. These were (1) Jabal Althar and (11) Ras Aqaba Nahuga. The other
positions mentioned in the Treaty were not recognized (Plates 2.6 and 2.7).
The problem of the position of the Treaty of Taif border marks began when the two states
failed to replace the temporary stone markers along the boundary (a sample of which are
mentioned by Philby (1952: pp.513-6); see Plate 2.8) with more permanent marks like
concete pillars. By 1990 the vast majority of the stone markers had been washed or taken
away, with only a few remaining such as that at Zibarat Alsir on the coastal plain (Plate
2.1).
Because of the difficulty of finding the stone markers themselves, in 1990 the
author concentrated on finding the positions described in Annex 2 of the Treaty of Taif.
However, the lack of maps, or longitude and latitude to locate the positions accurately,
together with the fact that a number of place names have been changed by local people in
the intervening 56 years, meant that there were considerable problems even with this
approach to recognising the position of the boundary.
One other observation was made during the survey which may explain the lack of
border marks located on the coastal plain and mountains compared to those found in the
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Surowat mountains and on the Najran plateau. This difference may be due to the fact that
in the coastal locations the markers were more prone to being covered by sand than they
are further inland.
By 1991, most of the boundary markers had disappeared and it was impossible to
recognize the position of the markers accurately. The author therefore recommended that
Saudi Arabia and Yemen should fonn a joint committee for redemarcating the boundary
according to Annex 2 of the Treaty of Taif(Al-Ghamdi, 1991: p.353).
On 26 February 1995 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen
signed a Saudi-Yemeni Memorandum of Understanding. Clause 2 of the Memorandum
states:
A joint committee will be set up, composed of an equal number (of people J from
each side, within a period of 30 days. Its task will be to reestablish the Lborderl
signs in accordance with the border reports appended to the accord - those (border
signsl still existing and those which have fallen down - starting from the border
point Rasif al-Bahr, ... (SWB, 1995: p.15; see Appendix 3 for the full text).
At the time of writing this thesis in 1996 the Saudi-Yemeni joint committee are continuing
their field survey on the Treaty boundary and have yet to publish any results.
2.4	 The Frontier East of the Treaty of Taif Boundary
The frontier to the east of the boundary created by the 1934 Treaty of Taif can be divided
into two sections, each with different characteristics. Firstly, there is the former Imamate
of Yemen-Saudi Arabia non-Treaty section which consists of 246.4km of frontier which
was mentioned in the Treaty but was not delimited. This section begins at Jabal Al-Thar
on the Najran plateau and runs to the former North Yemen-South Yemen-Saudi Arabia
tripoint at Radm Al-Amir (Figure 2.2(A)). This section was left undelimited in 1934 by
Saudi Arabia and the Imamate of Yemen, because of a dispute between the Wa'ilah and
Yamn tribes (see Section 2.4.1). Furthermore, it was not complicated by British
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interference as they had no direct interest in this section. No formal proposals regarding
this section of the frontier have been submitted to the Saudi Government by the Yemeni
Government. or vice versa. The only evidence available concerning the territorial claims
in this section are the maps published by the Saudi and Yemeni states, and personal
offerings by travellers such as Philby. His 1939 line.is discussed fully in Section 2.4.1.
The second part of the undelimited frontier is the former Aden Protectorate-Saudi
Arabia section which runs approximately 700km from the Radm Al-Amir former tripoint
to the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tnpoint at 19°N. 52E (Figure 2.2(A)). A number of
proposals concerning this section of the frontier were made during the period 1914-55 by
the Ottoman Government, the Saudi Government, and the British Government (on behalf
of its proteges in southern and south-eastern Arabia).
It is important to examine these historical boundary proposals so that the possibility
of using any of them as a basis for a future boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen
may be considered.
There are many publications featuring the historical correspondence between Saudi
Arabia and Britain concerning Arabia's frontiers; Schofield and Blake (1988-91) Vols.1-
30; Schofield (1992) Vols.6, 7, 10, 11, 16, 18, 19, and 20; and Schofield (1993)
writing in Arabian Geopolitics, Schofield (1993-4) Arabian Boundaries: New Documents
Vols.1-6. There are also the proceedings of the arbitration at the International Court of
Justice concerning Buraimi and the common frontier between Saudi Arabia, Abu-Dhabi,
and Oman (known as the Buraimi memorials) which Consist of the Saudi memorial in
three volumes (MSG, 1955) and the British memorial in two volumes (FCO, 1955). It is
not the aim of this thesis to review the huge number of documents in this section. Rather,
the historical proposals will be studied from four key aspects; the locations of the lines
proposed, the basis of the proposals, the Saudi-British reaction to the proposals, and the
possibility of the proposals forming the basis for a future boundary settlement.
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2.4.1	 FORMER IMAMATE OF YEMEN-SAUDI ARABIA NON-
TREATY SECTiON OF THE FRONTIER
This section of the frontier is mentioned in the Treaty of Taif 1934: Article 4
recommended the use of tribal boundaries as the basis for the boundary between Saudi
Arabia and the Imamate of Yemen on their eastern frontier
it then bends Ithe boundary I eastwards until it ends, on the edge of the boundary
between those of the Hamdan-bin-Zaid, Waila, &c., who are outside Yam, and
Yam. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.4.24).
However, because of the dispute over tribal territories between the Wa'ilah and Yam the
boundary remained unmarked, as the Border Demarcation Report indicates:
It was agreed to place the first border mark at Ras Jabal Althar - between the tribes
of Waila and Yam. Concerning the wasteland called (Silah), and the adjacent area to
the East which is under dispute between the tribes of Waila and Yam we have
decided to leave it as it is without placing any marks. Should there be any dispute
thereupon in the future, it should be settled in accordance with God's Sharia and the
provisions of the Taif agreement. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.439)
The provisions of the Taif agreement for the eastern frontier of the Imamate of Yemen are
mentioned above; members of the Hamdan bin Zaid tribe belong to the Imamate of Yemen
except the Yam sub-tribe (Figure 6.4 shows the genealogical tree of the Hamdan bin Zaid
tribe), and those members of the Wa'ilah tribe living in Najran city belong to Saudi Arabia
(Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.424.). Figure 3.14(A) shows the approximate boundary
between the tribes (see Section 6.2.2 for more details).
On 18 October 1955 the Saudi Government declared a new boundary which was
passed to the British Government. The western section of this line shows the Saudi view
of the location of its frontier with the Imamate of Yemen to the east of the Treaty of Taif
boundary (Figure 2.4(A)). Details of the location of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line are
contained in a Saudi memorandum to the British Embassy in Jiddah, dated 18 October
1955:
thence it should run through the point at 16 North 46 East to the Yemen
border. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.349; Figure 2.4(A))
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For the full text of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line see Section 2.4.2.7. This line was
supposedly drawn up on a tribal basis and was only passed to the British Embassy
(Schofield. 1993: Vol.2, p.345). There was therefore no comment from the Imamate of
Yemen regarding this part of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line. In fact it does not accurately
follow the tribal boundary (see Section 3.6 for the distribution of tribes in this section).
Until 1983 Saudi maps customarily used this line to define the frontier east of the
Treaty of Taif boundary with the former Imamate. and then North Yemen. In 1983 the
Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources produced a map of the Arbalan
Peninsula (MPMR-KSA, 1983) on which the frontier was shown further south than the
1955 Saudi Declaration line. This new line runs north-west from the point 4522'E
154O'N (which was also used by the 1955 line) to the point 44°8'E 16'45'N. from
where it runs to Jabal Al-Thar which was the location of the most easterly Treaty of Taif
border mark (MPMR-KSA, 1983, Arabian Peninsula Map). Figure 2.4(A) shows this
line. There is no accurate data about the basis on which this line was drawn up, but it is
assumed that it used those areas settled by people of Saudi nationality. This line is
depicted on all Saudi maps produced subsequently. The author considers the 1983 line as
the extreme Saudi claim in this section.
Yemeni maps also indicate the Yemeni position concerning the frontier to the east of
the Treaty boundary. In 1967 the North Yemen Government requested the Syrian Military
Survey to produce a map of the Yemen Arab Republic (MSD-SAR. 1967). On that map,
which clearl y
 reflects the opinion of the North Yemen Government, the line in the section
in question starts at Jabal Al-Thar from where it runs to the point 46° 19'E 16°43'N, north
of Jabal Al-Rayyan. From here it runs south until it reaches the 1914 Violet line at Jabal
Thaniya (MSD-SAR, 1967, Yemen Arab Republic map) (see Figure 2.4(A)). This 1967
line is the one used most frequently on British maps and atlases (Schofield, 1994: p.58).
The line is geometric rather than following either geographical features or tribal
boundaries, and the author considers it as the extreme Yemeni claim.
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The most famous line proposed by a traveller was Philby's line described in his
book Sheba's Daughters in 1939. In 1994 during his field survey the author found that
the majority of elderly people and sheikhs in the frontier tribes are still familiar with
Philby and his proposed line. However, it proved difficult to establish their opinion as to
the value of Philby's line. The location of this line is quoted in a summary of statements
about his Shabwa expedition made by Philby to Sir R. Bullard on 18 February 1937:
The boundary runs from Thar. the most easterly boundary pillar of the previously
demarcated Yaman-Sa'udi frontier, to a hillock called Rumaha in Wadi 'Atfain,
passing to the west of Maihar. From Rumaha it continues to the Madrak Hill,
whence it reaches the cairn at the edge of the Taiyibat Ism valley on the main camel
track from Najran to Hadhramaut. This cairn, though generally spoken of as Radm
a! Hadd (the boundary cairn), is properly named Ghawiyat at Riba, and it was
explained to me that caravans or travellers from north to south or vice-versa stop at
this point pending the enlistment of the necessary escort from the tribe into whose
territory they are going. In most cases, of course, the halt is merely nominal, as the
escort would probably be secured before reaching the spot. The boundary line from
here runs straight down the Shuqqat al Qaura corridor and veers round vaguely
outside the northern fringe of Hadhba, Dhab'a etc., to the Fuhud and Qafal hillocks
at the tail of Wadi Itima. and so. enclosing the Ma'u and Raiyan hills, to the cairn of
Radm al Amir in the Jau Mulais plain, from which it runs to Thaniya and so. in due
course, to the line or point that divides the tracts of Baihan and Hanb. (Schofield.
1992: Vol.20. p.678) (See Figure 2.4(A) to see approximate position of Philby's
line.)
Philby's line was based on tribal boundaries to the east of the Treaty boundary and it also
roughly follows the south-western edge of the Rub' Al-Khali (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20,
p.xix). The Imam of Yemen was not happy with Philby's expedition or his proposed line
(Wilkinson, 1991: p.21!). In fact, Philby's line is a more logical boundary than other
lines shown on Saudi and Yemeni maps as it takes into consideration an approximation of
both tribal boundaries and geographical features. However, there are other factors which
have an effect on the location of logical boundaries such as the population interaction
along the frontier, economic opportunities, and the de facto border. These factors and
others will be examined in the chapter on the former Imamate of Yemen-Saudi Arabia
non-Treaty section (see Western Study Sector. Chapter 3).
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2.4.2	 ANGLO-OTTOMAN AND ANGLO-SAUDI PROPOSALS
CONCERNING THE FORMER ADEN PROTECTORATE-
SAUDI ARABIA SECTION OF THE FRONTIER
The majority of historical Anglo-Saudi proposals had the aim of establishing boundaries
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. the Trucial States, and Muscat and Oman all of which
were protected by the British Government. The author will examine only those proposals
which involved the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier. The proposals are presented below in
chronological order.
2.4.2.1	 The Blue and Violet Lines 1913-4
The Blue and Violet lines were designed so that they would link up with one another, but
each line had a specific purpose. The Blue line which was defined on 29 July 1913 was
intended to separate the spheres of influence of Britain and the Ottoman Empire. The
Violet line, on the other hand, was defined on 9 March 1914 to link up the southern
terminus of the Blue line with the Anglo-Ottoman boundary in south-west Arabia,
delimited during 1903-5 to separate the wilavat of Yemen from the nine cantons of the
loosely federated Aden Protectorate (Schofield, 1994: p.19) (Figure 2.4(A)).
For the purposes of this study the Violet line is the more important as it runs
through the Saudi-Yemeni frontier region. The Violet line is described in Article Three of
the 1914 Anglo-Ottoman Convention:
Point 1 of the Wadi Bana indicated on the first of the maps annexed to the present
convention (Annex B), being the last point surveyed on the spot in the east, it is
agreed between the authorised High Contracting parties, in conformity with the
above mentioned protocol [20 April 1905 and subject to the conditions and
reserves contained in it. that the boundary of Ottoman territories shall follow a
straight line which will run from Lekemet ul-Choub north-eastwards to the desert of
Rub' al-Khali at an angle of 45°. This line shall joint in the Rub' al-Khali, on
parallel 20°, the straight line ...(Wilkinson, 1991: p.104-5; the original Convention
text in French. Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, p.9) (Figure 2.4(A) shows the Blue and
Violet lines).
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The Violet line followed neither geographical features, nor tribal boundaries. In fact,
together with the Blue line, it was the best example of a purely geometric boundary on the
Arabian Peninsula (Schofield. 1994: p.l9).
On 1 April 1959 the Directorate of Overseas Survey sent a letter to the Colonial
Office presenting three possible interpretations of the location of the 1914 Violet line. This
letter was in response to confusion over the location of the line declared by Britain in
1955 (see Section 2.4.2.6, British Declaration line 1955) (Schofield. 1993: Vol.2.
p.376).
Indeed, the Blue and Violet lines were beset with legal argument. Saudi Arabia
never accepted either of these lines as a definition of its boundary with its southern
neighbours, and Britain had doubts about their validity (Schofield, 1994: p.20):
W.E. Beckett, Legal Adviser at the Foreign Office, admits that Britain's defence of
the 'Blue' and 'Violet' lines during the Anglo-Saudi frontier negotiations will not
stand up in international law, 29 August 1934 (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, pp.111-2).
In fact, in the 1970s when Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States came to negotiate
compromise boundaries they completely ignored the 1913 Blue line. As previously
mentioned, the boundary with Qatar was established by the 1965 treaty, the Saudi Arabia-
UAE boundary by the 1974 agreement, and the Saudi-Omani boundary by the 1990
agreement (Figure 2.1(A)).
Maps produced by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen prior to unification
with the Yemen Arab Republic in May 1990 show the north-west frontier with Saudi
Arabia delimited by the 1914 Violet line (Schofield, 1994: p.24.). The unification of
Yemen effectively cancelled the southern part of the Violet line, but the central section of
the line connects the extreme 1955 British claim with the extreme Saudi 1955 claim. Both
claims are discussed in this chapter.
2.4.2.2	 Fuad Hamzah Line 1935
Twenty years of tranquillity over the eastern and south-eastern Saudi frontiers followed
the Blue and Violet line Conventions of 1913 and 1914. However, in 1934 the issue of
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boundaries arose once again between Saudi Arabia and Britain (acting on behalf of its
protëgés. Qatar, the Trucial States. Muscat and Oman. and th Aden Protectorate). The
cause was a note sent on 28 April 1934 by the British Minister in Jiddah, Sir Andrew
Ryan. to the Saudi Arabian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Fuad Bey I-Iamzah:
The Saudi Arabian Government was informed that the British Government had
received from the United States Government an enquiry respecting frontiers in
eastern Arabia. and that in reply the British Government had furnished the United
States with copies of the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of 1913 and 1914. (MGS.
1955: Vol.1, p.402).
The Saudi reaction was prompt, refuting the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of 1913 and
1914. and negotiations were resumed between Fuad Hamzah (on behalf of Saudi Arabia)
and Sir Andrew Ryan (on behalf of Britain). On 3 April 1935 Fuad Hamzah presented Sir
Andrew with his proposal:
The Fuad Hamzah line 1935. is setting forth a boundary line between Saudi Arabia
and Qatar, and a second line between Saudi Arabia and the various shaikhdoms
under British protection in eastern and southern Arabia. The two lines collectively
are commonly referred to as "Fuad's line". (MGS. 1955: Vol.1. p.406).
In this thesis the line will be referred to as the 'Hamzah line' rather than the Fuad
Hamzah' or 'Fuad Bey Hamzah line'. As previously mentioned, only those parts of the
line which coincide with the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier will be discussed. The second
part of the Hamzah line as mentioned above, which defined the boundary between Saudi
Arabia and the Trucial States, Muscat and Oman, and the Aden Protectorate, was
described as follows:
The said line extends from the limits of the land of Kaffat al-Liwa to the point of
intersection of longitude 56°E and latitude 22N. It then runs along the 56th
meridian to the point of its intersection with latitude 19N. It then runs in a straight
line to the point of intersection of latitude 17°N and longitude 5TE. Thence it runs
west a straight line along the 17th parallel to its intersection with longitude 46E.
From this point it runs in the same direction until it intersects the line known as the
Violet line (MGS, 1955: Vol.1, p.407) (Figure 2.4(A) shows the full line).
The basis of the Hamzah line was which tribes paid zakat and were obedient to the call of
the Saudi Government in times of war (Jihad) (MGS, 1955: Vol.2: pp.22 and 37-8).
However, geographical features were used to describe the Saudi frontier with Qatar and
the Trucial States, and the remainder of the Hamzah line follows lines of longitude and
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latitude until it meets the centre of the Violet line on the frontier with the Imamate of
Yemen (Wilkinson, 1991: p.190).
The British Government refused to acceptthe Hamzah line and six days after it had
been proposed, on 9 April 1935, the British made their own proposal, sometimes referred
to as the 'Green line'. Two months later in June 1935 the British made a second proposal
known as the 'Brown line' (MGS, 1955: Vol.!, pp.407-8). Both lines lie to the east of
the 1913 Blue line. They are not shown on Figure 2.4(A) because they are not relevant to
the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier.
More recently as the Saudi boundaries with Qatar, the UAE, and Oman have been
established, the Hamzah line has been largely ignored. The only section of the Hamzah
line still in use can be seen on Saudi maps (for example, MPMR-KSA, 1983, Arabian
Peninsula map; Bundagi, 1984, KSA Geographical Map) beginning at Habarout close to
the Oman-Yemen boundary and running along latitude 17°N coincident with the 1955
Saudi Declaration line to the point 48E, l7N (Figure 2.4(A)).
The author considers the Hamzah line to be the extreme Saudi claim in this part of
the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier. (Figure 2.4(A)).
2.4.2.3	 The Rivadh Line 1935
Seven months after the Hamzah line proposal, on 25 November 1935, Sir Andrew Ryan
presented a new British proposal which became known as 'Ryan's line' or the 'Riyadh
line' because it was presented to the Saudis in Riyadh (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2 p.148).
The term 'Riyadh line' will be used in this thesis to avoid confusion with the 1949 Umm
Al-Samim-Rayyan line.
That part of the Riyadh line which involves the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier is
described in a note handed by Ryan to Fuad Bey, Acting Saudi Minister for Foreign
Affairs on 25 November 1935:
5. A straight line from key-point J [the intersection of meridian 55E and parallel
22°30'N] to the intersection of the same meridian, 55°E, with parallel 20°N (key-
point G).
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6. A line from key-point G to the intersection of meridian 52°E with parallel 19'N
(key-point H), drawn approximately straight, but so as to leave Sabkhat Mijora to
Saudi Arabia and the Ramlat Mughsin to Muscat and Oman.
7. A straight line from key-point H to the intersection of parallel 18°N with the line
known as the Violet line" (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.148) (Figure 2.4(A) shows
the full line).
The Riyadh line proposal represented a big concession in the British position regarding
the location of the frontier, a position which they had previously held so tenaciously.
The 1935 Riyadh line, the most generous concession on the Violet line Britain ever
offered officially to Saudi Arabia in the course of the inconclusive 1934-55 frontier
negotiations. (Schofield, 1994: p.20)
However, there is a discrepancy between descriptions of the Riyadh line in British and
Saudi texts. The difference is to be found in Clause 6 of Ryan's note which is presented
in Saudi sources as:
A line running from key point G to the intersection of longitude 53°E and latitude
19°N ... (MGS. 1955: Vol.!, p.14.2).
British sources quote Clause 6 as follows:
A line from key point 0 to the intersection of meridian 52E, with parallel !9°N
(Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.14.8).
The discrepancy works to the advantage of the country from which the source comes. In
other words, the use of 53°E rather than 52°E as the point of intersection, as quoted in the
Saudi text, places more territory on the Saudi side of the line. Figure 2.4(A) shows the
difference between the position of the line using the Saudi and British sources. The author
was unable to find any reason for the difference in the meridians used. This discrepancy
also affects the position of the 1937 Aden Government Concession line which was based
on the Riyadh line (see Section 2.4.2.4).
It is worth drawing attention to the varying levels of accuracy used by the treaties
and boundary negotiators in the history of the Saudi-Yemeni dispute. Some, for example
the Riyadh line and the Aden Concession Line, use only degrees of latitude and longitude
(eg 19°N), most were measured to greater accuracy (eg 26°E14'), but none give seconds.
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According to Adler (1995: p.20) the assumed accuracy of such figures is considerable.
but rarely are their implications recognised in boundary treaties:
In geographical co-ordinates given as latitude 35°20'N and longitude 55°10'E, the
implied accuracy estimate is +/-0.5' or +1-30". Remembering that I second of arc is
equal to approximately 30m on the earth's surface, the estimated accuracy is +1-
900m in each coordinate or +I-1,273m in position. (Adler, 1995: p.20)
The Saudi Government turned down the Riyadh line:
Fuad Hamzah pointed out that the British offer was unsatisfactory ... (MGS. 1955:
Vol.1, p.412)
Despite this, the Riyadh line was quite helpful in the negotiation of the Saudi boundaries
with Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. A section of the Riyadh line was used to link the Oman-
Saudi Arabia-Yemen tnpoint with the Violet line on maps produced by both the former
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Britain to show the former south Yemen-
Saudi Arabia boundary (Schofield, 1994: p.24).
The Riyadh line is a further example of the use of geometric boundaries in southern
Arabia.
2.4.2.4	 The Aden Government Concession Line 1937
Following Ryan's 1935 Riyadh line proposal and Saudi dissatisfaction with it, the British
Government wanted to review the frontier negotiations and reach an agreement with the
Saudi Government as quickly as possible. On 4 March 1937 Mr W. Ormsby-Gore of the
Colonial Office wrote to the Resident in Aden:
it is desirable that every endeavour should be made to reach agreement as quickly
as possible on the question of these disputed frontiers. ... it has been suggested that
the position of the frontier negotiations should be reviewed, and that consideration
should be given to the question whether some further concession cannot be made
towards meeting King Ibn Saud's claims both in the more northern area and in the
Aden Protectorate Zone. So far as the Protectorate is concerned, I shall be obliged if
you will consider whether, in the light of this dispatch, some additional concession
might not be made in the area between parallels 17 and 18, particularly to the west
of meridian 51. (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20: pp. 15 1-2)
The concession line (shown in Figure 2.4(A)) was proposed in these terms:
...a 20-mile [wide I strip would be conceded to the Saudi Government running
parallel to and south of the Riyadh line for 300 miles between meridian 48 and
meridian 52 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.156).
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The concession covered around 6.000 square miles of desert. The British Foreign Office
was convinced that lbn Saud would not be interested in such a proposal and the subject
was therefore never broached with Saudi Arabia and the official Saudi reaction therefore
never discovered (Wilkinson, 1991: p.215). It is possible that the Saudis might have
agreed to the Concession line and a potential opportunity was therefore lost.
The 1937 Aden Government Concession line was based on geographical features as
it ran approximately along the irregular southern edge of the Rub' Al-Khali where the
sand dunes give way to flat sand and gravel.plain (Figure 5.3(A)). Figure 2.4(A) shows
the exact position of the Concession line. It was the only British proposal which
concerned the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier with no reference to the south-eastern
frontiers, and as such it might be of assistance in the negotiation of a compromise Saudi-
Yemeni boundary.
2.4.2.5	 Umm A1-Samim-Raian Line 1949
In 1949 the Aden Government, backed by the Colonial Office, discussed yet another
boundary proposal. This proposal became known as the Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line as
it ran south-west from the Umm Al-Samim sabkha to Jabal Al-Rayyan. It is also
sometimes known as the median line, but it will be referred to as the Umm Al-Samim-
Rayyan line in this thesis. The Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line is described in a letter from
the Governor of Aden to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, A. Creech Jones, dated
28 November 1949:
the "Urn as Samirn - direction of Raiyan line" cuts the Violet line at about 4WE:
17°30'N; and as the pivot of the line at its western end in the vicinity of Raiyan
IJabal Al-Rayyan ... (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.235; Figure 2.4(A) shows this
line).
The line delimited the Saudi frontier with western Oman and the Aden Protectorate,
running from 56 0 E 21°30'N at the Umm Al-Samim sabkha in the north-east to Jabal Al-
Rayyan which lies north of Radm Al-Amir (Figure 2.4(A)). The western part of the Umm
Al-Samim-Rayyan line was based on tribal boundaries, but the eastern section follows the
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edge of the Rub' Al-Khali. However, the proposal was never fully accepted by all
concerned departments in the Colonial Office and was therefore never submitted to the
Saudi Government (Schofield. 1992: Vol.20, p.xxi).
Although the western section of the 1949 Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line is in the
present Saudi-Yemeni frontier area, it is not helpful to negotiations regarding a
compromise boundary as most of it lies further north than the extreme British claim of
1955 (see Section 2.4.2.6). Furthermore, the successful Omani-Saudi boundary
negotiations of 1990 significantly ignored the Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line.
2.4.2.6	 British Declaration Line 1955
The British Declaration of 4 August 1955 was the first proposal regarding the boundary
between Saudi Arabia and the Aden Protectorate to disregard the 1914 Violet line. It is
known as both the 'British Declaration line' and the 'modified Riyadh (Ryan) line'. It will
be referred to in this thesis as the 1955 British Declaration line to avoid confusion with the
1935 Riyadh line. Contrary to the remarks of both Schofield (1994: p.22) and Wilkinson
(1991: p.320) that it was, in effect, the Riyadh line, the 1955 British Declaration line was
very different from the Riyadh line, particularly along the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier
which is the subject of this thesis. That part of the British Declaration line concerning the
present Saudi-Yemeni frontier is quoted in a letter from the British Embassy at Jiddah to
the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated 4 August 1955:
(b) From Umm al Zamul southwards and south-westwards the boundary of Muscat
and Oman is a line joining the following points: Umrn al Zamul to 22N, 554O'E,
to 20°N. 55eE, to 19°N 52E. At this point the line meets the boundary of the
Eastern Aden Protectorate which runs from there along the southern fringe of the
sand dunes on the general lines of the following co-ordinates: 1848'N 51°03'E,
1810'N 48°20'E. Thence it runs due south west to the boundary of Yemen.
(Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, pp.206-7) (Figure 2.4(A) shows the full line).
The 1955 British Declaration line therefore defined the Aden Protectorate-Saudi Arabia
frontier as starting from 19°N STE and running through 18°48'N 5103'E to l8°10'N
48°20'E, from where it ran south-west to the boundary with the Imamate of Yemen
(Figure 2.4(A)). By comparison, the 1935 Riyadh line defined the Aden Protectorate-
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Saudi Arabia frontier as starting from the same point, 19°N 52°E, but from there running
in a straight line to the intersection of latitude 18°N with the Violet line (Figure 2.4(A)).
The western part of the British Declaration line was based on percieved tribal
boundaries (Wilkinson, 1991: p.320). However, because like nearly all the other
proposals the British Declaration line included the Saudi south-eastern boundaries. Saudi-
British argument was concentrated on the Buraimi zone. Once again the proposal was not
accepted by the Saudi Government (Wilkinson, 1991: pp.320-I; Schofield, 1993: Vol.2,
pp.347-9).
However, concerning negotiations with Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. the 1955
British Declaration line was the most helpful of all the proposals. The author also
considers the line as representing the extreme British claim along the former Aden
Protectorate-Saudi Arabia section of the frontier. In a Foreign Office memorandum dated
22 March 1961, Mr K.H. Jones confirmed that the British Declaration line, especially that
part along the Aden Protectorate-Saudi Arabia frontier, was in Saudi territory:
we could make the 'bloodless concession' to the Saudis that co-ordinate
I 8° 10'N 48°20'E - declared to them on August 4. 1955 as the terminal point of one
stretch of the Aden Protectorate boundary - is in fact well inside Saudi Arabia
(Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, p.225).
Figure 2.4(A) shows the intersection 18°10'N 48°20'E which is the furthest point claimed
by Britain into Saudi territory.
2.4.2.7	 Saudi Declaration Line 1955
Two and a half months after the British Declaration of August 1955 the Saudi Ministry of
Foreign Affairs sent a note to the British Embassy in Jiddah on 18 October 1955 with the
following declaration of their own:
4. With regard to the region which lies south of latitude 19° North, His Majesty's
Government and the territories of the rulers for whom the British Government are
entitled to set should start at the point 19° North 56° East; the frontier should then
run to the point 17° North 52° East and thence westwards along latitude 17° North
until it reaches longitude 48° East; thence it should run through the point at 16°
North 46° East to the Yemen border. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.349)
91
CHAPTER 2
In fact, in the east, the 1955 Saudi Declaration line was coincident with the 1935 Hamzah
line, until the point 17N 48°E. To the west of this point the line represented a new Saudi
point of view on the delimitation of the boundary between the Violet line and Jabal Al-
Thar where the line met the boundary with the lmamate of Yemen (see Section 2.4.1,
Former Imamate of Yemen-Saudi Arabia non-Treaty section).
The central and western parts of the Saudi Declaration are the most important Saudi
proposals concerning the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier east of the Treaty of Taif
boundary (Figure 2.4(A)), and the Declaration was the last proposal involving the present
Saudi-Yemeni frontier until the British withdrew from Yemen in 1967.
In general the lines mentioned above are geometric boundaries, geometric lines joining
either points of intersection of longitude and latitide, or natural features:
Geometric boundaries are usually formed by a series of straight line segments
linking fixed boundary points, or, alternatively, are based squarely upon lines of
longitude and latitude (Boggs, 1940: p.26).
These lines do not, however, coincide with either tribal features or natural boundaries.
The disputed area of the former Imamate of Yemen-Saudi Arabia non-Treaty section
of the frontier is bounded to the north by the line shown on the MPMR-KSA (1983)
Arabian Peninsula map and to the south by the line shown on the MSD-SAR (1967)
Yemen Arab Republic map (Figure 2.2(A)). Along the former Aden Protectorate-Saudi
Arabia frontier the disputed area is bounded to the north by the British Declaration line of
4 August 1955 and to the south by the Saudi Declaration line of 18 October 1955.
As has already been seen in this chapter, the historical development of the present
Saudi-Yemeni frontier to the east of the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary vanes along its
length. As this part of the frontier is the principle subject of this thesis, the author has
classified it into three sectors for detailed study:
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Western Study Sector
The former Yemen Arab Republic (former Imamate of Yemen)-Saudi Arabia frontier to
the east of the Treaty of Taif boundary. This is the area bounded between the line shown
the MSD-SAR (1967) Yemen Arab Republic map and the line shown on the Saudi
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (1983) Arabian Peninsula map which
includes part of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (see Figure 1.5(A) and Chapter 3). The
characteristics of the Western Study Sector are:
1 The 1934 Treaty of Taif mentions this sector and states that tribal boundaries should
form the basis for the location of the boundary between the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Yemeni Kingdom in this sector (see Section 2.4.1).
2	 The two countries involved in this sector were Saudi Arabia and the former Imamate
of Yemen which became the former North Yemen on 26 September 1962.
3	 There are no British proposals concerned with this sector.
4	 There are two formal checkpoints in the sector: a Saudi checkpoint located just to
the north of the sector and a Yemeni checkpoint near the northern edge of the sector.
Central Study Sector
The western part of the former South Yemen (former Aden Protectorate)-Saudi Arabia
frontier. This area falls between the western part of the 1955 British Declaration line and
the 1955 Saudi Declaration line in the same section of the frontier (see Figure 1.5(A) and
Chapter 4). The characteristics of the Central Study Sector are:
1	 The former North Yemen-South Yemen-Saudi Arabia tripoint at Radm Al-Amir is at
the western extremity of this sector.
2	 The 1914 Violet line runs through this sector.
3	 A number of historical Saudi and British proposals involve this sector.
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4	 This sector was the scene of fighting between the armies of Saudi Arabia and the
former South Yemen at AI-Wadi'ah (just to the north of the sector on the Saudi side
of the frontier) in 1969.
5	 There are no checkpoints in this sector.
Eastern Study Sector
The eastern part of the former South Yemen (former Aden Protectorate)-Saudi Arabia
frontier. The sector is bounded by those sections of the 1955 British and Saudi
Declaration lines between the Central Study Sector and the Oman-Yemen boundary. (see
Figure 1.5(A) and Chapter 5). The characteristics of the Eastern Study Sector are:
1	 There have been more historical proposals involving this sector than any other
sector of the frontier.
2	 The sector includes the disputed Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint.
3	 There is an informal Saudi checkpoint located just to the north of the sector at Al-
Kharkhir.
The factors which have an effect on the location of a logical boundary, which were
mentioned in Chapter 1, will be examined for each of these study sectors to assist the
search for a solution to the Saudi-Yemeni boundary dispute.
2.5	 The Maritime Boundary
The principle motivation for partition of the oceans is often the quest for offshore
hydrocarbons. However, maritime boundary delimitation is useful for coastal states to
determine the extent of their jurisdiction in their territorial waters, continental shelf, and
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Blake, 1987: p.121).
In 1996 the only agreement which had so far been concluded in the Red Sea, where
there are nine states with potential maritime boundaries, was that between Sudan and
Saudi Arabia in 1974 (Blake, 1987: p.124.).
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As yet there is no agreement concerning the Saudi-Yemeni maritime boundary.
However, the fourth clause of the Saudi-Yemeni Memorandum of Understanding states:
A joint committee will be formed which will negotiate on determining the sea border
in accordance with international law, starting from the border point on the Red Sea
coast mentioned in Clause 2 above (SWB. 1995: p. 15).
The maritime boundary could form the topic for another thesis. As the main focus of this
thesis is the Saudi-Yemeni land frontier beyond the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary, this
section will present only a summary of the Saudi-Yemeni maritime boundary by
examining the main factors involved.
2.5.1	 THE 1934 TREATY OF TAIF
The maritime boundary is affected by the text of the 1934 Treaty of Taif because the
Treaty describes the location of the border mark on the Red Sea coast. Saudi Arabia and
Yemen have different interpretations of the position of this 'Tehama border mark Number
(1)' which is described in the Treaty as 'All the sea quay Ras Almiwaj of Radeef Qarad
outlet' (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.446). There are clearly serious problems of
understanding what the original Arabic text said; the translation does not make sense. The
Saudis interpret this location as the south of Duwayyimah Island, whilst the Yemenis
interpret it as the north of the island (Figure 2.5(A)) (MPMR-KSA, 1990b, Tracing on
Jaza'ir Farasan map).
Because of the vague description of the location of border marks in the Treaty (see
Section 2.3), Saudi Arabia and Yemen disagreed on the location of the border mark on the
Red Sea shore. As the maritime boundary should also start from this point on the shore,
the delimitation of the maritime boundary is affected by this dispute (Figure 2.5(A)).
2.5.2	 ISLANDS IN THE DISPUTED ZONE
There are a number of islands in the maritime area disputed between Saudi Arabia and
Yemen (Figure 2.5(A)). The islands in question are (local names are given in brackets):
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Zahrat Ashiq (Small 'Ashiq), Al-Unsurat (As Siya), Nakal (Ruba), Zamhar (Sumary).
Barn (North), Rafa Barn (Rafa North), Duharan. Ardayn, Fasht. Duqaylah. Bukian,
Manahis. Umm a! Hummad. Tawq (or Atwaq), Rukuda (Abu-Arwr), Hashish Reef
(Dadefor). and Al-Bayda.
Al-Muwaled (1993)wrote about the delimitation of Saudi's maritime boundaries in
his PhD thesis (see Section 1.8.2.2). However, considerable further fieldwork is needed
to study these islands from a number of aspects. particularly hydrocarbon and other
economic potential especially fisheries; population size, nationality, and interaction; and
defacto ownership.
2.5.3	 YEMENE OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE DISPUTED ZONE
Yemeni oil exploration in the Red Sea is more active than that of the Saudis. Yemeni
exploration began in the area in 1953 when the West German firm Deilmann Bergbau
signed an agreement with the former North Yemen Government to carry out prospecting
work in a coastal area north of Al-Hudaydah. But the German exploration was cut short
in 1955 as a licence covering 40,000km 2 in almost the identical area was, awarded to an
American firm, Yemen Development Corporation, which withdrew a few years later
(AOG Directory, 1993: p.4.99).
In 1959 the American Overseas Investment Corporation was awarded a concession
of 10.000 km2 on the Tehama coastal plain and in the adjacent waters, but it did not drill
any wells. In 1962 the Mecom Company was awarded the concession for the same zone
and drilled four wells at Salif, Zaidiya, and A1-Hudaydah (Figure 2.6(A)). The drilling
stopped due to the civil war in Yemen in 1962. Yemen then set up two joint ventures to
carry out oil operations; in 1964 the Yemen Fuel Company was established in partnership
with Egypt, and in 1970 Yemen joined forces with Algeria's Sonatrach to form Yominco.
This company was dissolved in 1972 and replaced in 1973 with the Yemen Petroleum
Company (AOG Directory, 1993: pp.499-500).
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Following this period a number of companies were awarded exploration licences in
the Red Sea, but these were relinquished when no oil or gas finds were made. In 1974
Yemen Shell Exploration was awarded a licence for a 19.000km2 offshore zone between
the port of Al-. Hudaydah and the Saudi frontier. The licence was relinquished in 1981. In
1984 Hunt Oil signed an exploration agreement for l2,955km 2 in the same zone, 49% of
which it farmed out to Elf Aquitaine of France in 1986. In July 1987 Elf drilled a well
6.100 feet deep, Al-Meethaq- 1 (Figure 2.6(A)), but then pulled out of the zone as the well
was dry. In February 1988 Hunt Oil drilled a second offshore exploration well. Al-
Meethaq-2 (Figure 2.6(A)). but this was also dry and Hunt Oil also decided to relinquish
the licence. In 1984 British Petroleum was awarded a 22,000km 2 tract on the Tehama
coastal plain, but the company relinquished the licence in 1990 (AOG Directory, 1993:
p.500).
All these companies, the West German firm Deilmann Bergbau (1953). Yemen
Development Corporation (1955), American Overseas Investment Corporation (1959),
Mecom Company (1962). Yemen Fuel Company (1964), Yominco (1970), Yemen
Petroleum Company (1973), Yemen Shell Exploration (1974), Hunt Oil (1984), Elf
Aquitaine (1986), and British Petroleum (1990), all relinquished their concessions on the
Yemen coastal plain and in the adjacent waters primarily because of disappointing survey
results and a failure to discover oil or gas (AOG Directory, 1993: p.500). All this activity
was far from the disputed area and no objections were therefore raised by the Saudis.
British Petroleum returned to offshore operations in the Red Sea and became the
only company to drill a well close to the disputed zone on the Saudi-Yemeni maritime
frontier when it was awarded Block 23, part of which is located in the zone. The block
was a 13,040km2 tract around Antufash Island, 120km north of Al-l-Iudaydah (Figure
2.6(A)). It had been relinquished by Hunt Oil in March 1989 after they had drilled two
dry wells. The concession was for a six-year period beginning in October 1990. The BP
well, known as Antufash (Figure 2.6(A)) was drilled in November 1992 to a depth of
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2.075m. Figure 2.6(A) shows the location of the well and that part of Block 23 which is
in the disputed area. The Saudi Government sent a letter to British Petroleum during the
seismic survey in March 1992 warning the company that it should cease operations as it
was in the disputed zone. Operations in the area were suspended, the Antufash well was
plugged and BP officially abandoned it in April 1993 (AOG Directory, 1993: p.508).
On the Saudi side there were optimistic reports long ago that oil would be found on
the Farasan Islands which are located outside the disputed zone in the Red Sea. A report
on the oil-bearing concessions in the Farasan Islands by Arthur Wade, dated 21 December
1912 states:
Summing up therefore, one can only say, that so far as one can tell by a surface
inspection of oozing petroleum and geological indications, everything is favourable
to the occurrence of commercial quantities of oil on the Farsan Islands (Schofield.
1993: Vol.6: p.399).
But over the following years the results of oil operations on the Farasan Islands have not
been successful. As F.G. Starling of the Petroleum Department wrote to the Under
Secretary of State for the Foreign Office on 21 June 1933:
The Farsan Islands have been investigated by the Shell Group (Red Sea Petroleum
Company), who at one time obtained a concession there and superseded the Eastern
and General Syndicate. The Shell Company drilled without success and abandoned
operations in 1930. A reply has now been received from Shell stating that they are
not interested in the matter. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company have replied that they
are not interested in any concession over the Farsan Islands ... (Schofield, 1993:
Vol.6, p.460).
On 10 July 1936 Saudi Arabia announced in Umm-al-Qura newspaper that an agreement
had been signed with the representative of Petroleum Concessions Limited for oil
extraction in the area:
the area of the concession was the whole Red Sea coasts of Saudi Arabia. to a
depth of 100 kilom., including the Farsan and other islands and other territorial
waters, with the exception of the stretch between Rabigh and Lith (Schofield, 1993:
Vol.6, pp.559-60).
Although Saudi exploratory operations over the following years have been outside the
disputed zone, this does not mean that there is no hydrocarbon potential in the area. The
Saudi Government has not given any concessions in the disputed area. There is no data
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available on the volume of hydrocarbons in the disputed zone even for the 1992 British
Petroleum well, Antufash, which is close to the disputed zone the only available data is
the depth, location, and type of well (Figure 2.6(A)). in general, however, it is possible
to say that the area of the Red Sea which has been explored by Saudi Arabia and Yemen is
not as rich in hydrocarbon deposits as the Arabian Gulf. as most of the companies which
have had concessions have been disappointed.
The solution to the Saudi-Yemeni maritime boundary dispute lies in finding a compromise
to the location of the border mark on the island of Duwayyimah (Figure 2.5(A)), followed
by agreement over the ownership of the islands lying in the disputed zone. The two
countries only then need to decide which method should be used to delimit the maritime
boundary.
2.6	 Conclusion
By signing the Saudi-Yemeni Memorandum of Understanding on 26 February 1995, both
countries agreed to renew the 1934 Treaty of Taif. In Clauses 2, 3, and 4 of the
Memorandum it was agreed to set up two joint committees to deal with the Saudi-Yemeni
boundary including that part already delimited by the 1934 Treaty of Taif, the undelimited
land frontier, and the maritime boundary (SWB, 1995: p.15).
Along the Treaty of Taif boundary the joint committee's task will be to re-establish
the border marks in accordance with the border reports appended to the Treaty. The
author recommended such action in 1991 in his Master's thesis, The Saudi-Yemeni
Boundary
 According to the Treaty of Taif 1934. As the two countries have followed this
recommendation of the 1991 study, the author hopes that further advantages will be
gained by Saudi Arabia and Yemen from the present study which focuses on the
undelimited frontier to the east of the Treaty of Taif boundary.
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The committee which is responsible for re-establishing the Treaty of Taif border
marks will also decide on the measures required to demarcate the remainder of the
territorial boundary (SWB, 1995: p.15). The frontier beyond the Treaty boundary has
been divided by the author into the Western Study Sector, Central Study Sector, and
Eastern Study Sector as Figure 1.5(A) shows, each study sector having different
characteristics as has been previously mentioned.
Some British authors have rated the chances of various historical boundary
proposals being used as the basis for the Saudi-Yemeni frontier to the east of the Treaty
boundary. Schofield (1994: p.25) regards the liklihood of an agreed boundary in the
Southern Peninsula being based on the 1935 Hamzah line as extremely slim. Wilkinson
(1991: p.364), on the other hand, mentions the use of the British Declaration line as a
possible boundary.
It is.. however, unrealistic to suggest the use of historical proposals without
examining other factors such as the de facto border, hydrocarbon potential and other
economic opportunities, tribal boundaries, the distribution of population, and population
interaction between the two states. It is these factors which the author will consider in the
following chapters to assist the determination of a logical Saudi-Yemeni boundary which
may, or may not, coincide with historical proposals (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5).
The key to a Saudi-Yemeni maritime boundary solution is agreement on the location
of the border point on the Red Sea coast. The possibility of a trade-off involving the
islands should be considered, along with a Joint Development Zone in the event of
hydrocarbons being discovered.
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The Western Study Sector
3. 1	 Introduction
The Western Study Sector covers the former Yemen Arab Republic (tbrmer Imamate of
Yemen)-Saudi Arabia frontier to the east of the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundar y. The sector
is enclosed to the south by the extreme Saudi claim represented by the line shown on the
MPMR-KSA (1983) Arabian Peninsula map (see Section 2.4.1) (which coincides with
part of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (see Section 2.4.2.7)), and to the north by the
extreme Yemeni claim represented by the line shown on the MSD-SAR (1%7) Yemen
Arab Republic map (see Section 2.4.1). The sector is approximately located between
173O'N, 15°30'N and 44'OO'E, 46°30'E (Figure 3.1). There are five provinces which
border the Western Study Sector: the Saudi province of Naj ran, and the Yemeni
governorates of Manb, Sa'dah, San'a', and Shubwah. Figure 3.2 shows the terms which
will be used in this chapter to describe the different parts of the Western Study Sector
frontier.
Several factors make this study sector of the Saudi-Yemem frontier more important
than either of the other sectors. These include the fact that it is adjacent to the eastern
extremity of the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary, the existence of oil fields in the south of
the sector, a relatively large population, and a number of checkpoints. Most significantly,
some people of Saudi nationality live under Yemeni control in this region.
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3.2	 Geographical Features
According to Drysdale and Blake writing of the land boundaries of the Middle East and
North Africa:
About 35 percent of the boundary lines in the region are physiographic, chiefly
following rivers, wadis, and watersheds. (Drvsdale and Blake, 1985: p.81)
The study of the geographical features in this sector is very important because here the
frontier was established using geographical features. This section examines the geology,
relief, water resources, and climate of the sector.
3.2.1	 GEOLOGY, RELIEF, AND WATER RESOURCES
There are two principal groups of geological formations in the Western Study Sector. The
first group consists of pre-Permian granite and grandionte which are most pronounced in
the west of the sector where they constitute an extension of the Sarowet Mountains
(Figure 3.3(A)) (GMAQ-KSA, 1979). This granite and grandiorite has created strong
relief consisting of mountains and wadis as Figure 3.3(A) shows. The maximum height
of the mountains is approximately 2,000m. Jabal Barat (jabal is the Arabic term for a hill
or mountain, or a range of either) is the most important of the relief features in this sector
as there are several wells and cultivated wadis on its slopes in which grapes, figs, coffee
beans and tobacco have been planted. These wadis are Wadi Salba, Wadi Sayh, Wadi
Amlah, Wadi A1-'Atfayn, Wadi Ablaj, and Wadi Khabb. The second group of geological
structures in this sector consists of Permian and pre-Permian Wajid Sandstone. In the
south-east of this sector there are a number of long, nearly parallel, sharp-crested, narrow
sand ridges and dune chains, separated by sandy plains (GMAQ-KSA, 1979). The major
wadi in this sector is Wadi Al-Jawf which is approximately six kilometers in length and
two kilometers wide. It is one of the best wadis in Yemen in agricultural terms because of
an abundance of water which originates from the flood-flow of the Wadis Amran and
Qamar south of Sa'dah, and the Jabal Barat (Al-Thawr, 1985: p.393; Swiss Technical
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Co-operation Service, 1978: p.1/4). In the west of the Western Study Sector there arc
also several plains (Figure 3.3(A)), namely May'in, Al-Hazm, AL-Ham in Wadi Al-Jawl
and the Khabb plain. On the Khabb and Al-Jawf plains groundwater is at a depth of about
five metres (Al-Thawr, 1985: p.391).
In the Wadi Al-Jawf and Jabal Al-Rayyan areas there arc also sabkhas (salt
encrusted flats where evaporites are commonly found, Monkhouse and Small (1978:
p.256)). In the past, sabkha was considered as evidence of the presence of hydrocarbons
(A1-Thawr, 1985: p.392). Oil exploration teams also relied on other perceptible signs -
such as the seepage of oil or gas - to lead them to a reservoir. However, advances in
technology have since allowed exploration teams to go beyond such basic methods of
exploration to enable the location of reservoirs where no obvious signs of them exist.
Seismic survey currently provides the most effective method for finding and mapping
underground reservoirs (Watkins, 1993: p.18).
There is a possibility of using a geographical feature in this sector, namely Jabal
Barat, as a basis for delimiting the boundary. This mountain range is located in the south
of the Western Study Sector, near to the extreme Saudi claim (Figure 3.3(A)).
In any discussion about the Saudi-Yemeni frontier, water resources should be
second only in significance to oil.
By the [year] 2000 water not oil will be the dominant resource issue in the Middle
East. (Agnew and Anderson, 1992: pA.7)
It is therefore vital to examine at transboundary water resource issues in the Western
Study Sector. The most significant cultivated land is Wadi AI-Jawf in the south of the
sector, and a few of the wadis on Jabal Barat. In the mountains in the west of the sector
there are fresh-water wells. These are dug wells, usually lined either with man-made
blocks, or stones, cemented together. Most of these wells arc old, some of them having
been constructed over 100 years ago. On the plains in this sector there are sabkhas and
wadis where the water is saline and deep wells are drilled (Al-Thawr, 1985: p.39!). Table
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3.1 shows some of the water wells drilled in the north be yond the sector on the Saudi sidc
oF the frontier by the Saudi Ministiv oF Agriculture (Figure 3.3(A)).
Table 3. / Water wells drilled on the Saudi side adjacent to the Western Study Sector
Location of Wells	 Depth	 Geologic Time	 Water Production
(m)	 gallons/mm
Al-Khadra(l)	 46	 Permian	 2(X)
Al-Khadra(2)	 61	 Penman	 420
Al-Khadra(3)	 79	 Permian	 16.22
Khbash	 79.4	 Pcrmian	 185
Souree: Miiiistrv of Agncu(ture jrchive (1994)
Such clls are the onl y SOUCC oF drinking water on the Saudi side. The exact location of
the aquifer in relation to the frontier is unknown, but the depth of water and the level of
water prxluction is goo.I evidence of the relative accessibility of water in this area,
compared to the Central Study Sector where the water table is over 1,000m deep in the
vicinity of Sharurah. This will undoubtedl y have an effect on the resolution of the
boundary, as water resources are an important bargaining int ii tradc-offs arc to be
made and a compromise boundary agreed. For this reason it will be important to
determine the exact location of the aquifer in relation to the frontier, and if necessary agree
a groundwater treaty in order to avoid problems relating to water resources arising
between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the Future.
3.2.2	 CLIMATE
The migration of the Anaia, Rowalla and Shammar tribes in thc northern borderland of
Saudi Arabia is affected by the climate: they move to pasture and water during the winter
and spring (Asadallah, 1971: p.17). However, on the frontier between Saudi Arabia and
Yemen, especially in the Western Study Sector, the Saudi and Yemeni border guards
do not allow shepherds in the frontier area for security reasons (Saudi Border Guard, 1994
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The nearest meteorological station to the Western Study Sector is in Wadi Najran in
Najran province, which borders the sector. The climate in this sector is basically a desert
climate, with hot summers and cool winters. Figure 3.4 shows the average daily
maximum temperatures for each month in Najran province over two years; spring and
summer temperatures reach 38°C, decreasing to 23°C in the winter. The most important
question with regard to frontier crossings is whether the high summer temperatures have
an effect on the number of crossings made. The Saudi Immigration Office gave a clear
answer to this question; the number of people crossing is only affected by the the timing
of the pilgnmage (hajj) and public holidays, and the periods during which the Saudi
government allows the frontier tribes certain privileges. These privileges will be discussed
in the following section.
3.2.3	 RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF FRONTIER TRIBES
In the 1934 Treat y
 of Taif (Article 4), the tribes which were split by the Treaty were given
certain privileges concerning freedom to cross the frontier:
and while the Hadah and Zur Wad'a and the Wailah in Najran belong to Wailah,
and except in so far as has been mentioned, do not come within the Saudi Arab
Kingdom, this shall not prevent them nor their brothers of Wailah from enjoying
mutual relation ... (cited in Schofield, 1992: Vol 20, p.92) [author's emphasisi
In Arabic, the meaning of 'shall not prevent them' is stronger than in English. The Saudi
government therefore gives members of the Wa'ilah tribe of both Saudi and Yemeni
nationality more privileges than other tribes on the frontier. The Saudi government also
gives privileges to Saudi citizens who live in Wadi Al-'Atfayn under Yemeni control.
There are approximately 5,000 Saudi citizens living in Wadi Al-'Atfayn (Saudi
Immigration Office Records, 1994). The privileges they are allowed are as follows:
a	 The Saudi government allows members of the Wa'ilah tribe of Yemeni nationality to
cross the frontier from Yemen to enter Saudi, but only through the checkpoint in
Najran province.
111
CHARTER 3
b	 Members of the Wa'ilah tribe of Yemeni nationality crossing the frontier from
Yemen are allowed to do so with just a 'statement' for identification (Plate 3.1, see
Section 2.3.5.1). They are exempt from passport and visa requirements.
c Saudi Customs allow members of the Wa'ilah tribe of both Saudi and Yemeni
nationality to export a certain quantity of goods tax-free, and the price of the goods
is always lower than the market price (see Appendix 4 showing an individual's
duty-free allowance). The duty-free allowance is permitted only every three months.
The period is three months because the Saudi Privileges Office estimates three
months as the minimum time for the allowance to run out (Saudi Customs, Al-
Khadra checkpoint,.Author's field surve y, Oct-Dec 1994).
A simple comparison of the national product per capita between Saudi Arabia and Yemen
shows the considerable difference which exists between the two countries economically.
In 1994 this was US$1,955 for Yemen, whilst in Saudi Arabia it was US$9,510. As an
illustration of the relative stability of the two economies a comparison of the exchange
rates shows that whilst in Saudi Arabia the rate is US$1:3.74 Saudi Riyals (a rate which
has been fixed since 1986), in December 1994 the official Yemeni rate stood at
US$1: 12.00 Yemeni Riyals, and the market rate was US$1:90 Yemeni Riyals (CIA
World Factbook, 1996)
3.2.4	 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
Populations of frontier regions are generally concerned about their future, and that of their
property and relatives, especially in cases where a boundary is disputed. The significance
of studying population distribution in the Western Study Sector is to recognise the most
populous parts of the frontier zone, as the existence of settlements affects the location of
the Logical Boundary.
In the absence of any reliable up-to-date population data, the author used the Final
Report presented by the Swiss Technical Co-operation Service (STCS) in 1978 to study
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the disthbution of population on the Yemeni side of the Western Study Sector of the
frontier. This report is still the most specific data currently available for the study of
population distribution in the eastern region of former North Yemen. The Yemeni
Ministry of Development requested a survey from the Swiss government to test the
accuracy of the 1976 population census, to elaborate the approximate population figures
of those districts in the eastern part of the country which were not reached by the 1976
census, to collect the names of settlements, and to determine the administrative divisions
of the country (STCS, 1978: p.viii).
The Swiss team had difficulties in subdividing the population into two main groups:
residents and bedouin. They found not only fully sedentary farmers (residents) and
permanently migrating cattle breeders (bedouin), but all kinds of organisational forms
between these two elementary life styles (STCS, 1978: p.ii-121).
However, the Swiss team decided to use two groups for population distribution in
the eastern region of Yemen: residents, meaning farmers, and bedouin (including semi-
bedouin).
On the Saudi side, the author used the Saudi Census 1994 together with the Najran
map to determine population distribution. The Swiss team's classification of residents and
bedouin was also used.
Figure 3.5(A) shows the distribution of bedouin and residents in the frontier zone,
the majority of residents being located in the west of this sector. The Saudis who live
under Yemeni control are mostly found in Nahiyat Kitaf because Wadi Al-'Atfayn is
located in this nahiat (sub-governorate, Yemeni administrative area).
The Saudi territorial claim is partly based on the fact that there are people of Saudi
nationality living under Yemeni control in the area claimed. In the case of the Yemeni
territorial claim, the extreme part of the area claimed is uninhabited.
On the Saudi side, the author gleaned some knowledge about the lifestyle of
bedouin during his field survey. In Al-Khadra Emirate the bedouin are living in tents and
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follow the grazing seasonally, whilst in the Rijlah Emirate the bedouin are living in
permanently-located tents. Most of the bedouin in the Rijlah Emirate arc from the Wa'ilah
tribe and many own properties on the Ycmeni side in Wadi Al-'Atfayn, Nahiyat Kitaf (for
more information about the properties see Section 3.3. 1.3). Most of the Wa'ilah
tribesmen who live in the Rijlah Emirate have a second wife on the Yemcni side of the
frontier in Wadi Al-'Atfayn.
3.3	 Cross-Frontier Interaction
In recent years there has been a strong tendency towards the integration of borderland
populations, and much interest in the process by borderland scholars (Martinez, 1994:
p.1). In Europe and North America the interaction consists of a flow of people and
commerce between places, but in the Middle East the flow is powerfully influenced by
political factors (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.21). This effect was clear during 1990-I
'hen, as a result of the Yemem government's pro-Iraqi actions and its voting pattern at
the UN, Saudi Arabia cut all financial aid and withdrew the residence permits of more
than 850,000 Yemeni workers (Arab News, 1992: p.4). As a result of this political
action, the level of interaction along the Saudi-Yemeni frontier was greatly reduced.
However, it is important to note that cross-frontier interaction of the borderland
population (those able to cross the frontier using only a statement) was unaffected during
this period.
This section presents the analysis of replies to the author's structured interview
made by respondents crossing the frontier in the Western Study Sector between 1 October
and 10 December 1994 (see Section 1.6.2.2). The information requested included the
purpose of the crossing; the experience of the checkpoints and the perception of the
frontier.
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Table 3.2 Nationality , tribe, and residence of respondents inten'iewed
at Al-Khadra checkpoint
Respondent's Province
	 Settlement	 Tribe	 Sample Size
Nationality
	Nu er	 %
Saudi	 Najraa (S)	 AI-Sharih	 Wa'ilah	 73	 20.2
Kital'(Y)	 Rmah	 Wa'ilah	 49	 13.7
Kital	 Sha'ir	 Wa'ilah	 23	 6.4
Kilaf	 Madrak	 Wa'ilah	 21	 5.8
Kitaf	 Atuis	 Wa'ilah	 21	 5.8
Kitaf	 'Alib	 Wa'ilah	 18	 5.0
Kitaf	 \lihar	 Wa'ilah	 17	 4.7
Najran	 Najran	 Yam	 17	 4.7
Kitaf	 GhawihAl-Rbaa	 Wa'ilah	 15	 4.2
Kitai	 Sallbah	 Wa'ilah	 14	 3.9
Kital	 Al-'Aqiq	 Wa'ilah	 13	 3.6
Najran	 A1-Swq	 Wa'ilah	 13	 3.6
ajran	 Al-Hasymyah	 Wa'ilah	 12	 3.3
Najran	 Dhdah	 Yam	 12	 3.3
Kitaf	 A1-Mavin	 Wa'ilah	 12	 3.3
Kitaf	 Al-Rwikabh	 Wa'ilah	 12	 3.3
Kitaf	 Al-Harshaf	 Wa'ilah	 11	 3.0
Najran	 A1-Sa'id	 Wa'ilah	 8	 2.2
Total	 361	 100
Yemeni	 Kitaf	 Wadi A1-'Atfayn	 Wa'ilah	 38	 10.7
Kitaf	 Atiis	 Wa'ilah	 32	 9.0
Kitaf	 Sh.air	 Wa'ilah	 30	 8.4
Kitaf	 Sallbah	 Wa'ilah	 28	 7.8
Kitaf	 Madrak	 Wa'ilah	 25	 7.0
A1-Jaf	 A1-Ytmah	 Dahm	 25	 7.0
Kitaf	 A1-Mwsatah	 Wa'ilah	 23	 6.4
Kitaf	 A1-Hadnah	 Wa'ilah	 22	 6.2
Kitaf	 A1-Fara	 Wa'ilah	 17	 4.8
A1-Jawf	 Khabb	 Dahm	 13	 3.6
Kitaf	 Kitaf	 Wa'ilah	 13	 3.6
A1-Jawf	 A1-Ashraf	 Wa'ilah	 12	 3.4
Sa'dah	 Wadi Amlah	 Wa'ilah	 8	 2.2
A1-Jawf	 A1-Ghavl	 Dahm	 8	 2.2
A1-Jawf	 Al-Gaif	 Dahm	 8	 2.2
A1-Jawf	 Wadi Wasat	 Dahm	 7	 2.0
A1-Jawf	 Barat	 Dahin	 6	 1.7
Sana'	 San' a'	 Arhb	 6	 1.7
A1-Jawf	 Al-Zahir	 Dahm	 6	 1.7
Sa'dah	 Nushur	 Hamdan	 6	 1.7
A1-Jawf	 A1-Jawf	 Dahm	 6	 1.7
lbb	 Al-Udayn	 Namh	 5	 1.4
San'a'	 Shaharah	 A1-Ahnwni	 4	 1.1
Mahb	 Zararh	 Dabni	 4	 1.1
M-1-ludaydah	 Bayt Al-Faqih	 Hamdan	 3	 0.8
Al-Bayda'	 Al-Bayda'	 Yafa'	 2	 0.6
Total	 357	 100
UAE	 Abu-Dhabi	 Abu-Dhabi	 Al-Manasir	 39	 59.1
Abu-Dhabi	 A1-Dfrah	 Al-Manasir	 27	 40.9
Total	 66	 100
Qatan	 Al-Doha	 Raiyan	 Al-BriakiAl-Kuzab 	 -14	 100
Total
	
	 -44	 100
(S): on the Saudi side of the frontier; (Y): on the Yemeni side of the frontier
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994
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Table 3.2 shows that the majority of people crossing the frontier are from the Wa'ilah
tribe (65.8%) and are also living in Wadi Al-' Atfa n which is not far (30-40km) from the
Al-Khadra checkpoint (Figure 3.6 (A)). Wadi Al-'Atfayn includes several villages
belonging to the Wa'ilah tribe. This tribe uses the checkpoint more than any of the other
tribes living in the Western Study Sector. There are members of the Wa'ilah tribe of both
Saudi and Yemeni nationality living in Wadi Al-'Atfayn. With regard to the crossings
made by people from the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, the respondents reside
approximately 1,000km from the checkpoint at Al-Khadra. The chief tribes are Al-Kurab,
Briak and Al-Manasir.
3.3.1	 PURPOSES OF FRONTIER CROSSINGS
Borderland populations cross boundaries for various purposes such as transboundary
trade, recreation, migration and attendant social and cultural relationships. Such activities
have linked regions of adjoining countries ever closer to one another (Martinez, 1994).
The purposes of crossing are often very closely associated. The author noted that during
his interviews on the frontier, it was very difficult to priontise the purposes of crossing
the frontier, especially for bedouin and uneducated people. However, the author tried
very hard to identify the main purpose of frontier crossings in the Western Study Sector.
En comparison with other nationalities, the Saudis crossing the frontier found it very
hard to separate the various purposes from one another, not least because they have
relations and properties in both Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and they also make shopping
trips to the Saudi side of the frontier. Because most crossings were multi-purpose, the
identifcation of a primary purpose can only be approximate in this thesis.
Table 3.3 shows the various purposes of frontier crossings in the Western Study
Sector. 89% of all crossings were for the purpose of visiting relatives. Kinship ties are
thus one of the most common reasons for tribal frontier movement in the Western Study
Sector (Figure 3.7). Abu-Dawdood (1984) found many Yemenis crossing the Saudi
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frontier to seek cmplovment in the construction industry. This was probably true along
the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary, especially at Al-Tawal checkpoint, but not in the
Western Study Sector at Al-Khadra checkpoint. The majority of Yemenis crossing the
frontier have a 'statement' as their means of identification as this is one of the Saudi
privileges for people living along the frontier (see Section 2.3.5.1). However, if Yemenis
want to work in Saudi Arabia they must have a passport and visa.
Table 3.3 The purposes of frontier crossings of respondents questioned at Al-Khadra
checkpoint, classified according to priority
Purpose of Prionty	 Nationality
Crossing	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE	 Qatari
No.	 % No.	 %	 No.	 c7	 No.	 7c
Relatives	 First priority	 361	 100	 --	 --	 66	 100	 44	 100
Second priority	--	 --	 273	 76.5 --	 --	 --	 --
Other purposes	 --	 --	 84	 23.5 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 361 100 357 100	 66 100	 44 100
Markets	 First priority	 --	 --	 357 100	 --	 --	 --	 --
Second pnorlty	 --	 --	 --	 --	 9	 13.6 ii	 25
Third priority	 247	 68.4 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Other purposes 114	 31.6 --	 --	 57	 86.4 33	 75
Total	 361 100 357 100	 66 100	 44 100
Properties First pnonty
	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Second priority 361	 100	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Other purposes	 --	 --	 357 100	 66 100	 44 100
Total	 361 100 357 100	 66 100	 44 100
Grazing	 Other puposes 361 100 357 100	 66 100	 44 100
andWells	 ____________________________________________
Total	 361 100 357 100	 66 100	 44 100
Source: Authofs Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994
Table 3.3 also shows the purposes of frontier crossings of the respondents questioned at
Al-Khadra checkpoint, classified according to priority. The purpose most frequently
stated by Saudis was visiting relatives, followed by visits to properties, and trips to
markets. However, as previously mentioned, all the purposes are closely linked to one
another. Many Saudi crossings are accounted for by relatives and properties on both sides
of the frontier. In these cases the individuals live on both sides of the frontier, having
originated from one of several villages in Wadi Al-'Atfayn. Using information from Saudi
crossings at Wadi Al-'Atfayn, Saudi Immigration estimates that more than 5,000
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Figure 3.7: Purposes of crossing by respondents interviewed at A1-Khadra checkpoint
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individuals are living under Yemeni control. This situation only exists on this scale on the
Saudi-Yemen frontier in the Western Study Sector, although similar situations are found
in many
 other parts of the Middle East as a result of boundary change. In the Golan
Heights, for example, there is a population of 15,000 Syrians living in several villages
under Israeli control (Harris, 1993: p.86). However, there the comparison ends, as Saudi
citizens living in Yemen can visit their relations and property in Saudi Arabia every day if
they want to. The Druze population in the Golan Heights, on the other hand, cannot cross
the frontier for any purpose.
Table 3.3 also presents the reasons given by the Yemeni respondents at Al-Khadra
checkpoint for their frontier crossings, classified according to priority. The most
frequently stated purpose was trips to markets in Saudi Arabia, followed by visits to
relatives. In the Yemeni cases it was equally difficult to identify the main purpose for
crossings. Most of the people in the sample have relatives from the same tribe on the
Saudi side of the frontier. In general, they go straight to their relatives for about one
week, eat and sleep in the same house and purchase goods in the Najran markets.
The main purpose of frontier crossings made by people from Qatar and the UAE
(Table 3.3) was visits to relatives, followed by trips to markets. All of those from Qatar
and UAE crossing the frontier had Yemeni wives who lived with their husbands in Qatar
or the UAE, and visiting their wives' relatives was the only reason for them to cross the
frontier.
The following sections present more details about each purpose of frontier crossing.
3.3.1.1	 Visits to Relatives
Alienated borderlands are those in which people are not allowed contact with their
relatives on the other side of the boundary and in which the possibility of large-scale
violence keeps such unstable areas sparsely populated and underdeveloped. In the past
there have been many good examples of alienated borderlands:
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the Scottish-British frontier n the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the USA-
Mexico border during most of the nineteenth century. Currently, alienated
borderlands are found in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe.
(Martinez, 1994: p.2)
As the boundary in the Western Study Sector is currently formally undelimitcd, the study
of the relationships between the tribes on the frontier is very important. Contact between
relatives should be allowed across the frontier, and such crossings should be easily
tici!itated.
Article Four of the 1934 Treaty of Taif states that contact between members of the
Wa'jlah and Wada'a tribes on the Saudi and Yemeni sides of the frontier should not be
prevented.
Table 3.4 shows more details about respondents interviewed at A1-K1iadra
checkpoint who were visiting relatives on both sides of the frontier. Substantial numbers
of Saudis crossing the frontier have relatives in Yemen in the villages in Wadi Al-'Atfayn
(93%). These people have properties (farms, houses, wells, and grazing land) in Wadis
Al-Sharfah and Rijlah in Saudi Arabia, and in Wadi A1-'Atfayn under Yemeni control
(Figure 3.8(A)). These Saudis cross the frontier because they wish to maintain their
properites on both sides of the de facto border and take advantage of the better living
conditions on the Saudi side. The majority of Saudis crossing the frontier were from the
Al-Swidan, Al-Slah and Al-Qari'a branches of the Wa'ilah tribe (Author's Field Survey,
I Oct-10 Dec 1994). Yemenis crossing the frontier often have relatives on the Saudi side
in Najran province as Table 3.4 shows. These relatives are Saudis from the same
branches of the Wa'ilah thbe, namely Al-Abuwjbarah and A1-Hasyniyah (Author's Field
Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994).
The people from the UAE and Qatar crossing the frontier had relatives in the Al-
Kurab and Al-Briak branches of the Bul-'Abeid tribe. They all had wives from Yemen
who still hold Yemeni nationality (Saudi Immigration Office, 1994; Author's Field
Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994).
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Table 3.4 Tribe and settlement of relatives of respondents interviewed
at Al-Khadra checkpoint
ml's Relatives'	 Relatives'	 Relatives'	 Sample
National itv	 Province	 Settlement	 Tribe	 Number
Saudi	 Kitaf (Y)
	 Wadi Al-Atfayn Wa'ilah/Yam	 336	 93.0
Najran	 Najran	 Wa'ilah	 13	 3.6
Najran	 Al-'Arisah	 Wa'ilah	 4	 1.1
Najran	 Al-Swg	 Wa'ilah	 3	 0.8
Najran	 Dhdah	 Wa'ilah	 3	 0.8
Najran	 Al-Hasyniyah	 Wa'ilah	 2	 0.6
Total	 361	 100
Yemeni	 Najran	 Al-Shartah	 Wa'ilah	 92	 25.8
Najran	 Najran	 Wa'ilah	 71	 19.9
Najran	 A1-'Ansah	 Wa'ilah	 65	 18.2
Najran	 Al-Jarbah	 Wa'ilah	 20	 5.6
Najran	 Al-Fidh	 Wa'ilah	 18	 5.0
Najran	 Al-Swg	 Wa'ilah	 7	 2.0
Novisitto	 --	 --	 84	 23.5
relatives
Total	 357	 100
UAE	 Manb (Y) Maib	 Al-Manasir	 29	 43.9
Mahb	 Wadi 'Abidh	 Al-Kurab	 25	 37.9
Bihan	 Al-Bnak	 12	 18.2
Total	 66	 100
Qatan	 Maib	 Mahb	 Al-Kurab	 27	 61.4
Wadi 'Abidh	 Al-Bnak	 17	 38.6
Total	 44	 100
(S) on the Saudi side of the frontier
(Y) on the Yemeni side of the frontier
Source: Authofs Field Survey. 1 Oct-lODec 1994
All the nationalities keep in touch with their relatives through overland visits, as this is the
only available means of contact. Telephone, post and air travel are not used to contact
relatives. Telephones are available in Najran city on the Saudi side of the frontier, but not
available in Wadi A1-'Atfayn, for example. The people living in Yemen like to use friends
to deliver letters and goods to their relatives on both sides of the frontier as it is regarded
as safer and quicker. There are also no flights available from Najran province in Saudi
Arabia to Nahiyat Kitaf in Yemen.
Table 3.5 shows the frequency with which the respondents interviewed at Al-
Khadra crossed the frontier to visit their relatives. 90% of the Saudis cross weekly
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because most of them have a second wife on the Yemeni side of the frontier, whilst their
children are taught in schools in Saudi Arabia. They take their children to the Saudi
schools every
 week and bring them back to Yemen each weekend. 62.2% of Yemenis
cross the frontier monthly to take advantage of government privileges, as discussed in
Section 3.2.3. UAE and Qatari nationals visit their relatives on average every three to six
months, but particularly during public holidays, as discussed above.
Table 3.5 Frequency of visits to relatives by respondents interviewed
at A1-Khadra checkpoint
k-requency	 Respondent's Nationality
	 Total
of Visits	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE	 Qatan
No.	 %	 No.	 % No. % No.
	 7c No.	 %
Daily --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Weekly
	325	 90	 43	 12.0	 --	 --	 --	 --	 368 44.4
Monthly
	36	 10	 222 62.2	 --	 --	 --	 --	 258 31.2
Yearly--	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Other	 --	 --	 8	 2.2 66	 100	 44	 100 118 14.2
(3-6 months)
No visit	 --	 --	 84	 23.6	 --	 --	 --	 --	 84 10.2
to relatives
Total	 361 100	 357 100	 66	 100	 44	 [00 828 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994
3.3.1.2	 Visits to Markets
Routine visits into neighbouring countries by local people is commonplace throughout the
world where a degree of goodwill and stability exists:
Interdependent borderlands are made possible by relatively stable international
relations and by the existence of a favourable economic climate that permits
borderlanders on both sides of the line to stimulate growth and development that are
tied to foreign capital, markets, and labour. (Martinez, 1994: p.4)
The development of a cross-boundary economy probably helps to prevent the smuggling
of goods across the frontier, especially when there is a weak economy on one side of the
boundary and a developing economy on the other, as is the case with Yemen and Saudi
Arabia.
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Table 3.6 shows that the Yemen-based Saudis use the Naj ran markets because the
goods are cheaper there than in Yemen. For example, a live kilogram box of tea costs
US$15 in Yemen, but only US$7 in Saudi Arabia (Author's Field Survey, Oct-Dec
1994). Similarly, in the mid- 1980s a 30,000 litre load of petrol cost SR8,000 and sold in
Yemen for YR27,000 (Dresch, 1989: p.3O9). The Najran markets arc also more
convenient (Figure 3.9(A)). The people living in Wadi Al-'Atfayn in Yemen still have
Saudi nationality. Their shopping goods consist of petrol, food, and other essentials. The
duty-free allowance list in Appendix 4 gives an indication of the goods regularly
purchased.
Table 3.6 Markets visited by respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint
Markets visited	 Restx)ndents' Nationality	Total
emeni
NO.	 "c	 INO.	 ic	 INO.	 ic	 NO.	 'ic	 INO.	 '/c
Najran	 231	 64.0	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 231	 27.9
Al -Buq ' a	 16	 4.4	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 16	 2.0
AVArjsah
	
--	 --	 62	 17.4	 --	 --	 --	 --	 62	 7.6
Al-Sa'id	 --	 --	 295	 82.6	 --	 --	 --	 --	 295	 35.6
Mahb --	 -	 --	 --	 9	 13.6	 --	 --	 9	 1.0
SuqAl-Anan	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 11	 25	 11	 1.3
No visit to
	 114 31.6	 --	 --	 57	 86.4 33	 75	 204 24.6
market
Total	 361	 100 357 100
	 66 100	 44	 100 828 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994
4.4% of Saudis crossing the frontier also go to Al-Buq'a market on the Yemeni side. It
was expected to find a greater percentage of Saudis crossing the frontier to go to Al-Buq'a
because Saudi tradesmen do good business there selling blankets, carpets and vehicle
tvres. Such goods are clearly visible in Plates 3.2 and 3.3. This unexpectedly low figure
may be explained, as the Customs Office informed the author, by the fact that some Saudi
tradesmen are hiring Yemeni tradesmen to deliver their goods to Al-Buq'a market to sell
them there. Many Yemeni vehicles carrying these goods are driven to Al-Buq'a market. A
queue of such vehicles is shown in Plates 3.2 and 3.3.
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All the Yemenis crossing the frontier to go to markets on the Saudi side were going
to the markets at Al-'Aravisah and A1-Sa'id. There are several reasons for this:
a	 The majority of Yemenis crossing the frontier have only limited permission to travel
in Saudi Arabia, being confined by their 'statements' to Najran province. A copy of
a 'statement' is shown in Plate 3.1.
b	 The Naj ran markets are cheap, nearby, and easy to reach.
c	 The privilege of purchasing duty-free goods every three months is limited to those
goods bought in Najran province only.
Some of the Yemenis crossing northwards bring sultanas (rasiki, white and black) and
coffee (husks, seeds, and ready-ground) to sell in Saudi Arabia. Most of the popular
sultanas and coffee in the Najran markets come from Yemen. Of those crossing into
Yemen holding UAE passports, 13.6% were visiting Mahb market, and 25% of Qataris
in the sample were visiting Suq Al-'Anan (suq is Arabic for market), both groups with the
intention of selling cars popular for crossing the desert (notably Toyota Pickups). The
cars are bought in the UAE and Qatar and sold in Yemen at a higher price.
Table 3.7 Frequency of visits to markets by respondents interviewed
at Al-Khadra checkpoint
Irequency	 Keponde
of Visits	 Saudi	 Yemeni
INO.	 ic	 INO.	 'Ic	 INO.	 'to	 INO.	 'Ic	 INO.	 'to
Daily --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Weekly	 201	 55.7 94	 26.3 --	 --	 --	 --	 295	 35.6
Monthly	 46	 12.7 220	 61.7 --	 --	 --	 --	 266	 32.2
Yearly--	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Other	 --	 --	 43	 12.0	 9	 13.6 ii	 25	 63	 7.6
No visit	 114	 31.6 --	 --	 57	 86.4 33	 75	 204	 24.6
Total	 361 100 357 100	 66 100	 44	 100 828 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994
Table 3.7 shows the frequency with which respondents interviewed at Af-Khadra
checkpoint crossed the frontier to visit markets. 55.7% of Saudi crossings are weekly
because they are only allowed to carry personal shopping across the frontier, in addition
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to their three monthly duty-free goods allowance (see Section 3.2.3). 01 the Yemenis
crossing the frontier to visit markets, 61.7% cross monthly and 26.3% weekly. Unlike
the Saudis, Ycmenjs are not allowed to cross the frontier with personal shopping bought
in Saudi Arabia. Instead they sell sultanas and coffee in the Najran markets and return to
the Yemeni side with their duty-free goods such as petrol, food, and furniture when their
three-monthly allowance is due (see Plate 3.2). 12% of Yemenis cross the frontier at
every
 three to six months, including some who come from great distances such as from
Sanaa', Ibb and Al-Hudvadah.
Along the Saudi-Iraqi boundary bedouin sell their animals in markets on the Saudi
side and buy provisions for themselves from Saudi towns or oases (Asadallah, 1971:
p.72). But along the Saudi-Yemeni frontier the Saudi Customs Office do not allow
animals to be imported for sale for health reasons (Saudi Customs Office, Al-Khadm
checkpoint, 1994).
Table 3.7 also shows the frequency with which the UAE and Qatari respondents
visit Yemem markets. Both groups only cross every three to six months, no doubt
because they come long distances (approximately 1,000km).
3.3. 1.3
	 Visits to Properties
Properties located in close proximity to boundaries show some remarkable features. For
example, the Morocco-Algeria boundary divides kinsfolk, properties, and even a
cemetery. Remarkably, there is a house on the boundary line whose windows open into
Algerian territory, while the house is on Moroccan land (Al-Ahmdi, 1990 p.15).
Similarly, some properties exist on the Saudi-Yemeni frontier whose significance is
associated with the undelimited Western Study Sector boundary. People who have
properties in the frontier region should be compensated or have special access to their
properties across the barrier of a boundary, once delimited.
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Table 3.8 Tribes of respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint
who own property across the frontier, and location of properties
<espon1ents	 Respondents'	 Location o
	 Sample Size
Nationality
	Tribe	 Respondents' Property
	Number
Saudi	 Wa'ilah	 Al-Shari ah (S)
	 167	 46.3
Wa'ilah	 Al-'Atfayn (Y)
	 130	 36.0
Wa'ilah&Yam	 Rijlah(S)	 39	 10.8
Wa'ilah	 Najran(S)	 13	 3.6
Wa'ilah	 Al-'Ansah(S)	 4	 1.1
Wa'ilah	 Al-Swq (S)
	 3	 0.8
Wa'ilah	 Dhdah(S)	 3	 0.8
Wa'ilah	 Al-Hasvniyah (S)
	 2	 0.6
Total	 361	 100
Yemeni	 --	 No visit to property
	 357	 100
UAE	 --	 No visit to property	 66	 100Qatari	
--	 No visit to property	 44	 100
(S): on the Saudi side of the frontier; (Y): on the Yemeni side of the frontier
Source: Author's Field Survey. I Oct-10 Dcc 1994.
Table 3.8 shows the tribe of respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint who were
crossing the frontier to visit property, together with the name of the settlements in which
the properties are owned. The table shows that only Saudis own properties on both sides
of the frontier in the Western Study Sector. All the Saudis crossing the frontier own
property on the Yemeni side in Wadi Al-'Atfayn and they also own property on the Saudi
side in Al-Sharfah and Rijlah (Figure 3.10(A)). Yemeni, UAE and Qatari nationals have
no properies on the Saudi side because Saudi law does not allow other nationalities to
own property in Saudi Arabia.
Saudis crossing into Yemen own farms, houses, wells and grazing land, all of
which are in Wadi Al-'Atfayn. The frequency with which the Saudis cross to the visit
their properties is 91.7% weekl y , and 8.3% monthly (Table 3.9). The weekly visits are
boosted by other factors such as taking children to school, visiting relatives, and trips to
markets on the Saudi side (Table 3.7).
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Table 3.9 Frequency of visits to property by respondents interviewed
at A1-Khadra checkpoint
1-requency	 kepondents Nationali
of Visits	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE
NO.	 /c	 No.	 /0	 NO.	 '10	 NO.	 /0	 NO.	 fc
Dali --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Weekly
	331	 91.7	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 331	 40.0
Monthly30	 8.3	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 30	 3.6
Yearly--	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
No visit to --	 --	 357	 100	 66	 100	 44	 100 467	 56.4
property
Total	 361 1(X)	 357	 100	 66	 100	 44	 100	 828 1(X)
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994
3.3.1.4	 Grazing and Wells
There is a long history of problems associated with international boundaries and access to
traditional grazing land in the Middle East. On the Saudi-Jordanian boundary, for
example, the Sharawrah tribe cross the boundary westwards into Jordanian territory for
spring grazing (Asadallah,1971: p.27). Grazing land and wells also exist on the Saudi-
Yemeni frontier and they should therefore be a significant boundary issue. In the Western
Study Sector, however, no separate figure is recorded for visits across the frontier to
grazing land and wells. In fact, there are grazing areas on the Yemeni side belonging to
the Wa'ilah tribe in the Wadi Amlah, Wadi Sayh and Wadi Khabb. The bedouin on the
Saudi side cannot visit these grazing areas or even the spring grazing along the frontier
(Figure 3.3(A)). This is because the Saudi Border Guard prevent bedouin from crossing
the frontier for reasons of national security (Saudi Border Guard, Western Study Sector,
1994).
3.3.2	 THE CHECKPOINTS
Travel across the boundaries of Saudi Arabia has been going on a long time for the
purposes of pilgimage, commerce and seeking water and pasture. Statistics on this
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movement have only been available since 1%5 (Abu-Dawood, 1984: p. 119-20).
According to the key informants interviewed by the author during his field surve y, there
ere no checkpoints on the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Yemen thirty years ago,
and bedouin were free to move across the frontier (Author's Field Survey, 1994)
On 8 August 1989 the Ministers of Interior of Saudi Arabia and North Yemen
agreed a statement about the location of checkpoints between the two countries. The text
ol the statement was as follows:
1. The westward checkpoints are Al-Tawal [on the Saudi sidel and Harad [on
the Yemeni side].
2. The eastward checkpoints are Al-Khadra [on the Saudi side] and A1-Buq'a
[on the Yemeni side].
Both Ministers of Interior warned the citizens of their countries to only pass through the
checkpoints and that offenders would be punished (Asharq Al-Awsat, 1989). In the
Western Study Sector, Al-Buq'a checkpoint is on the Yemeni side and Al-Khadra
checkpoint is on the Saudi side (Figure 3.11(A)). The Saudi Ministry of Interior does not
use the terms 'boundary' or 'frontier' in the statement, no doubt to guard against Yemen
using the statement as an indication that Saudi Arabia has abandoned its territorial claim.
Al-Buq'a checkpoint falls within the Saudi claim on the Yemeni side, but Al-Khadra on
the Saudi side is not within the Yemeni claim (Figure 3.11(A)). Both these checkpoints lie
beyond the Treaty of Taif boundary, and they are located on the sandstone between the
foothills and the sand sea. They are also located close to concentrations of population,
especially of those people who use the checkpoints, such as the Wa'ilah tribe in Wadi Al-
'Atfayn on the Yemeni side, and the same tribe at Al-Sharfah and Rijlah on the Saudi
side.
The Al-Khadra checkpoint on the Saudi side was chosen by the author in order to
intel-view people crossing from both sides, and to study the functions of the checkpoint. It
was impossible to interview people crossing at the Al-Buq'a checkpoint on the Yemeni
side for political reasons.
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The study of the current checkpoints was considered important because of the
likelihood that the location of checkpoints in the Western Study Sector and other sectors
may change on the delimitation of the boundary.
This section examines the function of Al-Khadra checkpoint; the time spent at the
checkpoint; the reasons for choosing the checkpoint; transport and the route taken to the
checkpoint: the condition of the rest area at the checkpoint; and documents used, with
special reference to the question of dual nationality.
3.3.2. 1	 Time Spent at the Checkpoint
Table 3.10 shows the respondents' attitude towards the amount of time they had to spend
completing immigration and customs procedures at Al-Khadra checkpoint. None of the
Saudis crossing were satisfied with the length of time spent at the checkpoint. They
complained that Saudi Immigration at the checkpoint kept them waiting a long time for
permission to cross the frontier. They felt that they should not have to wait so long
because they have Saudi nationality. In addition they dislike waiting in the same queue as
those of Yemeni and other nationalities.
The other nationalities (Yemenis, UAE and Qataris) were satisfied with the length of
time spent at Al-Khadra checkpoint. In fact, by international standards, the time spent at
Al-Khadra checkpoint is very reasonable; it takes between 15 and 30 minutes for a single
person, but if the traveller has family and goods, it can take between one and two hours
(Saudi Immigration Office, 1994) These times seem reasonable compared with Al-Buq'a
checkpoint on the Yemeni side.
Table 3.10 Respondents' attitude to the length of time spent at Al-Khadra checkpoint
Attitude	 Saudi	 Yemeni
No.	 %	 No.	 7c	 No.	 %	 No.	 7c	 No.	 '7o
Reasonable	 --	 --	 357 100	 66	 100	 44	 100 467	 56.4
Unreasonable	 361	 100	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 361	 43.6
Total	 361	 100 357 100	 66	 100	 44	 100 828 100
Source: Authors Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dcc 1994
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Furthermore, those crossing complain that the Yemeni Government takes £7,000 sterling
as a bond for each Saudi vehicle crossing the frontier at Al-Buq'a chcckpoint, and that
officials at A1-Buqa checkpoint are rude and ask for bribes. The Yemeni newspaper Al..
Sahwah published a letter on 15 June 1995 from a group of Yemeni travellers to the
President of Yemen about the unprofessional behaviour of officials at the Harad
checkpoint on the Treaty of Taif boundary at the Red Sea coast. The officials had asked
for bribes, and had either taken goods, or delayed the travellers an excessively long time
at the checkpoint if bribes had not been forthcoming (Al-Sahwah, 1995: p.1). This
indicates that it is likely that not only Saudi nationals are affected by the behaviour of
officials at Al-Buq'a checkpoint, but Yemeni citizens as well.
3.3.2.2	 Reasons for Choice of Checkpoint
The normal reason for choice of a particular checkpoint is because of its proximity to the
respondent's residence. Table 3.11 shows that all the Saudis and Yemenis interviewed
(86.7% of the total sample) had chosen Al-Khadra checkpoint for the same strong reason:
the fact that the privileges which the Saudi Government allows the frontier tribes only
relate to this checkpoint.
Table 3.11 Reasons for respondents' choice of Al-Khadra checkpoint
Reason for choice	 Respondents
of checkpoint	 Saudi	 Yemeni
NO.	 '10	 No.	 9'o	 No.	 %	 No.	 '10	 No.	 '10
Close to your residence
	 --	 --	 --	
--	 66	 100	 44	 100	 110	 13.3
Frontier tribe	 361	 100	 357	 100	 --	 --	 --	 718	 86.7
privileges
Providesa good service	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Safefrom the Yemeni	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
side
Sale from the Saudi side
	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Good road from Saudi
	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Goodroad from Yemen	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 361	 100 357 100 66	 100 44	 100 828 100
Source: Author's Field Survey. 1 Oct-10 Dcc 1994
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The Saudi-Yemeni tribes along the frontier in the Western Study are allowed to buy
duty-free goods every three months from Najran province, but only get the exemption
from duty by crossing the frontier at Al-Khadra checkpoint. The Saudis and Yemenis
using Al-Khadra checkpoint have no alternative but to choose this checkpoint if they wish
to take advantage of the frontier tribes' privileges. The privileges, which are exclusively
for the frontier tribes are, therefore, a more important factor than the distance between the
checkpoint and residence of those crossing the frontier. By contrast, UAE and Qatari
nationals had chosen Al-Khadra checkpoint because it was the most convenient on the
route from the UAE and Qatar.
3.3.2.3	 Transport and the Routes to the Checkpoint
Boundary disputes and functions affect transport and routes in frontier areas. The
development of a road network is delayed and the people in the frontier area have to
continue using primitive forms of transport. In 1990 at AlIb checkpoint in the 1934
Treaty
 of Tail boundary (Figure 2.3(A)), people were still using donkeys and camels as
transportation because of a dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen about the position of
markers along the boundary (Al-Ghamdi, 1991: p.185).
Table 3.12 shows the modes of transport used by the respondents interviewed at
Al-Khadra checkpoint to cross the Saudi-Yemeni frontier. 55.8% of those crossing were
passengers in friends' vehicles and 44.2% were using their own cars. Nearly all the
vehicles used were of the same type (Toyota Pickup, Plate 3.3). Abu-Dawood (1984)
indicated that four-wheel drive vehicles were used more than any other t'pe on the Saudi-
Yemeni frontier.
Figure 3.11(A) shows the roads which lead to the checkpoint; there is an asphalt
road on the Saudi side of the frontier which goes all the way to the UAE and Qatar, whilst
on the Yemeni side the roads are mountainous and unpaved roads. The lack of
development of roads on the Yemem side of the frontier clearly influences the type of
vehicles Toyota Pickup) which people prefer to use for the crossing.
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Table 3.12 Transport taken by respondents to Al-Khadra checkpoint
LJ'.A Li!	 rLf&?!IUcI1L. 1NIL1UI1U1IY
	
I OWl
Transport	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE	 Qatan
No.	 %	 No.	 7c	 No.	 '7c	 No.	 (7	 No.	 '7c
Personal vehicle 169 55.2 140 39.2	 18	 27.3	 39 88.6 366 44.2
Friertd'svehjcle 192 46.8 217 60.8	 48	 72.7	 5	 11.4 462 55.8
Onfoot --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Bus --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Taxi --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Donkey--	--	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Camel --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 -	 --
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 361	 1(X) 357	 100	 66	 100	 .44	 100 828	 l0()
Source: Author's Field Survey. 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994
3.3.2.4	 Facilities at the Checkpoint
Table 3.13 shows that 66.4% of those interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint believe that
the facilities of the checkpoint are adequate. The facilities in question include car parking,
shade whilst queuing, a mosque for prayers, a restaurant, toilets, a shop selling
necessities such as ropes for securing goods, knives, containers, etc, and free drinking
water. Although the survey showed general satisfaction, many travellers would naturally
like more facilities at the checkpoint, such as a petrol station and markets at which to trade
with merchants bringing goods from the Yemeni side. 72% of travellers from the UAE
reported that the facilities were less than adequate because they had travelled a great
distance (more than 1,000km) and therefore required more facilities.
In fact, A1-Khadra checkpoint has some of the best facilities of all the checkpoints
between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen; it is an attractive modern building with
most basic facilities. By comparison, Al-Buq'a checkpoint which is opposite Al-Khadra
checkpoint on the Yemeni side, is less than adequate as both Yemenis and Saudis
crossing the frontier have reported (Saudi Immigration Office, Al-Khadra checkpoint,
1994).
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Table 3.13 Respondents attitude to facilities at Al-Khadra checkpoint
titude to Facilities	 Respondents' Nationality
emeni	 VA
No.	 '7c	 No.	 %	 No.	 7c	 No.	 tjc	 No.
Morethan adequate	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Adequate	 301	 83.4 201 56.3	 18	 27.3 30	 68.2 550 66.4
Lessthanadequate	 60	 16.6 156 43.7 48	 72.7 14	 31.8 278 33.6
Total	 361	 100	 357 100	 66 100	 44 100	 828 100
Source: Authofs Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994
3.3.2.5	 Documents Used at the Checkpoint
People who have to cross a boundary regularly should have their crossings facilitated.
Passports are not an ideal form of identification for borderlanders, not least for reasons of
cost, as the following example shows:
I cross the boundary between Algeria and Morocco illegally, because if I cross
legally with a passport, I have to renew my passport every three months or sooner,
because I cross the boundary more than once a week. (Al-iumdi, 1990: p.15)
For this reason, identity cards which are not stamped are more suitable than passports.
On the Saudi-Yemeni frontier, Saudi Immigration uses 'statements' (Plate 3.1) as
the means of identifying members of the frontier tribes. The privilege of being allowed to
cross the frontier with only this statement applies only to the Saudi side of the frontier (for
more about the frontier tribes' privileges, see Section 3.2.3). Table 3.14 shows that all of
the Yemenis interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint used a statement as their means of
identification for crossing the frontier. By contrast, the Saudis in the sample used
passports (Table 3.14).
There is, however, a legal and practical problem with regard to those of Saudi
nationality, because the majority of them live in Wadi Al-'Atfayn under Yemeni control. If
the Saudi Immigration Office were to stamp Saudi passports to enable their holders to
cross to the Yemeni side, the Saudis crossing would implicitly be crossing the frontier of
the Saudi state. However, Wadi Al-'Atfayn and the surrounding area is still the subject of
dispute and negotiation. The Saudi Immigration officers therefore stamp a separate piece
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of paper instead of the passport itself. Yemeni Immigration, on the other hand, stamps the
Saudi passports to indicate that the holders are crossing into Yemen. This is inconvenient
for the Saudis crossing as their passports quickly fill up as a result of crossing the frontier
weekly, and they have to be renewed more than once a year. Citizens of the UAE and
Qatar also use passports at the checkpoint.
Table 3.14 Documents used by respondents to cross the frontier
at Al-Khadra checkpoint
Documents	 Respondents' Nationality	 Total
emeni
No.	 '7o	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 7o	 No.	 '7r
Passport	 361	 100	 --	 --	 66	 100	 44	 100 471 56.9
Statement	 --	 --	 357	 100	 --	 --	 --	 --	 357 43.1
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 361	 100	 357 100	 66	 100	 44	 100	 28 100
Source: Authofs Field Survey, I Oct-10 Dec 1994
3.3.2.6	 Dual Nationality
Some members of frontier tribes have dual nationality in order to take of advantage
of the differences in economy and political regimes of two states. In the case of the Saudi-
Yemeni frontier, the advantages of Saudi nationality include better employment prospects,
and grants and interest-free loans for house construction and agriculture, whilst Yemeni
citizens enjoy a tribal life with the right to carry arms and chew qat (a kind of dope), both
of which are forbidden in Saudi Arabia. Enquiries were made about nationality in an
attempt to establish the extent of dual nationality. However, Table 3.15 shows that none
of the respondents interviewed at A1-Khadra checkpoint would admit to having dual
nationality because applicants for Saudi nationality must abandon their previous
nationality as stated in Article 11 of the Saudi Organisation of Nationality (1981: p.5):
It is not permissible for those with Saudi nationality to have foreign nationality
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The Ycmeni Constitution (1970) makes no mention of dual nationality. However, the
Saudi Immigration Office at Al-Khadra checkpoint confirmed that Yemeni law does not
allow its citizens to have dual nationality.
In practice, however, the Saudi Immigration Office at Al-Khadra checkpoint
described to the author that there are very real possibilities of citizens holding dual
nationality, in particular amongst the Saudis living in Wadi Al-'Atfayn and the Yemeni
wives of UAE and Qatari nationals. One example of the way in which people can gain
dual nationality
 by deception involves individuals going to Immigration on the Yemeni
side, surrendering their Saudi passports and receiving a Yemeni identity statement. They
then return to the Saudi side and go to Immigration telling them that they have lost their
identity card and apply for a replacement. This is, however, only heresay and there are no
statistics on the phenomenon.
Table 3.15 Nationalities held by respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint
; pondents'	 Resnondents' Nationality	Total
Nationality
	SiiIdi Arabia
	 Yemen	 UAE	 Qatar
No.	 '7o	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 7o	 No.	 %
Saudi	 361	 100	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 361	 43.6
Yemeni	 --	 --	 357	 100	 --	 --	 --	 --	 357	 43.2
UAE --	 -	 --	 --	 66	 100	 --	 --	 66	 7.9
Qatari	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 44	 100	 44	 5.3
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 361	 100 357 100	 66	 100 44	 100 828 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dcc 1994
3.3.3	 PERCEPTIONS OF THE FRONTIER
By studying the interactions between borderlanders and a frontier it is possible to
determine the borderlanders' perception of the location of the frontier. Political
geographers cannot always determine borderlanders' perceptions of the frontier by
examining the frontier itself, because the perceptions involve a special relationship
between the borderlanders and the features regarded as marking the frontier. On the
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Saudi-Yemeni frontier, onl y the Treaty
 of Tail boundary is currently delimited. However,
those crossing the frontier from both sides use their own frontier markings. The
borderlanders' perception of the frontier, the features considered to indicate its location,
and the level of satisfaction with the frontier, should all be important considerations when
the remainder of the Saudi-Yemeni boundar y
 is delimited. For this reason it was
considered important to study the perceptions of the frontier of those crossing it.
The frontier is a very sensitive matter in discussions with those crossing it. The
subject makes people nervous and they get upset about it. This section examines the
features indicating the frontier, frontier changes, and the level of satisfaction with the
frontier.
3.3.3. 1
	 Features Indicating the Frontier
Table 3.16 lists the Saudi and Yemeni features which respondents interviewed at Al-
Khadra checkpoint recognised as marking the frontier. 83% of those questioned recognise
the frontier on the Saudi side by the route followed by the round-the-clock border guard
patrol from Khbash guard post (see Figure 3.13(A)). The remaining 17% recognise the
frontier by Al-Khadra checkpoint.
Table 3.16 Features recognised as indicating the frontier by respondents interviewed
at Al-Khadra checkpoint
eatures	 ationalitv	 T
indicating frontier	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE	 Qatari
Saudi Side:
	 No.	 7c	 No.	 c7	 No.	 7o	 No.	 7o	 No.
Mountains --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Plateaux --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Wadis --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Checkpoints	 17	 4.7	 14	 3.9 66
	
100	 44 100	 141	 17
Patrol Route	 344 95.3 343 96.1 --	 --	 --	 --	 687	 83
Total	 361 100	 357 100	 66	 100	 44 100	 828 100
Yemeni Side: 	 No.	 (7	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
Mountains	 128 35.5 177 49.6 --	 --	 --	 --	 305	 36.8
Plateaux --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Wadis --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Checkpoints	 --	 --	 --	 --	 66	 100	 40	 90.9 106	 12.8
Border Posts	 233	 64.5 180 50.4 --	 --	 4	 9. 1 417	 50.4
Total	 361 100	 357 100	 66	 100 44	 100	 828 100
Source: Authors Field Survey. 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994
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Surprisingly perhaps, no markers or geographical features such as mountains or plateaux
are perceived as relevant as a mark between the two countries on the Saudi side. On the
other hand, on the Yemeni side, 50.4% of those crossing recognise the frontier by the
Abasah guard post, and a further 36.8% by Mount 'Abasah (see Figure 3. 13(A)).
The majority of people therefore recognise the checkpoint, border guard posts and
patrols, and the mountains as the frontier markers between the two countries. If and when
both countries reach an agreement delimiting the boundary, mountains are impossible to
relocate, but checkpoints and border guards may be relocated with relative ease.
3.3.3.2	 Frontier Changes
In (939 the Saudi Government started a programme to settle the bedouin living in the
frontier areas. Most bedouin on the Arabian Peninsula dislike conforming with the
political boundaries between countries, preferring to live independently, following
grazing seasonally (Al-Mangor, 1988: p.23).
Table 3.17 Perceptions of frontier changes of respondents interviewed
at A1-Khadra checkpoint
Frontier	 Respondents' Nationality
	 Total
perceived as
	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE	 Qatari
having changed No.
	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No. %
Yes	 361	 100	 341 95.5 66	 100	 44	 100 812	 98
No --
	 -	 16	 4.5	 --	 --	 --	 --	 16	 2
Donot know	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 361	 100	 357 100	 66	 100	 44	 100 828	 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994
Table 3.17 shows that 98% of those interviewed at A1-Khadra checkpoint believe that the
de facto border has changed over the years. This change refers to the position of the
operational frontier or the checkpoints, because in this study sector the boundary between
Saudi Arabia and Yemen has yet to be delimited. However, people still recognise the
frontier in the Western Study Sector by the location of checkpoints, border guards, and
mountains as discussed above. The respondents identified a number of changes.
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Approximately 35 years ago there were no checkpoints between the two countries:
bedouin were able to move their sheep and camels wherever they wished without border
guards to prevent them. They were also able to travel across the desert to the other Gulf
States without being stopped. But since oil companies started to compete to gain oil
concessions, this competition has exacerbated boundary disputes in the Arabian Peninsula
(Al-Shamlan. 1987: p.10). Oil revenues began to have a serious impact on the Arabian
Peninsula after World War II (Wilkinson, 1991: p.xi). This made the states look seriously
at boundary issues: they settled bedouin on the frontiers, established border guard posts
and checkpoints, and sought solutions to boundary disputes.
3.3.3.3	 Level of Satisfaction with the Frontier
Table 3.18 shows that 82.4% of respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint were
dissatisfied with the present operational frontier in the Western Study Sector between
Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Republic. The majority of those dissatisfied were of Saudi
nationality, particularly those of the Wa'ilah tribe living in Wadi Al-'Atfayn. These people
believe that the boundary should be to the south of Wadi Al-'Atfayn.
Table 3.18 Level of satisfaction with the frontier amongst respondents
interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint
nts
Satisfaction	 Saudi	 Yemeni
No. % No. %
	 No. % No. %
	 No. %
Satisfied	 3	 0.8	 16	 4.5	 --	 --	 --	 --	 19	 2.3
Dissatisfied	 358	 99.2 324
	 90.8 --	 --	 --	 --	 682	 82.4
Do not know	 --	
--	 17	 4.7 66
	 100	 44	 100	 127	 15.3
Total	 361 100	 357 100
	 66	 100	 44	 100 828 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec. 1994
On the other hand, the chiefs of the Yam tribe living in Najran maintain that the boundary
should be to the south of TabtAl- Ism (Radm Al-Hadd) on the Yemeni side in the
Western Study Sector (see Figure 3. 14(A)). Philby (1939: p.30) wrote:
Taiyibat Ism ... known as Radm Al-l-ladd and marking the tribal boundary
between Yam and Dahm
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Those of Yemeni nationality would also like the Al-Khadra checkpoint to be relocated
further south in the Western Study Sector, because they want their lands of Wadi Al-
Atfayn, AL-Far'a and Tabt - Ism which are currently under Yemeni control to be on the
Saudi side of the boundary. No doubt this is because the Saudi side is economicaUy and
socially more developed than the Yemeni side, especially in terms of roads, schools.
markets, government benefits, and personal security. With regard to the lack of personal
security in Yemen, Halliday (1985: pA.) reported:
The Yemeni Government has banned tribesmen from bringing arms into the largest
cities. But outside Sana and Taizz most men carry them, and the government's
ability to control these areas directly remains limited. Such control a exits is
mediated by tribal chiefs.
3.4	 Economic Opportunities
The possibility of finding hydrocarbon and mineral resources in frontier regions makes
boundary disputes very sensitive and sometimes causes wars between countries.
In the Middle East and North Africa, the possibility of finding oil, gas, or mineral
resources has accelerated the quest for precisely defined national boundaries.
(Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.75)
The significance of studying economic opportunities in the Western Study Sector is to get
an indication of the potential economic value of the frontier area between the extreme
Saudi and Yemeni territorial claims. This section examines the economic opportunities
presented by mineral and hydrocarbon potential, and commercial activity.
3.4.1	 MINERALS AND HYDROCARBONS
There is currently no mining on either side of the frontier in the Western Study Sector, but
there are potential sources of minerals in the sector on both sides. There are two kinds of
geologic strncture granite and grandiorite in the mountains containing iron, and Wajid
sandstone in the west of the sector containing salt deposits (GMAQ-KSA, 1979). With
regard to hydrocarbons in the Western Study Sector, most researchers suggest that the
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chief reason for the boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen is the potential
for the discovery of hydrocarbons (Schofield, 1994: pp.l9-27: Pike. 1994: pp.187-98:
Walker. 1994: pp.173-83). in reality, this factor may be exaggerated by researchers.
Article 4 of the 1934 Treaty of Taif mentions that the boundary in the Western Study
Sector was undelimited due to a tribal dispute, and this was long before oil was
discovered in Saudi Arabia in commercial quantities.
The first oil was not discovered in commercial quantities anywhere in the peninsula
until 1932. (Wilkinson, 1991: p.96)
Wilkinson also comments that territorial claims in the Arabian Peninsula were not created
by the potential of finding oil. There were, therefore, other reasons for these disputes,
such as lbn Saud's loyalty to the tribes in the Western Study Sector, evidenced by
protection agreements between Ibn Saud and the tribes in the Najran area.
Table 3.19 Status of oil concession blocks in the Western Study Sector in 1994
Name	 Block No.
	 Area	 Companies	 Date awarded or(km2 )	 approved
Manb/A1-Jawf	 18	 8,445	 HuntlExxonl	 Sept.1981
Yukong
Al-Jawf	 19	 4,223	 Open to bidders 	 --
Upper Al-Jawf	 20	 4.222	 Open to bidders 	 --
Central Plateau
	 21	 22.660	 Open to bidders 	 --
Source: AOG Directory. 1994: Figure 3.10
There is undoubtedly some hydrocarbon potential in the Western Study Sector. Figure
3.12(A) shows the position of the extreme Saudi territorial claim together with the
location of Blocks 18, 19, 20, and 21 (Table 3.19) of the licensed area under Yemeni
control. Figure 3.12(A) also shows three abandoned wells within the Western Study
Sector. Hunt, Exxon, and Yukon have been jointly awarded an exploration licence for
Block 18 (Marib and Al-Jawf) which at 8.445km 2 , covers most of the production area.
The map shows that the majority of the oil and gas fields lie beyond the Saudi claim in the
Western Study Sector. However, in March 1992 the Saudi Foreign Ministry sent warning
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letters to six foreign oil companies and groups which had concessions in the disputed
areas (MEES. 1992: p.A8)
On the Saudi side there is no active production of. or exploration for, hydrocarbons
in the disputed area. This does not mean, however, that there is no potential for
hydrocarbons on the Saudi side in the Western Study Sector.
3.4.2	 COMMERCE AND EMPLOYMENT
Trade across the frontier in the Western Study Sector is chiefly from the Saudi side to the
Yemeni side, but there is some trade in the opposite direction. About 7% of respondents
questioned at A1-Khadra checkpoint are working as traders, but the author noted that
people did not like to state that they work as traders. Many traders probably claimed to be
either shepherds (59.5% of the sample) or farmers (30.8% of the sample) (Table 3.20).
The reason for the high proportion of respondents claiming to be shepherds may be that
the individuals hope to receive Saudi Government benefits, and subsidies for their flocks.
The majority of Yemenis returning to the Yemeni side of the frontier importing consumer
goods such as sugar, rice, dried milk, liquid milk, flour, maize, barley, gas, benzene,
kerosene, grain, and cooking oil ('Mazola') from the Saudi side (see Plates 3.2 and 3.3)
(Saudi Customs, Al-Khadra checkpoint, 1994). Many Yemenis crossing the frontier to
the Saudi side carry coffee (husks, seeds, and ready-ground), sultanas (rasiki. white and
black), and honey to sell in the Najran markets.
The average annual income of all the respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra
checkpoint was between US$300 and US$3,000 (Author's field survey, 1 October - 10
December 1994). The 1996 national product per capita for Saudi Arabia and Yemen was
US$9,510 and US$1,955 respectively (CIA World Fact Book on the Internet, 15 July
1996). However, a similar marked difference between the countries does not appear when
the average annual incomes of the Saudi respondents is compared to that of the Yemeni
respondents. This may be because most of the respondents were uneducated 84% were
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illiterate and 15.5% had only learnt to read (Author's field survey, I October - JO
December 1994).
Table 3.20 Occupations of respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint
Students --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Traders	 16	 4.4 41	 11.5	 --	 --	 --	 --	 57	 6.9
Farmers	 89 24.7 150 42.0	 10	 15.2	 6	 13.6 255	 30.8
Officials	 --	 --	 1	 0.3	 14	 21.2	 8	 18.2 23	 2.8
Labourers --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Unemployed --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Drivers --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Shepherds	 256 70.9 165 462	 42	 63.6 30	 68.2 493	 59.5
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 361 100	 357 100
	 66 100	 44 100 828 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, I Oct-10 Dec, 1994
3.5	 The De Facto Border
The identification of the defacto border is a key objective of this thesis. The significance
of examining the border is to help the researcher suggest a Logical Boundary which is the
ultimate aim of this thesis (see Section 1.6.1, Recognising and delimiting the defacro
border). The defacto border in the Western Study Sector is delimited by the location of
the Saudi and Yemeni border guard posts (Figure 3.13(A)). In the west of the sector the
Saudi Border Guard are positioned (from west to east) at Jabal Al-Thar, Jabal Shah,
Tansab, Khbash, Salatah. and Al-Rwikbah. The Yemeni Border Guard locations are
(from west to east) Makwa, 'Abasah, Western A1-Adhr'ain, Eastern A1-Adhr'ain, and Al-
Buq'a. To the east of these positions the defacto border runs eastward through the sands
until it reaches the Saudi position at Al-Hala Al-Sawda. From here it runs southwards
through the Yemeni posts at AI-Bramah and Al-Mutashakkirah (Figure 3.13(A)). The
positions of both the Saudi and Yemeni Border Guard are in ideal strategic locations for
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controlling the frontier they afford good views of the frontier, provide natural defence in
the event of attack, and are effective positions for observation radar.
Between the Saudi and Yemeni border guard positions is an area of no man's land
(see Section 1.6.1 for Prescott's (1987) description of no man's land). The width of this
no man's land varies along the length of the defacto border, but on average it is 5-15km
in the Western Study Sector. The border guards maintain a 24-hour vehicle patrol in order
to control smuggling and infiltrators along the defacto border. Table 3.21 shows that
many more items were confiscated by the Saudi Border Guard in 1994, possibty because
the Yemeni civil war in May 1994 resulted in attempts to smuggle weapons which were
then numerous, cheap, and legal in Yemen to the Saudi side of the frontier where they are
illegal.
Table 3.21 Reasons for arrest and items confiscated in the Western Study Sector 1992-4
Reasons for Arrest: 	 1992	 1993	 1994
Infiltrator	 16	 39	 34
Smuggler	 --	 10	 15
Items Confiscated:	 1992	 1993	 1994
Trip wire	 --	 --	 4,863
Wire	 --	 --	 726
Dynamite	 --	 --	 48
Weapons	 --	 3	 26
Various	 --	 29	 790
Source: Saudi Border Guard statistics. 1994
3.6	 Distribution of Tribes on thc Frontier
A number of commentaries concerning the frontiers of South Arabia seek to attribute the
tribes to either Saudi Arabia or Yemen for the purpose of establishing a boundary between
the two countries based on tribal boundaries:
The Dahm is a Yemeni tribe ... The Rawashid and Murra are both Saudi tribes
(Schofield, 1993: Vol.3, pp.558, 539)
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This attribution of tribes to only one country is misleading as most of the tribes on the
Arabian peninsula are descended from Yemeni tribes:
According to Arab and other historians, the present Yemeni tribes are the
descendants of the Qahtan tribe, just as the present Hejazi tribes are the descendants
of the Adnan tribe. But the Qahtan tribes have, over the years, scattered to all
corners of the Arabian peninsula. (Schofield, (993: p.672. See also Al-Jarafi.
1987: p.57-8: Kami. 1968: p.143.)
A more appropriate method of attribution is the method mentioned in Article 4 of the 1934
Treaty of Taif, whereby areas and tribes which were not specifically mentioned by name
remained under the control of the country (Saudi Arabia or Yemen) which controlled them
prior to 1933:
the names which are not mentioned and which were actually subject to or under
the control of the Yemeni Kingdom before the year 1352 (1933). are on the Yemeni
side and belong to the Yemen.
their vicinities which have not been mentioned by name, and which were actually
subject to or under the control of the Saudi Arab Kingdom before the year 1352
(1933), are on the left of the Said line and belong to the Saudi Arab Kingdom.
(Schofield, 1992: p.94, see Appendix I for the full text of the Treaty)
Using the pattern of control existing during a particular period as a means of attributing
the tribes on the frontier to either country is a more logical method than genealogy in the
Arabian peninsula.
The method used by the author to determine the location of the tribal boundaries is
mentioned in Section 1.6.3 (Interviews with key people). Figure 3.14(A) shows that
there are three tribal boundaries which are close to the defacto border, those of the Yam,
Wa'ilah, and Dahm.
As a result of examining the tribal boundaries, there is a clear difference between the
territorial claims of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the tribal boundaries. The tribal
boundary between the Yam and the other tribes, namely the Wa'ilah and Dahm. runs
close to the south of the extremeYemeni claim. There are two areas of overlapping tribal
claims in the Western Study Sector: that between the Wa'ilah and Yam tribes in Wadi Al-
Atfayn. and between the Yam and Dahm tribes at Al-Ramlat. For an analysis of the
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possibility of using tribal boundaries as the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen,
see Chapter 6.
Table 3.22 shows the loyalties of tribes near the frontier in the Western Study
Sector; the Yam tribe are under Saudi control and most of their land is on the Saudi side.
except the Tabt Al-Ism area; their loyalty is thus to the Saudi Government. The Wa'ilah
tribal lands are mostly under Yemeni control and the majority of the tribe has Yemeni
nationality and loyalty to Yemen. However, the Wa'ilah sub-tribes Al-Slah, Al-Qri'a. and
Al-Swidan have Saudi nationality. These sub-tribes are located in Wadi Al-'Atfayn and
their loyalty is to Saudi Arabia. The Dahm tribal lands are wholly under Yemeni control
and their loyalty is to Yemen.
Table 3.22 Political loyalty of tribal people in the Western Study Sector
ri
Yam	 Ismaili	 Mainly Saudi Arabia
(plus a few Sunni)
Wa'ilah	 Zaidi	 Mixed Saudi/Yemen
Dahm	 Zaidi/Shafi	 Mainly Yemen
Source: Interviews with Sheiks in the Western Study Sector. October 1994
As mentioned in the 1934 Treaty of Taif, tribal boundaries are the key factor to the
establishment of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary in the Western Study Sector (for more
information see Section 6.2.2 and Appendix 2.)
3.7	 Conclusions
The central aim of this study as mentioned in Chapter 1, is to aid decision makers in Saudi
Arabia and Yemen by suggesting a boundary, the Location of which takes into
consideration geographical features, economic opportunities, cross-frontier interactions,
checkpoints, perceptions of the frontier, and the defacto border today.
There is a realistic possibility in this sector of using geographical features, namely
Wadi Al-'Atfayn, as a basis for the boundary. This wadi is in an area of overlapping tribal
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claims between the Yam and Wa'ilah tribes. Water is accessible in this sector at a depth of
30-70m. compared to 1,000m in the Central Study Sector, which increases the value of
land. A potential for hydrocarbons exists in the Western Study Sector: however all current
operational activities are beyond the Saudi territorial claim. There is good cross-frontier
interaction here, despite cold political relations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen from
time to time. The frontier in this sector is inextricably linked with the tribes, especially the
Wa'ilah who have relations and properties on both sides. These people should not be
ignored in discussions about the boundary. The tribal boundary between the Yam,
Wa'ilah. and Dahm is particularly important as the 1934 Treaty of Taif recommended that
this should be the key to the boundary in this sector (see Section 6.2.2).
The privileges afforded the frontier tribes by the Saudi Government have affected
the frequency of frontier crossings, and the documents used at the checkpoints. These
tribes also use their own frontier markings which it might be helpful to incorporate in a
boundary between the two countries.
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Chapter 4
The Central Study Sector
4. 1	 Introduction
The Central Study Sector covers the western part of the former South Yemen (former
Aden Protectorate)-Saudi Arabia frontier. It is enclosed to the south by the extreme Saudi
claim represented by a section of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (Section 2.4.2.7), and to
the north by the extreme Yemeni claim represented by the western section of the 1955
British Declaration line (Section 2.4.2.6). It is approximately located in the area between
16°1O'N and 18°O0'N latitude, and 462O'E and 48°20'E longitude. On the Saudi side the
frontier is bordered by the Najran and Eastern Provinces, and Shabwah Governorate on
the Yemeni side (Figure 4.1). The study of this sector is significant for a number of
reasons: the Yemeni claim to territory on the Saudi side of the frontier was originally
made by the British Government on behalf of the Aden Protectorate (see Section 2.4); the
Yemeni side of the Central Study Sector belonged to South Yemen prior to the unification
of Yemen in May 1990; there is no checkpoint in the Central Study Sector; most of the
Central Study Sector is under Saudi control in contrast to the Western Study Sector where
most of the area is under Yemeni control. Its importance is emphasised by the fact that in
December 1969 there was fighting at Al-Wadi'ah in this sector between the Saudi and
South Yemeni armies. This chapter examines the geographical features, cross-frontier
interactions, economic opportunities, and the defacto border in the Central Study Sector.
Figure 4.2 shows the terms which will be used in this chapter to describe the different
parts of the Central Study Sector frontier.
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4.2	 Geographical Features
It is important to study the geographical features of the Central Study Sector for much the
same reasons as those mentioned for the Western Study Sector (Chapter 3), with the
exception of climate. The climate of the Central Study Sector will not be discussed as its
only si gnificance to this thesis would be its effect on the rhythm of frontier crossings. As
there are no checkpoints in the Central Study Sector to allow people to cross the frontier
legally, this is not relevant. The few crossings made by smugglers and infiltrators (Table
4.2) are made at all times of year and are unaffected by climate (Saudi Border Guard
statement, Central Study Sector, September 1994).
4.2.1	 GEOLOGY, RELIEF, AND WATER RESOURCES
There are two principal groups of geological formations in the Central Study Sector
(Figure 4.3(A)). Firstly, most of the south-west of the sector is sand and gravel together
with various outcrops forming a number of the sector's chief relief features. These
include the mountains of AI-Mutashakkhirah and Radm Al-Amir formed by the
Precambrian Thaniya group; the gravel plains of Qarn Al-Wadi'ah and the site of
Sharurah town are part of the Wasia and Biyadh formations; 'Aywat A1-Say'ar and its
wadis comprise the Paleocene Jeza formation. Secondly, there is Quaternary Eolian sand
in the north-east of the sector. Most of the relief in this area consists of sand features such
as 'uruq (singular, 'urq, long linear sand ridges) and shiqaq (singular, shiqqar, valleys or
depressions between the ridges) (see Plate 4.1), for example Shiqaq Al-Ma'atif and Al-
Qa'amiyat, and 'Uruq Al-Zayza (Figure 4.3(A)) (GMWRQ-KSA, 1963). The Saudi
Border Guard in the Central Study Sector have selected relief features on the frontier for
locating their observation posts in the same way as the border guards in the Western
Study Sector have done (see Section 4.5.2).
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The water resources currently available in the Central Study Sector come from wells
which the Saudi Government has drilled. The first well drilled in the sector was in
Sharurah town in 1954 to a depth of l,050m (Al-Billadi, 1982: pp.1 11-2). Since then the
Saudi Government has drilled several further wells in Sharurah town and AI-Wadi'ah as
Table 4. 1 shows. Water in this sector is therefore not available at the relatively shallow
depths at which it can be reached in the Western Study Sector, but only at an average
depth of 1.lOOm. This factor should be taken into consideration when boundary issues
are officially discussed between Saudi Arabia and Yemen (see Section 6.4).
Table 4.1 Water wells drilled on the Saudi side adjacent to the Central Study Sector
Location of wells
	 Depth (m)
	 Geologic Time	 Water Production
(Gallons/mm)
Sharurah	 1,100	 Lower Ordovician to
	 480
Cambrian
Sharurah	 1.123	 500
Sharurah	 1.150	 "	 560
Al-Wadi'ah	 1.004	 530
Source: Saudi Ministry of Agriculture Archive. 1994
4.2.2	 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
The latest population data for the Saudi side of the frontier is from the 1994 Saudi census.
On the Yemeni side however, population data is not available for individual villages and
cities, but for the governorate as a whole only, and the most recent census carried out in
the former South Yemen was in 1988. A number of population data sources were
consulted including the Socio-Demo graphic Profiles of Key Arab Countries (HRDbase,
1987), and The Population Situation in the ECWA Region, (United Nations Economic
Commission for Western Asia, 1979). However, like the 1988 South Yemen census,
both sources present the population distribution in South Yemen by governorate only.
The author also attempted to estimate village populations using 1994 Landsat satellite
images, but they were not clear enough for this purpose. However, the nearest
154
CHAPTER 4
settlements on the Yemeni side of the frontier to the extreme Saudi territorial claim are Al-
Abr, Zamakh, Al-Hajar, and Raydat Al-Say'ar (Figure 4.4(A)), and all of these
settlements are at least 40km from the area claimed.
The 1988 South Yemen census calculated rural and urban population distribution by
governorate. Figure4.4ç0$hows that 87.5% of the population in Shabwah Governorate
was rural (Ministry of Planning and Development, 1991: p.6).
This region of the Arabian peninsula is sparsely populated, particularly in the
Central Study Sector itself (Figure 4.4(A)). The only concentrations of population in the
sector are the Saudi and Yemeni border guard posts and small bedouin groups. The
border guard posts were excluded from both the 1994 Saudi census and the 1988 Yemeni
census, but, during the 1994 field survey the Saudi Border Guard estimated the
population of each of the Saudi and Yemeni posts at between twenty and fifty individuals.
Figure 4.4(A) also shows three locations in the Central Study Sector where Saudi
bedouin are living in tents and following the grazing on the Saudi side of the frontier
seasonally. By contrast, in Al-Wadi'ah on the Saudi side of the frontier close to the
extreme British claim, bedouin are living in permanently-located tents.
The above factors indicate that population distribution in the Central Study Sector is
hardly likely to be a major issue in discussions about the border between the two
countries.
4.3	 Cross-Frontier Interaction
Interaction in this sector is affected by a number of factors; there is no checkpoint in this
sector; there are no Saudi citizens living under Yemeni control as there are in the Western
Study Sector; the region is sparsely populated compared to the Western Study Sector (see
Figure 3.5(A)); and there was previously a cold relationship between Saudi Arabia and
South Yemen due to the Yemenis' adoption of a Marxist ideology (Gause, 1990: p.154).
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In this sector information was collected about cross-frontier interaction by
interviews with key people (primarily tribal sheikhs) on the Saudi side, in addition to the
author's field observations. The lack of a checkpoint in the Central Study Sector meant
that it was not possible to question people crossing the frontier. The sheikhs interviewed
were questioned about the existence of relatives, properties, and markets on the Yemeni
side of the frontier, satisfaction of the people in the Central Study Sector with the present
frontier, their wishes for the future border, and the tribal boundaries.
As with the Western Study Sector, illegal frontier crossings are made in this sector
(see Table 4.2. Section 4.5). Unfortunately the author did not get the opportunity to meet
and interview any of those apprehended during his field study, and so had to rely on the
Saudi Border Guard's statistics.
4.3.1	 RELATIVES AND PROPERTY
The sheikhs interviewed indicated that some people living on the Saudi side of the Central
Study Sector frontier have relatives and property on the Yemeni side. Members of Al-
Say'ar tribe living in Sharurah town have relatives in Raydat Al-Say'ar, Al-'Abr,
Zamakh, and Shabwah. Members of the Bul-'Abeid tribe living in Al-Wadi'ah and a few
members of the Nand tribe living in Sharurah have relatives in Ramlat A1-Sab'atayn and
'Ataq (Figure 4.5(A)). These tribes had the protection of one of the members of the Ibn
Saud family after they agreed to pay zakar (tax) to him, and they were obedient to Ibn
Saud's call for assistance in times of war (jihad ). An example of one such protection
agreement, in this case between Emir Saud Al-Faisal and the Al-Say'ar tribe, was shown
to the author during his field survey in 1994 by one of the sheikhs interviewed. The date
on the document was not clear, but from further historical research the author found that
Emir Saud Al-Faisal was the son of Imam Faisal Ibn Turkey who established the second
Saudi state during the period 1869-74 (Fasiliif, 1995: p.229).
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Philby (1939: p.59), Wilkinson (1991: p.196), and Schofield (1992: Vol.2. p.109;
1993: Vol.3, p.81; 1994: p.21) all mention zakat as the reason for Fuad Bey establishing
the I-lamzah line in 1935 claiming the north of the Hadhramaut on behalf of lbn Saud (see
Chapter 2 for more about the 1935 Hamzah line).
In 1939 Philby (p.59) wrote:
The route thus marked out for the guidance of travellers or caravans is known to
this day 119391 as Darb al Amir. According to Ibn Hadban, its author, whom he
remembers quite well as an old man, was Abdullah ibn Mishari ibn Qamla, a Dahmi
shaikh, who explored and marked the way to Abr under the orders of Faisal Ibn
Saud. Also on behalf of the Wahhabi Sultan he collected the Zakat taxes on the
Saiar flocks and herds at the "Abr wells" where the little fort or Husn, now in ruins,
was his handiwork. [see Figure 4.5(A) for the position of A1-'Abrl
However. Saudi members of the A1-Say'ar, Nand and Bul-'Abeid tribes who have
relatives and property on the Yemeni side find it difficult to cross the frontier for a number
of reasons. Not only are the routes to their relatives and properties difficult, but as a result
of the former cold political relations between South Yemen and Saudi Arabia, there is no
checkpoint in this sector and the Saudi Border Guard does not allow people to cross the
frontier.
The author was fortunate in that during his field work in 1994 there were 6,000
refugees from the Yemeni civil war on the Saudi side of the frontier. These people when
spoken to informally provided good evidence for the existence of relationships between
people living on either side of the frontier, as most of the refugees were from the same
tribes as those which live on the Saudi side of the frontier, namely AI-Sayar, Nand, and
Bul-'Abeid. Moreover, despite the fact that the Saudi Government had established a camp
for the refugees in September 1994, some Saudis broke the law by trying to help their
relatives by moving them to Sharurah town.
According to the sheikhs interviewed, most of the properties owned by Saudis on
the Yemeni side of the frontier are farms and houses, some of which were inherited from
their relatives in the Al-Say'ar. Nand, and Bul-'Abeid tribes on the Yemeni side.
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4.3.2	 OPINIONS OF KEY PEOPLE CONCERNING THE FRONTIER
The sheikhs interviewed by the author were not satisfied with the present frontier. They
want the land traditionally occupied by their tribes which is currently under Yemeni
contol, namely Raydat A1-Say'ar, Al-'Abr, and Ramlat Al-Sab'atayn (Figure 4.5(A)), to
belong to Saudi Arabia. In fact, these areas lie to the south of the extreme Saudi claim so
this is unlikely to ever happen.
4.4	 Economic Opportunities
The greatest economic potential in the Central Study Sector is in the field of
hydrocarbons. There are currently active Yemeni operations in the oil concession
Block.18 which is located in the south of the Western Study Sector, as mentioned in
Section 3.4.1.
In this sector all the Yemeni operations are beyond the extreme Saudi claim with the
exception of Block 11 as Figure 4.6(A) shows. Elfpetroland has the concession for Block
11, but in December 1992 they decided to suspend drilling operations because of the
block's location on the disputed frontier with Saudi Arabia (AOG Directory, 1993:
p.504). Blocks 5, 6, and LI are adjacent to the disputed area, but are affected by the
Saudi claim:
A total of 12 blocks are affected all of which adjoin or touch the existing border
with Saudi Arabia. In April 1992 the Saudi government addressed memoranda to
five contractors, British Petroleum, PetroCanada, Philips, Hunt Oil and Atlantic
Richfield, informing them they were operating in disputed territory and calling on
them to cease their operations pending a settlement of the dispute. (AOG Directory,
1993: p.507)
Blocks 7, 8, 9, and 10 are located to the south of the Central Study Sector. Most of the
activity in these blocks has resulted in abandoned wells as Figure 4.6(A) shows).
On the Saudi side of the frontier, ARAMCO's 1959 operations were to the east of
48°E (Schofield and Blake, 1989: p.4.86), in other words, in the Eastern Study Sector
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(see Chapter 5). En recent years there have been no reported hydrocarbon operations in the
Central Study Sector on the Saudi side of the frontier, but this does not mean that no
potential exists.
An examination of hydrocarbon operations in the Central Study Sector makes it
clear that the activities of exploration and production companies have affected the border
dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. With the expectation of a compromise in the
future, it is possible to imagine joint development agreements for the oil and gas fields
this sector.
4.5	 The De Facto Border
The de facto border in the Central Study Sector is delimited by the location of border
guard posts. On the Saudi side of the frontier the border guards in this sector are located
at Al-Mahtadar, Al-Murassas, Huwaymil. Qallubah, and Af-Akhashim. On the Yemeni
side the posts are at Al-Mutashakkhirah, three posts in the area of Al-'Ari'arin, and Al-
Manabiz (Figure 4.7(A)). These border guard posts are located using natural features
such as mountains, 'uruq and shiqaq. Figure 4.7(A) also shows the distances between the
border guard positions on both the Saudi and Yemeni sides of frontier. In general the
distances are between 20 and 80km, and the width of the defacto border is approximately.
10-20km. Where border guard positions are closer together in a situation like the Saudi-
Yemeni frontier, more tension can be expected in these areas. The Saudi and Yemeni
border guards patrol the de facto border around the clock and do not allow anyone to
cross the frontier. Anyone caught attempting to do so is arrested as a smuggler or
infiltrator.
Figure 4.7(A) shows the defacro border. Section A is coincident with part of the
1914 Violet line and the terrain mainly consists of sand dunes forming 'uruq and shiqaq.
Section B is coincident with part of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line and the terrain is a
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mixture of gravel, sand, and mountains, as it also is in Section C which is coincident with
part of the line shown on the MSD-SAR (1967) Yemen Arab Republic map.
Table 4.2 Reasons for arrest and items confiscated in the Central Study Sector, 1992-4
Reasons for Arrest:
	 1992	 1993	 1994
Infiltrators	 3	 10	 74
Smugglers	 54	 47	 240
Items Confiscated:	 1992	 1993	 1994
Alcohol	 879	 --	 325
Weapons	 66	 22	 144
Ammunition	 12788	 68	 2640
Boxes/sacks of food
	 229	 495	 --
Various items
	 105,504	 --	 724,439
Source: Saudi Border Guard statistics. 1994
Table 4.2 shows the reasons for arrest and items confiscated in the Central Study Sector
between 1992-4. There were more arrests in the Central Study Sector than the Western
Study Sector during this period for two reasons. Firstly, there is no checkpoint in the
Central Study Sector. Secondly, the frontier in the Central Study Sector is mostly through
sandy terrain. Infiltrators and smugglers prefer crossing the frontier in sandy areas as the
distance between border guard posts is greater, especially in the north-east of the sector
where the Saudi guard posts are between 20-90km apart, making it easier to evade the
patrols (Saudi Border Guard statement, 1994) (Figure 4.7(A)). Table 4.2 also shows that
there were a greater number of infiltrators and smugglers arrested in 1994 (almost an
average of one a day) than either of the previous years, perhaps due to the effect of the
Yemeni civil war in 1994 as has been mentioned in Section 3.5 dealing with the defacto
border in the Western Study Sector.
4.6	 Distribution of Tribes on the Frontier
The method used by the author to determine the tribal boundaries in the Central
Study Sector was the same as that used for the Western Study Sector: interviews with
sheikhs (see Section 1.6.3).
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All the land in the Central Study Sector belongs to the AL-Say'ar tribe (Figure
4.8(A)). Both the extreme British claim and the extreme Saudi claim would divide the AL-
Sayar tribe in two. The Aden Protectorate claimed the Al-Say'ar tribe:
The following tribes emerged as belonging to the Aden Protectorate on the northern
border from west to east: the Karab ..., the Saiar ... (Schofield, 1993: Vol.3,
p.538)
The Saudi Government also claim the Al-Say'ar tribe:
The Amir Faysal was reminding the British that Al-Abr tin the south of the Al-
Sayar tribal area, Figure 4.8(A)J had once belonged to his Majesty's forefathers
during the past century. (Wilkinson, 1991: p.214.)
However, most of the Al-Sayar tribe and their sheikhs now live on the Saudi side of the
frontier in Sharurah town and in the town of Al-Wadi'ah (see Appendix 2.4 for the
genealogy of the A1-Say'ar tribe).
The sheikhs interviewed stated that those members of the AI-Say'ar tribe living on
the Saudi side of the frontier are loyal to Saudi Arabia. They showed the author copies of
receipts for the zakat (tax) paid by the Al-Say'ar tribe to the Saudi Government for the
period 1946-72, together with a copy of the protection agreement between Saud Al-Faisal
(1869-74) and the Al-Say'ar sheikh. The reason that the author was shown these
documents was not that the members of the Al-Say'ar tribe wanted to prove that their
tribal lands should lie on the Saudi side of the border, but to give evidence of the fact that
the tribe had been loyal to Ibn Saud for a long time, despite part of their land being under
Yemem control. The most important areas of Al-Say'ar tribal land on the Yemeni side of
the frontier are Al-'Abr, Al-Hajar, Raydat Al-Say'ar, Wadi Hazar, and 'Aywat Al-Say'ar
(Figure 4.8(A)).
There are members of three other tribes living amongst the Al-Say'ar tribe in the
Central Study Sector, but these peoples' tribal lands are beyond the extreme Saudi
territorial claim. The tribes concerned are AL-Kurab and Al-Briak, both sub-tribes of Bul-
'Abeid, and most of the individuals live in the town of Al-Wadi'ah.
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From the facts presented in this section, it can be seen that the distribution of tribes
in the Central Study Sector does not impinge on the de facto border. Furthermore, it
would not be possible to use tribal borders as a basis for a future compromise boundary
in this sector for two reasons. Firstly, the Saudi de facto border is coincident with the
extreme Saudi claim as Figure 4.7(A) shows and some of the Al-Say'ar tribal land lies
beyond the extreme Saudi claim. Secondly, the validity of tribal claims is extremely hard
to prove, here as elsewhere.
4.7	 Conclusion
The most likely compromise border in the Central Study Sector would be the de facto
border with some modification (see Chapter 6). The de facto border in this sector has
special characteristics compared to other sectors along the Saudi-Yemeni frontier.
The frontier in the Central Study Sector prohibits interaction between the people on
either side no visits to relatives or properties can be made, and no one crosses the frontier
to go to markets, with the exception of smugglers (Table 4.2). This is in marked contrast
to the good level of interaction which exists across the frontier in the Western Study
Sector.
The Saudi and British claims in the Central Study Sector both ignore tribal
boundaries. The A1-Say'ar tribe are divided by the current frontier (Figure 4.8(A)). The
chief of the Al-Say'ar tribe estimated that in 1994, 60% of the Al-Say'ar tribal land was
on the Saudi side, along with 80% of the tribe, whilst 40% of their land and 20% of their
tribal members were on the Yemeni side of the frontier. Those members of the A1-Say'ar
tribe on the Yemeni side of the frontier are not likley in the future to find themselves on
the Saudi side of an agreed boundary, as they live to the south of the extreme Saudi claim.
The other characteristic of the Central Study Sector is the number of border guard
posts on both the Yemeni and Saudi sides of the frontier. There are six Saudi posts and a
further six Yemeni posts at a distance of between 20-80km apart (Figure 4.7(A)). This
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relatively high density of guard posts is partly explained by the tension that existed
between the Saudi and South Yemen regimes prior to the unification of Yemen in May
1990, and which resulted in the Wadi'ah war in 1969 (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, p.947).
In addition, the existence of oil in the triangular area to the south of the Central Study
Sector, together with the conflict between the Yemeni states in both 1972 and 1979, has
contributed to the number of border guard posts on the frontier in this sector (Gause,
1990: p. 148). All the Yemeni border guard posts in this sector were built by South
Yemen, with the exception of Al-Bramah guard post in the west which was built by North
Yemen.
For all of the above reasons it is presumed that, with a few modifications, the
Logical Boundary will follow the defacto border in the Central Study Sector (see Section
6.2.3).
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Chapter 5
The Eastern Study Sector
5.1	 Introduction
The Eastern Study Sector covers the eastern part of the former South Yemen (former
Aden Protecorate)-Saudi Arabia frontier. This sector is enclosed to the south by the
extreme Saudi claim represented by a section of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (Section
2.4.2.7) and the extreme Yemeni claims represented by a section of the 1955 British
Declaration line (Section 2.4.2.6). This area is approximately located between 17OO'N
and 19°OO'N latitude, and 482O'E and 52°OO'E longitude (Figure 5.1). The study of the
Eastern Study Sector is significant for a number of reasons. This is the only sector of the
Saudi-Yemeni frontier which has an informal checkpoint (see Section 1.6.2.1 for the
difference between a formal and informal checkpoint), namely Al-Kharkhir checkpoint on
the Saudi defacto border. There is also more tension in the defacto border area in this
sector than either of the other sectors, particularly at Dahyah, 'Uruq Ibn Hamudah, and
'Uruq Al-Kharkhir, near the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint (SWB, 1994a: p.15-6).
Figure 5.2 shows the terms which will be used in this chapter to describe the different
parts of the Eastern Study Sector frontier.
An agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman signed on
1 October 1992 used the geographical point at the intersection of latitude 19°O0'N and
longitude 52°O0'E as the terminus of the boundary between the two countries. This point
is in the north-east of the Eastern Study Sector (Figure 5.1). Another agreement signed on
21 March 1990 by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman used the same
geographical point (19°O0'N 52°O0'E) as the terminus of their mutual boundary (MEES,
l99pp. ID-4D).
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Figure 5.1: Location of the Eastern Study Sector
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CHAPTER 5
The existence of these agreements has heightened the tension concerning the location of
the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint. Saudi Arabia and Yemen in principle each want
to claim as much territory as possible at the junction with the Omani border. The Saudis
are attempting to push the tnpoint as far south as possible towards the junction of the
extreme Saudi territorial claim with the Oman-Yemen border. The Yemenis, on the other
hand, want the Saudi-Yemen border to be an extension of the Saudi-Oman border, which
would coincide with the extreme British claim. The Yemenis' case is strengthened by the
existence of the above agreements.
Finally, in contrast to the Central Study Sector (Chapter 4) which is largely
controlled by Saudi Arabia. most of the disputed Eastern Study Sector region is controlled
by Yemen.
5.2	 Geographical Features
The geographical features of the Eastern Study Sector are an extension of those in the
Central Study Sector. This section examines the geology, relief, water resources, climate,
and population distribution of the sector.
5.2.1	 GEOLOGY, RELIEF, AND WATER RESOURCES
There are three principal groups of geological formation in the Eastern Study Sector.
Starting in the north of the sector there are Quaternary Eolian sands with gravel, together
with Tertiary sandstone and limestone forming a relief of mega-ridge dunes ('uruq) with
elevations of between 201 and 350m, and intervening valleys (shiqaq). There are also
sand seas, known in Arabic as rainlat. Some of the more prominent dune features in this
area are 'Uruq Al-Mawarid, 'Uruq Dahyah, 'Uruq Ibn Hamudah, 'Uruq Al-Kharkhir,
Ramlat Umm Gharib, and Ramlat 'Aywat, whilst Shiqaq Al-Ma'atif, Shiqqat Al-Sirdab,
Al-Qaamiyat, Al-Dikakah, and Umm Al-Maib are some of the more prominent inter-
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dune valleys (Figure 5.3(A)). These features are all close to the 1955 British Declaration
line which is the extreme British claim in this sector.
To the south is an area of wadis and plateaux between 351 and 450m above sea
level and formed of a mixture of Tertiary and Quaternary geological formations,
principally gravel and sand, the Dammam and Rus formations, and the Jeza formation.
The most notable relief features are the wadis of Wadi 'Aywat Al-Say'ar, Wadi Hazar,
Wadi Qanab, Wadi Armah, Wadi 'Arabah, and 'Aywat Al-Manahil, whilst Khasfat Qanab
is an important wadi entrance (Figure 5.3(A)).
In the south-east of the Eastern Study Sector there is the Tertiary Habshiya
formation, which forms Jabal Mahrat (601 to l,000m) (GMSCRQ, 1963; GMSERQ,
1963: MSD-KSA, 1992. Republic of Yemen map).
There is a possibility of using a geographical feature in the Eastern Study Sector as
the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The feature in question is the southern
edge of the Rub' A1-Khali (Empty Quarter), where sand dunes give way to flat sand and
gravel plain. This margin runs some 30 to 50km south of the 1935 Riyadh Line (Figure
5.3(A)). The possibility of using this feature to demarcate the boundary was considered
by the Aden Government in March 1937, but was never formally proposed to Saudi
Arabia (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, pp.139-52; 1994: p.2!; Wilkinson, 1991: pp.216-7;
also see Section 2.4.2.4 for more details).
Relatively little information is available concerning water resources and the location
of aquifers in relation to the frontier in the Eastern Study Sector. The water resources
currently available on the Saudi side of the frontier in this sector come from wells drilled
at Umm Gharib, Al-Sirdab, and Al-Kharkhir at an average depth of approximately 450m
as Table 5.1 shows. There are also hand-dug wells at Wadi Dahyah and 'Uruq Ibn
Hamudah. On the Yemeni side there are a further four drilled wells at Wadi Sha'it,
'Aywat Al-Manahil. Thamud, and Wadi Hazar as well as hand-dug wells in Wadi Hazar,
Thamud. 'Aywat Al-Manahil. Wadi Armah, Wadi 'Arabah, and Wadi Rakhawt as Figure
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5.5(A) shows (MSD-KSA. 1992. Republic of Yemen map; MPMR-KSA, 1983. Arabian
Peninsula map). Data concerning wells on the Yemeni side of the frontier is not available.
but one might speculate that they are similar to those on the Saudi side.
Differences in the depth of the water table and well productivity, and the consequent
variation in the availability of water, are very important and should be taken into
consideration when the boundary is discussed between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
Table 5.1 Water wells drilled near the Saudi defacto border in the Eastern Study Sector
Location of	 Depth	 Geologic Time	 Water Production
wells	 (m)	 (Gallons/mm)
Umm Gharib	 350	 Pliocene	 504
Al-Sirdab	 400	 Pliocene	 452
Al-Kharkhir( 1)
	
505	 Pliocene	 600
Al-Kharkhir(2)	 530	 Pliocene	 220
Source: Saudi Ministry of Agriculture Survey, 1994
5.2.2	 CLIMATE
As was indicated in the preceding two chapters, the climate of the area will be discussed
only in so far as it affects frontier crossings.
The climatic factor most likely to affect frontier crossings in the Eastern Study
Sector is rainfall which affects the availability of pasture (Saudi Border Guard statement at
Al-Kharkhir, 1994). The nearest meteorological station to the Eastern Study Sector is in
Sharurah town which is a considerable distance (600km) from Al-Kharkhir checkpoint.
Figure 5.4 shows the monthly rainfall totals for the Sharurah meteorological station for
1992 and 1993. The total annual rainfall for these two years was 36.7mm and 49.3mm,
with 17 and 23 rainy days respectively. These exceptionally low totals and number of
rainy days make this region one of the driest in Saudi Arabia (Saudi Yearbook, 1992-3:
pp.38-S I). Due to the scarcity of rainfall along the frontier in the Eastern Study Sector the
bedouin move to pasture and wells during the winter and spring. Plate 5.1 shows one of
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Figure 5.4: Monthly rainfall totals at Sharurah Meteorological Station for 1992 and 1993
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these bedouin with his herd of camels on the Saudi defacto border. The author visited
him during his 1994 field survey. He is from the UAE and he moves his camels across
the desert between pasture and water wells. The Saudi Border Guard allow the bedouin to
use the pasture in the defacto border area under Saudi control on the condition that they
obtain permission from the Border Guard at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint. As previously
mentioned, in the Western and Central Study Sectors, bedouin are not allowed to cross
the Saudi defacto border for security reasons. However, in the Eastern Study Sector the
Saudi Border Guard at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint allOw the bedouin to cross the de facto
border because most of them are well known to the Border Guard due to the frequency
with which they cross, and they do not cause problems like smuggling (Saudi Border
Guard statement at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint. July 1994). Furthermore, some of the shiqaq
and 'uruq pastures such as 'Uruq lbn Hamudah, Al-Sardab, Badi' Al-Ghanm, Qanab,
Aywat Al-Manahil, and Hazar, have been used by the bedouin for a very long time
(Figure 5.5(A)). There are also a small number of bedouin from the UAE who cross the
Saudi defacto border for pasture (see Table 5.4 in Section 5.3.1).
The 1990 Oman-Saudi Arabia and 1992 Oman-Yemen agreements stipulated the
rights to pasture, movement and the use of water resources:
The organization of the border authorities as well as the right to pasture lands,
movement and the use of water resources in the border areas shall be governed in
accordance with the two annexes attached to this agreement (Oman-Yemen, 1992:
Article 7, cited in MEES, 1992bp.D2).
The organization of the border authorities as well as the right to pasture lands,
movement and the use of water resources in the border areas shall be regulated in
accordance with the two annexes appended to this agreement (Oman-Saudi Arabia,
1990: Article 7, cited in MEES. 199p.D3).
Access to pasture lands and the use of water resources on the frontier, particularly in the
Eastern Study Sector, should likewise be discussed and regulated in talks concerning the
boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It should be possible to reach a workable
and practical mechanism to allow cross-border grazing.
172
CHAPTER 5
5.2.3	 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
The population in and around the Eastern Study Sector is sparse compared to both the
Western and Central Study Sectors. On the Saudi defacto border there are 3.000 people
living in the village of A1-Kharkhir which has a market, schools, a health clinic, petrol
stations, and electricity. The inhabitants are bedouin who are mostly living in
permanently-located tents, with a few houses built of local stone (Plate 5.2). Most of the
menfolk work for Al-Kharkhir Emirate (the local governorate) or as camel herders. A few
of them also have small farms in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir (Plate 5.3). Most of the settlers are
from Al-Manahil tribe.
Nearly all of the Eastern Study Sector has been under Yemeni control in recent
years. The Yemeni Government divided most of the sector between the Hadhramaut and
A1-Mahrah Governorates (Figure 5.6). These two govemorates are the least populated of
all the governorates in Yemen, especially Al-Mahrah Governorate (Ministry of Planning
and Development, 1991: p.25). Figure 5.6(A) shows that the two governorates have a
higher percentage of rural inhabitants than urban which is the norm for this part of the
Arabian Peninsula. As was mentioned in Chapter 4 (Central Study Sector), there is no
data available on population distribution for the Yemeni side of the frontier, but Figure
5.6(A) shows the villages, wadis, and wells in the Eastern Study Sector as shown on the
MSD-KSA (1992) Republic of Yemen map. It can be expected that the bedouirt will be
settled around these areas. Most of the settlers in the Eastern Study Sector are from Al-
Say'ar, Al-Manahil, and Al-Mahrah tribes. The Al-Mahrah tribe have their own language
which they use in their tribal area, whilst speaking Arabic with other tribes (Al-Thawr,
1985: p.4.97).
An examination of the sparse population in the Eastern Study Sector indicates that it
should not be a factor to obstruct a border agreement between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
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5.3	 Cross-Frontier Interaction
As indicated above, the population both within and around the Eastern Study Sector is
very scarce, even more so than that of the Western Study Sector. This, together with the
informal nature of Al-Kharkhir checkpoint (see Section 5.3.2 on checkpoints), affects
cross-frontier population interaction. Table 5.2 shows the big differences in the numbers
of people crossing the Saudi defacto border in 1992 through A1-Khadra checkpoint in
comparison to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint.
Table 5.2 Numbers and nationalities of those arriving at and departing from Al-Khadra
and Al-Kharkhir checkpoints. January to December 1993
Nationality
Al-Khadra	 Saudi	 Yemeni
Arriving
Departing	 22,237	 22,580	 321	 202	 89
Total
	
46.980	 45,298	 589	 355	 144
Al-Kharkhir	 emeni	 r
Amving	 4,700	 1,350	 600	 150	 --
Departing	 4,300	 1,280	 416	 213	 --
Total	 9,000	 2,630	 1,016	 363	 --
Source: AI-Khadra data from Saudi Immigration Statistics Archive. 1993 and
AI-Kharkhir data estimated by AI-Kharkhir Border Guard, 1993
The difference in the numbers of Saudis and Yemenis crossing is particularly notable.
Table 5.2 also shows that more people from the UAE cross the Saudi defacto border at
A1-Kharkhir than at A1-Khadra. This is for two reasons; members of Al-Manahil tribe
living in the UAE travel to visit their relatives who live in the Eastern Study Sector (see
Section 5.3.1.1 on visits to relatives); Al-Kharkhir checkpoint is also closer to the UAE
than Al-Khadra.
Table 5.3 shows the residence and tribe of respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir
checkpoint whilst crossing the Saudi de facto border. Most of those interviewed were
members of Al-Manahil tribe which shares the Eastern Study Sector with Al-Say'ar and
A1-Mahrah tribes (see Section 5.5.3 on the distribution of the tribes). All of those
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questioned lived in the Eastern Study Sector with the exception of those from the UAE
and Qatar. Most of the Saudis in the sample lived close to the defacro border, with some
of them living under Yemeni control (see Section 5.5 on the defacro border).
Table 5.3 Nationality, tribe, and residence of respondents interviewed
at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
Mespondents	 inbe	 Settlement	 Sample Size
Nationality
	 o.	 %
Saudi	 Al-Manahil	 Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir (S)
	 150	 57.7
Al-Mahrah	 Armah (Y)
	 25	 9.7
Al-Manahil	 Wadi Hazar(Y)	 14	 5.4
Al-Manahil	 'Aywat Al-Manahil (Y)
	 [3	 5.0
Al-Mahrah	 Dahyah (S)
	 12	 4.6
Al-Manahil/Al-Mahrah 	 Uruq Ibn Hamudah (S)
	 10	 3.8
Al-Mahrah	 Sanaw (Y)
	 10	 3.8
Al-Manahil	 A1-Harajah (Y)	 9	 3.5
Al-Manahil	 Upper 'Aywat (Y)	 7	 2.7
Al-Manahil	 Badi' AI-Ghanm (5)	 6	 2.3
Al-Mahrah	 Wadi Sha'it (Y)	 4	 1.5
	
260	 100
Yemeni	 Al-Manahil	 Thamud (Y)
	 42	 38.9
A1-Mahrah	 Lbnah (Y)
	 11	 10.2
A1-Say'ar	 Raydat Al-Say'ar (Y)	 11	 10.2
A1-Say'ar/A1-Manahil 	 Wadi Hazar (Y)
	 10	 9.3
A1-Say'ar/Al-Manahil	 Husn A1-'Abr (Y)	 9	 8.3
A1-Mahrah	 Jabal Maharat (Y)	 8	 7.4
Al-Manahil	 Wadi Qanab (Y)	 8	 7.4
Al-Manahil	 Armah (Y)	 6	 5.6
A1-Mahrah/A1-Manahjf 	 Wadi 'Arabah (Y)	 3	 2.1
	
108	 100
UAE	 Al-Manahil	 Abu-Dhabi	 30	 37.5
Al-Manahil	 Al-Dhafrah	 22	 27.5
AI-Mahrah/Al-Manahil	 A1-Humrah	 15	 18.8
Al-Mahrah	 Aradah	 10	 12.5
Al-Rowashed	 Al-Manadir	 3	 3.1
	
80	 100 -
Qatari	 Al-Kurab	 Al-Doha	 20	 40
Al-Bnak	 A1-Wakra	 10	 20
Al-Kurab	 AI-Raiyan	 7	 14
AI-Mahrah	 Al-Harithy	 7	 14
AI-Say'ar	 BaditAl-Raiyan	 6	 12
	
50	 100
(S): Settlement under Saudi control
(Y): Settlement under Yemeni control
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1994
175
CHAPTER 5
Most of the Saudi respondents were living in the defacto border area under Saudi control,
whilst some were living in the defacro border area under Yemeni control. The Yemeni
respondents were also living either in that part of the defacto border area which is under
Yemeni control, or on the Yemeni side of the frontier (Figure 5.7(A)).
Anyone crossing the Saudi de facto border in either direction must report to Al-
Kharkhir checkpoint, including Saudis who are only crossing the Saudi defacto border to
or from the defacto border area under Saudi control. Because there are no checkpoints to
control the movement of people within the defacto border area between the areas under
Saudi and Yemeni control, Saudi Arabia uses this system to control the movement of
people from the Yemeni to the Saudi side of the frontier. If anyone attempts to cross the
Saudi defacro border to the Saudi side of the frontier in this sector they will be arrested
by the Saudi Border Guard as smugglers. However the Saudi Border Guard along the de
facto border reported to the author in July 1994 that, in general, very few such crossings
are attempted.
For the same reason as mentioned above, the Qataris and those from the UAE who
wish to visit their relatives either on the Yemeni side, or even in the defacto border area
under Saudi control must first report to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint. The settlement of
Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir and its market, Al-Harah are regarded as being on the Saudi defacto
border. This means that people visiting the settlement and market from either side.
whether locally from the defacto border area under Saudi control, or from further afield
such as anywhere in Saudi Arabia or the UAE, have to report to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
before they can begin their business in the settlement, and again, prior to leaving the area.
5.3.1	 PURPOSES OF FRONTIER CROSSINGS
Table 5.4 shows reasons, in order of priority, for crossing the Saudi de facto border
given by respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkir checkpoint. As previously mentioned, the
main purpose of crossings can only be approximations because the various purposes for
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the crossings were often very closely related. 44.6% of all crossings were primarily for
the purpose of visiting markets, making this the most common reason for Saudi and
Yemeni movement in the Eastern Study Sector (Figure 5.8). This is presumably because
of the rarity of markets in the Eastern Study Sector. The market at Al-Kharkhir supplies
the people of the frontier region with various goods and petrol (see Section 5.3. 1.2 on
visits to markets). The second most common reason for Saudi defacto border crossings
in this sector amongst the Saudis and Yemenis in the sample was for visits to relatives.
Most of the Saudis, Yemenis, and those from the UAE in the sample were from Al-
Manahil tribe.whose tribal lands cover much of the Eastern Study Sector. Amongst those
interviewed from Qatar and the UAE, visits to relatives was the most common reason
given for crossing the Saudi defacto border. Few of the crossings in the sample were for
the purpose of visits to properties, with the exception of a number of Saudis who own
property in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir. 12.5% of crossings made by those from the UAE were
for the purpose of grazing only.
Table 5.4 The purposes of Saudi defacto border crossings of respondents interviewed
at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint, classified according to priority
1-'urpose ot 1-'rlonty	 Respondents' Nationality
Crossing	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE	 Qatan
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Relatives	 First priority	 --	 --	 --	
--	 70	 87.5 50	 100
Second priority 146 56.2 59 54.6 --	 --	 --	 --
Other purposes 114	 43.8 49
	 45.4 10
	 12.5 --	 --
Total	 260 100	 108 100	 80 100	 50	 100
Markets	 First pnority	 114 43.8 108 100
	 --	 --	 --	 --
Secondpriority	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Third priority	 --	 --	 --	 --	 8	 10	 --	 --
Other purposes 146 56.2 --	 --	 72	 90	 50	 100
Total	 260 100
	 108 100	 80 100	 50	 100
Properties First priority
	 146	 56.2 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Secondpriority	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Other purposes 114 43.8 108 100
	 80	 100	 50	 100
Total	 260 100
	 [08 100	 80	 [00	 50	 100
Grazing	 First priority	 --	 --	 --	 --	 10	 12.5 --	 --
and Wells Other purposes 260 100
	 108 100	 70	 87.5 50	 100
Total	 260 100
	 108 100	 80 100	 50	 100
Source: Authors Field Survey, I Jul-10 Sept, 1994
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5.3.1. 1
	 Visits to Relatives
Visits to relatives are not as important a reason for Saudi de facto border crossings in the
Eastern Study Sector as they are in the Western Study Sector. In the author's field survey
in the Western Study
 Sector most of the Saudis questioned crossing the Saudi de facto
border had a second wife on the Yemeni side, but in the Eastern Study Sector this factor
did not arise in the survey.
Table 5.5 Tribe and settlement of relatives of respondents interviewed
at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
Kespondent.s' 	 Relatives	 Relatives'	 Sample
Nationality
	Tribe	 Settlement	 No.	 L7
Saudi	 Al-Manahil	 'Uruq Ibn Hamudah (S)
	 23	 8.8
Al-Manahil	 'AvwatAl-Manahil(Y)
	 16	 6.2
Al-Manahil	 Badi' A1-Ghanam (S)
	 15	 5.8
Al-Manahil	 'Uruq A1-Kharkhir (S)
	 13	 5.0
Al-Manahil	 Al-Harajah(Y)	 13	 5.0
Al-Manahil	 Armah (Y)
	 12	 4.6
Al-Manahil	 Upper 'Aywat (Y)
	 12	 4.6
Al-Mahrah	 Dahyah (5)
	 12	 4.6
Al-Mahrah	 Lbnah(Y)	 9	 3.5
Al-Manahil	 Shiqqat Al-K.harkhir (S)
	 9	 3.5
Al-Manahil	 Shiqaq Al-Ma'atif (S)
	 7	 2.7
Al-Manahil	 Qanab(Y)	 5	 1.9
Novisittorelatives	 114	 43.8
Total	 260	 100
Yemeni	 Al-Manahil	 Shiqqat A1-Kharkhir (5)
	 59	 54.6
No visit to relatives 	 49	 45.4
Total	 108	 100
UAE	 Al-Manahil	 Armah (Y)
	 24	 30.0
Al-Manahil	 'Avwat Al-Manahil (Y)
	 15	 18.8
Al-Manahil	 ShiqqatAl-Kharkhir(S)	 11	 13.8
Al-Manahil	 Wadi Qanab (Y)
	 8.	 10.0
Al-Mahrah	 Wadi Hazar (Y)
	 7	 8.8
Al-Mahrah	 'Uruq Al-Kharkhir (S)
	 5	 6.3
Novisittorelatives	 10	 12.3
Total	 80	 100
Qatan	 Al-Kurab	 Al-Hajar	 17	 34
Al-Bnak	 Zamakh	 13	 26
Al-Say'ar	 Husn Al-'Abr	 10	 20
Novisittorelatives	 10	 20
Total	 50	 100
(S): under Saudi control; (Y): under Yemeni control
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994
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Table 5.5 shows more detail about those crossing the Saudi defacto border in the Eastern
Sector to visit relatives. Most of the relatives of the Saudis reporting to Al-Kharkhir
checkpoint live in the village of Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir (Figure 5.9(A)). The distances
between the Saudis' homes and those of their relatives are mostl y between 30 and 120km
(Figure 5.9(A)).
Thirty percent of the Saudis visiting relatives cross the Saudi de facto border daily
taking supplies (particularly petrol) to their relatives living south of the Saudi de facto
border. The remainder visit their relatives either weekly or monthly (Table 5.6), especially
those whose relatives live far from Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir (Figure 5.9(A)). Table 5.5
shows that 54.6% of all the Yemenis questioned reporting to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
were visiting their relatives in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir whilst making a trip to the market
there at the same time. The distance between these Yemenis' homes and those of their
relatives was, in general, greater than 100km (Figure 5.9(A)). Most of them cross the
Saudi defacto border monthly as Table 5.6 shows. Most of the relatives on both sides of
the frontier are from Al-Manahil tribe.
Table 5.6 Frequency of visits to relatives by respondents interviewed
at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
of Visits	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 VA
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Daily	 78	 30.0	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 78	 15.8
Weekly	 54	 20.8 12	 11.0 --	 --	 --	 --	 66 13.2
Monthly	 14	 5.4 47	 43.5 --	 --	 --	 --	 61	 12.2
Yearly--	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 8	 16	 18	 3.6
Other (mostly	 --	 --	 --	 --	 70 87.5 32	 64 102 20.4
3-6 months)
Novisitto	 114	 43.8 49	 45.5 10	 12.5	 10	 20	 173 34.8
relatives
Total	 2641) 100
	 108	 100	 80 100	 50	 100 498 100
Source: Authors Field Survey. 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994
Of those in the sample from the UAE visiting relatives, most of the relatives lived in
Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir, 'Aywat Al-Manahil, and Armah. The distance between their homes
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in the UAE and those of their relatives is more than 700km (Figure 5.7(A)). In general
they cross the Saudi de facto border every three to six months (Table 5.6). All the
relatives of those from the UAE were also from Al-Manahil tribe.
Figure 5.9(A) also shows that the relatives of the Qataris in the sample all live on
the Yemeni side of the frontier beyond the Eastern Sector, more than 1,000km from their
homes in Qatar. These Qatans are members of Al-Kurab and Al-Briak tribes which are
scattered throughout Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Qatar (tribal sheikh's statement, 1994).
The Qataris also cross the frontier every three to six months.
Comparing the data on purposes for frontier crossings statistically, using the
Kruskal-Wallis test (see Section 1.6.2.4), there is a highly significant difference between
the four nationalities with respect to visits to relatives (chi-sq = 62.9447; degree of
freedom (df) = 3; significance = 0.000). The Mean Rank of the Kruscal-Wallis test
indicates that the data for those of UAE and Qatari nationality with respect to visits to
relatives is significantly different from that of the other nationalities. This is because
nearly all of the UAE and Qatari respondents were crossing the Saudi de facto border in
order to visit relativies, and for most of them this was the main reason for the crossing.
The Saudi and Yemeni respondents, on the other hand, were crossing the de facto border
for a variety of purposes such as visits to markets, properties, and relatives.
5.3. 1.2
	 Visits to Markets
The market in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir is the only market visited by Saudis and Yemenis in
the Eastern Sector, as Table 5.7 shows. The market is known as Al-Harah and most basic
goods are available in addition to fuel (petrol, diesel, kerosene, and gas) which is the
most required commodity. People in the Eastern Sector use the fuel to run their vehicles,
cooking stoves, and lanterns. Petrol is always available in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir and is
cheaper there than on the Yemeni side of the frontier. For example, in 1994 the price of a
25u.barrcl of petrol in Al-Kharkhir market was US$3, whilst on the Yemeni side of the
frontier the price was more than US$10, and the petrol was not always available
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(respondent's statement during author's field surve y, July 1994). Figure 5. 10(A) shows
that A1-Kharkhir market is the closest market for both Saudis and Yemenis living in the
Eastern Sector and it is a considerable distance from any other major settlement on either
side of the frontier. In addition, A1-Kharkhir checkpoint is an informal checkpoint with no
customs. Saudis and Yemenis Living along the frontier are therefore allowed to cross the
Saudi defiicto border with their daily requirements. The Yemenis who cross the Saudi de
Jcto border do not import goods for trade as do the Yemems in the Western Sector. This
is presumably because of the exceptionally dry climate in the region which means that the
little agnculture that exists is for subsistence purposes only and people on both sides of
the frontier rely on herding livestock and employment in the Border Guard for a living
(see Section 5.5 on the deftwto border).
Table 5.7 Markets visited by respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
visited	 emeni
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 (7,	 No.	 7c
Al-Harah	 114	 43.8 108
	 100	 --	 --	 --	 --	 222 44.6
Atmah --	 -	 --	
--	 1	 1.2	 --	 --	 1	 0.2
Qanab--	 --	 --	 --	 7	 8.8	 --	 --	 7	 1.4
No visit to	 [46	 56.2 --	 --	 72	 90	 50	 100 268 53.8
market
Total	 260 100 108 100 80 100
	
50	 100 498 100
Source: Author's Field Survey. I Jul-tO Sept, 1994
Table 5.7 also shows that of those respondents from the UAE crossing the Saudi de facto
border, 8.8% visited Qanab and 1.2% visited Armah market on the Yemeni de facto
border. In these cases the main purpose for crossing the Saudi defacto border was to visit
relatives.
Table 5.8 shows that most of the Saudis cross the Saudi defacro border either daily
or weekl y. Those living close to Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir cross daily, and those living in
Hazar, Qanab, and 'Avwat Al-Manahil (between 50 and 120km from Al-Kharkhir
market) cross weekly. The Yemeni respondents who were crossing the Saudi de facto
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border to go to market did so monthly because most of them were living a considerable
distance (between 50-200km) from A1-Kharkhir market as Figure 5.10(A) shows.
Table 5.8 Frequency of visits to markets by respondents interviewed
at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
t-requency	 Kespondents Nationality
	Total
of Visit	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE	 Qatan
No.	 7c	 No.	 7c	 No.	 '7c	 No.	 7c	 N
Daily46	 17.7	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 -16	 9.2
Weekly	 46	 17.7	 9	 8.3	 --	 --	 --	 --	 55	 11.0
Monthly	 22	 8.4 99	 91.7 --	 --	 --	 --	 121	 24.3
Yearly --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 8	 10	 --	 --	 8	 1.7
No visit to
	 146	 56.2 --	 --	 72	 90	 50	 100 268 53.8
markets
Total	 260	 100	 108	 100	 80	 1(X)	 50	 1(X) 498 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994
Statistically companng the data on purposes for frontier crossings for both Al-Khadra and
Al-Kharkhir checkpoints using the Kruskal-Wallis test (see Section 1.6.2.4), there is a
highly significant difference between the four nationalities with respect to visits to
markets.(chi-sq = 558.6169; degree of freedom (dl) = 3; significance = 0.000). The
Mean Rank of the Kruscal-Wallis test indicates that the data for those of Yemeni
nationality with respect to visits to markets is significantly different from that of the other
nationalities. There are three factors which encourage Yemenis to cross the de facto
border to visit markets. Firstly, goods are generally cheaper on the Saudi side of the
frontier. Secondly, in the Western Sector the Saudi Government allows Yemems who are
members of the frontier tribes duty-free allowances at Al-Khadra checkpoint (see Section
3.2.3 for more details), and thirdly, in the Eastern Sector Yemeni members of the frontier
tribes are allowed to cross the Saudi de facto border through Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
without paying duty on any daily requirements, including petrol.
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5.3. 1.3
	 Visits to Properties
In this sector people of Saudi nationality own properties on both sides on the frontier, as
they do in the Western Sector, but in smaller numbers as the Eastern Sector is so sparsely
populated. There are no known Yemeni-owned properties on the Saudi side of the frontier
in the Eastern Sector, because as was mentioned in Chapter 3 (Western Sector), Saudi
law does not allow other nationalities to own property in Saudi Arabia. The Yemeni
constitution does not refer to the ownership of property, as this is a matter for tribal
organization (Al-Sharji, 1990: p.344).
Table 5.9 shows that 56.2% of the Saudi respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir
checkpoint were crossing the Saudi de facto border to visit their properties. Figure
5. 11(A) shows that most of the properties were permanently-located tents and wells,
whilst a few of the Saudis owned Portacabins.
Table 5.9 Tribes of respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint who own
property across the Saudi defacto border and location of properties
Respondents	 Respondents'	 Location of
	 Sample Size
Nationality	 Tribe	 Properties	 No.
Saudi	 Al-Manahil	 'Uruq Ibn Hamudah (S)
	 24	 9.2
Al-Manahil	 Badi' Al-Ghanam (S) 	 15	 5.8
Al-Manahil	 Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir (S) 	 13	 5.0
Al-Manahil	 Al-Harajah (Y)
	 13	 5.0
Al-Manahil	 Armah (Y)
	 12	 4.6
Al-Manahil	 Dahyah (S)
	 12	 4.6
Al-Manahil	 'Aywat Al-Manahil (Y) 	 11	 4.2
Al-Manahil	 Qanab (Y)
	 9	 3.5
A1-Manahil/Al-Mahrah	 Lbnah (Y)
	 9	 3.5
Al-Manahil	 Wadi Hazar (Y)
	
7	 2.7
Al-Manahil	 Upper 'Aywat (Y)
	
7	 2.7
Al-Manahil	 Shiqqat Umm Gharib (S) 	 5	 1.9
Al-Manahil	 Shiqaq Al-Ma'atif (S)
	 5	 1.9
Al-Manahil	 Sanaw (Y)
	 4	 1.5
Nopropertyvisited	 114	 43.9
Total	 260	 100
Yemeni	 No property visited	 --	 108	 100
UAE	 No property visited	 --	 80	 100
Qatari	 No property visited	 --	 50	 100
(5): settlement under Saudi control; (Y): settlement under Yemetu control
Source: Authors Field Survey. 1 Jul-10 Sept. 1994.
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Table 5.10 shows that of the Saudi respondents interviewed at A1-Kharkhir checkpoint
who were crossing the Saudi de Jcio border to visit properties, 30.4% cross daily,
chiefly those living near Al-Kharkhir checkpoint, whilst the remainder cross either weekly
or monthly.
Table 5.10 Frequency of visits to property by respondents interviewed
at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
1-requency	 lesponients' Nationality
	Total
of Visit	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE	 Qatan
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 (7
Daily	79	 30.4	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 79	 15.9
Weekl y
	56	 21.5	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 56	 11.2
Monthly	 11	 4.2	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 11	 2.2
Yearly --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Novisitto	 114	 43.9 108
	 100	 80	 100	 50	 100 352 70.7
properties
Total	 260	 100 108 100	 80	 100	 50	 100 498 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, I Jul-10 Sept, 1994
Companng the data on purposes for frontier crossings for both checkpoints statistically,
using the Kruskal-Wallis test (see Section 1.6.2.4), there is a highly significant difference
between the four nationalities with respect to visits to property.(chi-sq = 93 1.1882;
degree of freedom (df) =3; significance = 0.000). The Mean Rank of the Kruscal-Wallis
test indicates that the data for those of Saudi nationality
 with respect to visits to markets is
significantly different from that of the other nationalities. This is because those
respondents of Saudi nationality are the only nationality to own properties on both sides
of the frontier. The first reason for this is historical. In the Western Sector, Article 4 of
the 1934 Treaty
 of Taif placed those members of the Wa'ilah tribe who were living in
Najran before 1352 (1933) under Saudi control. However these families have retained the
properties which they owned in that part of the Wa'ilah tribal lands which was designated
to Yemen by the Treaty. Also some of the Yam tribal land which should belong to Saudi
Arabia according to the Treaty of Taif, has come under Yemeni control since 1934.
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Secondly, Saudi law does not allow other nationalities to own property, as mentioned
above.
5.3.1.4	 Grazing and Wells
There are several areas in the Eastern Sector which have traditionally been used for
grazing, and in which wells have been dug (statement by sheiks of Al-Manahil and Al-
Sav'ar tribes, 1994). Figure 5.5(A) shows these grazing areas and wells (MSD-KSA,
1992, Republic of Yemen map).
Table 5.4 (purposes of Saudi defacto border crossings of respondents interviewed
at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint, classified according to priority) shows that 12.5% of
respondents of UAE nationality questioned were crossing the Saudi defacto border solely
for the purpose of taking their livestock to grazing. These bedouin were from Al-Manahil
tribe. The Saudi Border Guard does not prevent the movement of bedouin across the
Saudi defacto border in this sector as they do not cause problems such as smuggling, but
they must obtain the permission of the Border Guard as previously mentioned (see
Section 5.2.2). There are also bedouin from Oman, most of whom are well known to the
Border Guard, who come to the Eastern Study Sector to graze their livestock (Saudi
Border Guard statement, Al-Kharkhir checkpoint, July 1994).
Plate 5.1 shows one of the bedouin from the UAE grazing his camels at lbn
Hamudah on the Saudi de facto border. He had brought his herd of camels from Al-
Dhafrah, approximately 600km away. The author asked this bedouin if he also owned
sheep or goats. "Sheep and goats are for poor people, camels are for real men and indicate
courage and Arabic generosity" was the unexpected answer!
The 1990 Oman-Saudi Arabia and 1992 Oman-Yemen agreements included
arrangements controlling the movement of people across the boundaries and the right to
pasture lands on the frontier (see Section 5.2.2). Saudi Arabia and Yemen should
likewise ensure that these local matters are properly dealt with in any future boundary
agreement.
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5.3.2	 THE CHECKPOINTS
The A1-Kharkhir checkpoint is located beyond the extreme 1955 British territorial claim.
The location is significant because of its proximity to the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen
tripoint.
Al-Kharkhir checkpoint is an informal checkpoint by comparison to the checkpoints
mentioned in the Western Study Sector. This means that unlike the formal checkpoints
there are no immigration, customs, or health officials at Al-Kharkhir (see Section
1.6.2.1). The reason for A1-Kharkhir being an informal checkpoint is presumably
because the Saudi authorities are unhappy about the location of the checkpoint and hope
that they will be able to relocate it further south in the Eastern Study Sector in the event of
a boundary agreement. In contrast, the position of Al-Khadra checkpoint in the Western
Study Sector was agreed between Saudi Arabia and Yemen on 8 August 1989 (Asharq
A1-A%vsat, 1989: p.1).
There are no checkpoints on the Yemeni side of the frontier opposite Al-Kharkhir.
This is possibly due to the lack of a market on the Yemem side of the frontier, equivalent
to that at Al-Kharkhir, which supplies the people of the frontier area with all their basic
goods, including petrol. The presence of the market is therefore one of the primary
reasons for crossings of the Saudi de facto border at Al-Kharkhir and the necessity for a
checkpoint there. Furthermore, all the routes to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint run east-west,
roughly parallel to the de facto border along shiqaq, namely Shiqqat Badi' Al-Ohanam
and Shiqqat Al-Sirdab. This is in contrast to the Western Study Sector where routes to Al-
Khadra checkpoint run north-south and A1-Khadra checkpoint on the Saudi side of the
frontier is opposite Al-Buq'a checkpoint on the Yemeni side. Alternatively, the lack of a
Yemeni checkpoint in this sector could merely be one of financial constraints. People
wishing to cross the Yemeni defacto border in the Eastern Study Sector have to report to
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one of the Yemeni Border Guard posts (statement by Al-Manahil and Al-Mahrah shcikhs
at Al-Kharkhir, July 1994).
The author used Al-Kharkhir checkpoint as a base to interview people crossing the
Saudi de facto border in both directions and to study the functions of the checkpoint as
there is no other checkpoint in the Eastern Study Sector.
5.3.2. 1
	 Time Spent at the Checkpoint
The majonty of respondents interviewed crossing the Saudi de facto border at Al-
Kharkhir checkpoint were satisfied with the amount of time they spent at the checkpoint.
Table 5.11 shows the respondents' attitude to the the amount of time spent at the
checkpoint completing crossing procedures. 32.7% of Saudi respondents were not
satisfied, especially those who cross the Saudi defacto border daily. These individuals
wanted more flexibility from the Saudi Border Guard. In fact the time spent at Al-
Kharkhir checkpoint seems very reasonable; it takes between five and ten minutes for an
individual, but if the traveller is accompanied by his family and carrying goods, it can take
between 15 and 30 minutes (Author's field survey, 1 July - 10 September, 1994).
The average time spent completing formalities at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint is less than
the equivalent time spent at Al-Khadra checkpoint in the Western Study Sector for two
reasons. Firstly there are more people crossing the Saudi de facto border at A1-Khadra
checkpoint (see Section 5.3, Table 5.2). Secondly, Al-Khadra checkpoint is a formal
checkpoint and there are therefore more procedures to be completed there than at the
informal checkpoint at Al-Kharkhir.
Table 5.11 Respondents' attitude to the length of time spent at A1-Kharkhir checkpoint
Reasonable	 175	 67.3 100 92.6 80
	 100	 50	 100 405 81.4
Unreasonable	 85	 32.7	 8	 7.4 --	 --	 --	 --	 93	 18.6
Total	 260 1(X)	 108 100
	 80	 100	 50	 100 498 100
Source: Authors Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994
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5.3.2.2	 Reasons for Choice of Checkpoint
All the respondents in the sample chose Al-Kharkhir checkpoint because of its proximity
to their homes and, or, those of their relatives, although of course there is no realistic
alternative. Table 5. 12 shows that the Saudi and Yemeni respondents interviewed at Al-
Kharkhir chose the checkpoint because it was both close to their homes and those of their
relatives. In fact, there is no alternative checkpoint in the Eastern Study Sector. By
contrast, the choice of checkpoint of the Saudi and Yemeni respondents in the Western
Study Sector was influenced by the fact that the privileges afforded the frontier tribes by
the Saudi Government are only available at Al-Khadra checkpoint.
Table 5.12 also shows that the UAE and Qatan respondents chose Al-Kharkhir
checkpoint because it is close to the homes of their relatives.
Table 5.12 Reasons for respondents' choice of Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
Reason for choice
	 Respondents' Nationality	 Total
ot checkpoint	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE	 Qatari
No.	 '7c	 No.	 (7	 No.	 % No.	 %	 No.	 %
Close to y our residence
and relatives	 260	 100	 108	 100	 --	 --	 --	 --	 368	 74
Close to your relatives
	 --	 --	 --	
--	 80	 100	 50	 100	 130	 26
Providesa good	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
service
Safefrom the Yemeru
	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
side
Safefrom the Saudi
	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
side
Good road from Saudi	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Goodroad from Yemen
	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --
Other--	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 260 100 108 100 80	 100 50
	 100 498 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994
5.3.2.3	 Transport and Routes to the checkpoint
The modes of transport used by the respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
between 1 July and 10 September 1994 to cross the Saudi de facto border in the Eastern
Study Sector are shown in Table 5.13. 6 1.5% of those in the sample were passengers in
friends' cars and the remaining 38.5% were using their own cars. Most of the vehicles
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were tour-wheel drive Toyota Pickups which are used because of their suitability for
crossing the sand dunes of the Rub Al-Khali on the the Saudi Arabia-Yemen frontier.
Figure 5. 12(A) shows the routes which lead to the checkpoinL All of the routes to
the checkpoint are sand and gravel tracks which have been created by the passage of
vehicles and on which the driving conditions are very difficult indeed (Plate 5.4).
Table 5.13 Transport taken by respondents to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
Mode 01	 Respondents' Nationality
	 Total
Transport	 Saudi	 Yemem	 UAE	 Qatan
	
No. (7	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No. %
	 No.	 %
Private vehicle
	 106 40.8 44 40.7 39 48.8
	 3	 6 192 38.5
Friend's vehicle 154 59.2 64 59.3	 41 51.2 47	 94 306 61.5
Ontoot	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Bus --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Taxi --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Donkey--	--	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Camel --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 260 100 108 100
	 80	 100	 50 100 498 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, I Jul-10 Sept, 1994
The development of asphalt roads along the frontier in the Eastern Study Sector has been
delayed by the problems on the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and Saudi
Arabia and Oman. However, after the agreements between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in
1974, and Saudi Arabia and Oman in 1990, the Saudi Ministry of Communications
started to plan an asphalt road to run along the frontiers in the Eastern Province and
around the edge of the Rub AI-Khali (Saudi Ministry of Communications Archive, 1992).
Away from the frontier, the Eastern Province (which borders the Eastern Study Sector)
has an excellent asphalt road network of 3,473km (Central Department of Statistics, 1993:
p.325). 987km of asphalt road have also been constructed in the Hadhramaut and Al-
Mahrah Governorates which border the Eastern Study Sector on the Yemeni side of the
frontier (Ministry of Planning and Development, 1991: p.108).
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5.3.2.4	 Facilities at the Checkpoint
Table 5. 14 shows that 64.97c of respondents interviewed at A1-Kharkhir checkpoint
believe that the facilities of the checkpoint are less than adequate. This was not an
unexpected result because Al-Kharkhir, being an informal checkpoint, has no facilities for
those crossing the defacto border. Some people have to wait as long as an hour in the sun
to get permission to cross. 34.3'7c of all respondents believe that the facilities of the
checkpoint are adequate. Some of this group are those who cross the Saudi de facto
border either dail y
 or weekly and who only have to wait at the checkpoint for between
live and ten minutes.
Table 5.14 Respondents' attitude to facilities at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
Attitude to
	 Respondents' Nationalit
Facilities	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE	 Oatan
r'o.	 ic	 No.	 ic	 No.	 INO.	 Yc	 No.	 7
N lore than adequate 	 4	 1.5	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 4	 0.8
Adequate	 86 33.1	 42 38.9 39
	 48.8	 4	 8	 171	 34.3
Less thanadequate	 170 65.4	 66 61.1	 41	 51.2 46	 92 323	 64.9
Total	 260 100
	 108 100
	 80 100	 50	 100 498 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994
Al-Kharkhir checkpoint undoubtedly needs considerably more financial investment and
development to bring it up to the same standard as Al-Khadra checkpoint in the Western
Study Sector.
5.3.2.5 Documents Used at the Checkpoint
The documents used by people crossing the Saudi de facto border at Al-Kharkhir
checkpoint are different from those used at Al-Khadra checkpoint in the Western Study
Sector. Table 5.15 shows that all the Saudis in the sample used an identity card to cross
the de facto border in both directions. By contrast, all the Yemeni respondents had
obtained a 'guarantee' to cross the frontier. This guarantee is different from the
'statement' used in the Western Study Sector. It is a document from the chief of Al-
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Manahil tribe in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir addressed to the Saudi Border Guard at Al-Kharkhir
checkpoint guaranteeing that the Yemenis crossing the Saudi de facto border are only
travelling to Al-Kharkhir market or within the Eastern Province, and that they will return
through the same checkpoint. A new guarantee is needed for each return crossing of the
Saudi de facto border. This bureaucratic procedure is partly a result of the fact that Al-
Kharkhir is only an informal checkpoint, and partly because of the boundary dispute
between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and it limits cross-frontier interaction.
Table 5.15 Documents used by respondents to cross the Saudi defacto border
at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
Passport	 --	 --	 --	 --	 80	 100	 50	 100	 130 26.1
Guarantee	 --	 --	 108	 100	 --	 --	 --	 --	 108 21.7
Identity Card	 260	 100	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 260 52.2
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 260 100 108 100	 80	 100	 50	 100 498 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994
Table 5.15 also shows that all the respondents from the UAE and Qatar used passports at
Al-Kharkhir checkpoint because they cannot cross other formal checkpoints on their
travels - Salwah, between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and Al-Batha between Saudi Arabia
and the UAE - without passports (Figure 5.12(A)).
5.3.2.6	 Dual Nationality
Dual nationality was a sensitive subject as most of the respondents interviewed knew that
dual nationality is forbidden for those holding Saudi nationality (see Chapter 3, Section
3.3.2.6). Table 5.16 shows that none of the respondents in the Eastern Study Sector
would admit to having dual nationality. However, the Saudi Border Guard at Al-Kharkhir
checkpoint explained that, in practice, there are very real possibilities of citizens holding
dual nationality, particularly amongst the Saudis living in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir.
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Furthermore, some of Al-Manahil tribe who live in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir could hold triple
nationality - Saudi, Yemeni, and UAE. This is a result of the distribution of members of
Al-Manahil tribe between Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the UAE, even though their tribal
lands are divided between Saudi Arabia and Yemen only (see Section 5.6 on distribution
of tribes). However, the comments of the Saudi Border Guard remain hearsay and are not
supported by accurate data.
Table 5.16 Nationalites held by respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
Respondents' 	 Respondents' Nationality
	 T
Nationality	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE	 Qatari
No.	 io	 No.	 %	 No.	 ',	 No.	 No.	 %
Saudi	 260	 100	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	
--	 260	 52.3
Yemeni	 --	 --	 108	 100	 --	 --	 --	 --	 108	 21.7
LJAE	 --	 --	 --	
--	 80	 100	 --	 --	 80	 16.0
Qatan	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	
--	 50	 100	 50	 10.0
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 260 100 108 100	 80	 100 50	 100 498 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994
5.3.3	 PERCEPTIONS OF THE FRONTIER
Borderlanders' perceptions of the frontier are a very important and under-rated
consideration in the settlement of a boundary dispute as was mentioned in connection with
the Western Study Sector. This is because of the possibility of using the features
recognised by local people as indicating the position of the de facto border in the event of
a future agreement on the boundary between the two countries.
5.3.3.1	 Features Indicating the Frontier
Most of the relief features in the Eastern Study Sector are 'uruq and shiqaq, as mentioned
above. Table 5.17 shows that all respondents recognised Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir as the
Saudi defacto border when they were crossing from the Saudi side of the frontier. When
crossing from the Yemem side of the frontier they recognised the Yemeni de facto border
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by
 the Yemeni Border Guard positions of Al-Fuhud, Khasiat Qanab, Amiah, and Al-
Harajah (see Figure 5.14). Most of these border guard positions are named after the
geographical features on the Yemem de fi2cto border where they arc located, namely Al-
Fuhud. Khasfat Qanab, and Armah. The use of these same geographical features,
together with Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir, might facilitate the delimitation of the boundary when
this sector is negotiated.
Table 5.17 Features recognised as indicating the defacto border area by respondents
interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
Features	 Respondents' Nationality
	 Total
indicating
defacto border	 Saudi	 Yemem	 UAE	 Qatan
Saudi Side:	 No.	 '7c	 No.	 %	 No.	 '70	 No.	 %	 No.	 '7o
Shiqaq	 260 100 108 100	 80	 100	 50	 100 498 100
Uruq--	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Ramlat --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Wadis --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 260 100 108 100
	 80	 100	 50	 100 498 100
Yemeru Side:	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 (7	 No.	 '7c	 No.	 '7o.
Shiqaq--	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Uruq--	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Ramlat --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Wadis --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Border Guard Posts 260 100 108 100
	 80	 100	 50	 100 498 100
Total	 260 100 108 100
	 80	 [00	 50	 100 498 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sep. 1994
5.3.3.2	 Frontier Changes
Table 5.18 shows that 71.3% of respondents interviewed at A1-Kharkhir checkpoint
believe that the de facto border area has changed in living memory. Most of the
respondents in the sample said that approximately 30 years ago there were no checkpoints
on the frontier. At that time there was much more freedom of movement between the two
countries than there is currently. 28.7% of the respondents believed that the de facto
border's location has not changed over the years, but that there are now more border
guard posts than there were in the past. Some evidence for this is provided by a letter
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from the Governor of Aden to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 30 September
1948, concerning the frontier dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Aden Protectorate,
and the tribes living there:
I have the honour to refer to my despatch No.50 of the 21st June on the subject of
raiding between Saudi, Yemeni and Protectorate nomadic tnbes in the indeterminate
areas to the north of the Hadhramaut, and to inform you that the Saudi delegates
arrived at Al-Abr on the 27th August, and were met by our delegates. The
Muqaddame (chiet) of the Kurab, Saiar and Awamir tribes were present and a
representative of the Mahras also arrives later. (cited in Schofield, 1992: Vol.20,
p.167)
The frontier must have been close to its current position as the Al-Kurab, Al-Say'ar,
Awamir, and Al-Mahrah tribes are all still living on the frontier, and there can have been
few, if any, border guards to prevent the raiding which was taking place across the
frontier. By the time the tension between Saudi Arabia and Yemen resulted in an increase
in the number of border guards in the de facto border area, the frontier itself was
becoming more clearly delimited than it was in 1948 (see Section 5.5 on the de facto
border).
Table 5.18 Perceptions of frontier changes of respondents interviewed
at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
Frontier perceived	 Respondents' Nationality
	 Total
as having changed
	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE	 Qatari
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Yes	 203	 78.1 74	 68.5 60	 75	 18	 36	 355 71.3
No	 57	 21.9 34	 31.5 20	 25 32	 M	 143 28.7
Donot know	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 260	 100 108 100	 80 100	 50 100	 498 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sep, 1994
5.3.3.3	 Level of Satisfaction with the Frontier
Table 5.19 shows that 51.2% of all Saudi respondents, and 26.9% of all Yemeni
respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint were dissatisfied with the location of
the present defacto border between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Republic in the Eastern
Study Sector. These respondents were members of Al-Manahil and Al-Mahrah tribes,
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members of which live on both sides of Lhe frontier. They want all of their tribal land to
be under Saudi control as Figure 5.15(A) shows. The reasons for this have already been
mentioned (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3.3), but they may not be typical of all their tribe.
Table 5.19 Level of satisfaction with the frontier amongst respondents interviewed
at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint
Level of
	 Respondents' Nationali
	 -	 Total.
Satisfaction	 Saudi	 Yemeni	 UAE
	
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 7o	 No.	 7o	 No.	 7o
Satisfied	 78	 30.0	 64 59.3 39	 48.8 --	 --	 181 36.3
Dissatisfied	 133	 51.2	 29	 26.9	 --	 --	 --	 162 32.5
Donotknow	 49	 18.8	 15	 13.8 41	 51.2 50	 100	 155 31.2
Total	 260 100	 108 100	 80 100	 50	 1(X) 498 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sep, 1994
Figure 5.15(A) shows that the lands of Al-Manahil and Al-Mahrah tribes stretch from the
Arabian Sea coast to the edge of the Rub' A1-Khali. It would therefore be impossible for
all this land to come under Saudi control as most of it lies to the south of the extreme
Saudi claim as Figure 5.15(A) also shows.
5.4	 Economic Opportunities
There are a number of factors which affect the economic potential of the frontier region in
the Eastern Study Sector, but this section will discuss only those factors which have an
impact on boundary issues and contribute to the tension between the two states. By far the
most significant factor is the potential for hydrocarbon and mineral discoveries in the area,
as is the case in the Western Study Sector. The commercial activity of the frontier area
will also be discussed in this section.
5.4.1	 MINERALS AND HYDROCARBONS
In general, the Yemeni Government has more interest in exploring for hydrocarbons than
minerals (Raswal, 1982: p.141). There is, therefore, currently no mineral activity in the
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Eastern Study Sector on the Ycmcni side of the frontier. This is also true on the Saudi
side of the frontier, but this lack of activity does not indicate a lack of mineral potential in
the area. All exploration activity in the Eastern Study Sector on both sides of the frontier
is focussed on hydrocarbons as Figure 5.13(A) shows.
In 1958 the American oil company Aramco surveyed two locations to the south of
the extreme British claim on behalf of Saudi Arabia. This activity is mentioned in a letter
dated 13 April 1959 from the Governor of Aden to the Colonial Office:
The nearest camps set up by P.C.L. [Petroleum Concessions Ltd] in the autumn
and winter of 1958 were sited at 1T58'N 4924'E, 1745'N 4855'E. and 17°38'N
48°25'E. All of these are of course south of the frontier declared by Her Majesty's
Government to the Saudi Arabian Government in August 1955. (Schofield and
Blake, 1989: Vol.29, p.486)
Figure 5.13(A) shows the location of Aramco's exploration camps, and of the two
incomplete wells which the company attempted to drill. In 1994 the author interviewed the
Head of the Survey Department in the Saudi Ministry of Petroleum about the results of the
1958 survey. It transpired that British officials had forced Aramco to withdraw from these
sites on the frontier before enough data had been gathered to discover the hydrocarbon
potential of the area (Head of Survey Department, Saudi Ministry of Petroleum, 1994).
The action taken by the Aden Protectorate exemplifies their concern about Aramco's
activities on the frontier, and was mentioned in a further letter, dated 4 April 1959, this
time from the Colonial Office to the Governor of Aden:
I notice in paragraph 203 of the Monthly Aden Intelligence Summary No.3 for
March 1959, dated April 23, a comment on the Saudi Arabian note protesting
against the establishment of a camp at a site from which British officials had
previously forced Aramco to withdraw. (cited in Schofield and Blake, 1989:
Vol.29, p.487) (author's emphasis).
The two wells are now abandoned in the no man's land between the Saudi and Yemeni de
facto borders, as a comparison between Figures 5.13(A) and 5.14(A) shows.
Hydrocarbon exploration is more active on the Yemeni side of the frontier. Most of
the companies operating in the area have been awarded their exploration licences since the
creation of the Republic of Yemen in May 1990 (AOG Directory, 1993: p.498). Table
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5.20 shows the companies which have licences for blocks in the Eastern Study Sector.
The blocks which lie on the frontier with Saudi Arabia, namely Blocks 11, 12, 30, and
39, have been affected by the boundary dispute (AOG Directory, 1993: pp.504.7), as the
wells are now abandoned.
Table 5.20 Oil concession blocks in the Eastern Study Sector
Name	 Block No.	 Area	 Companies	 Date awarded or(kmz )	 approved
SirrHazar	 11	 7,217	 Elf Petroland	 Nov 1988
North Sanau	 12	 15,940	 Arco/PecteniPectenlBin 	 March 1990
HamlCoplexiToweroil
South Sanau	 29	 12,634	 Nimir Petroleum	 Sept 1991
Habrout	 30	 12,083	 Open to bidders	 --
Thamud	 36	 10,660	 Consolidated Colonnade March 1993
Resources
Source: AOG Directory, l993 also, see Figure 5.14(A)
As Figure 5.13(A) shows, of those wells drilled by Yemen in the Eastern Study Sector,
two wells in Block 29 have found oil and gas, a further well has found just oil, seven
wells have been abandoned, and the results from two wells are currently unknown due to
the tension on the frontier (FSSPA, 1994, Yemen map).
Figure 5.13(A) also shows that most of the significant hydrocarbon finds are in the
Al-Masila Block (14) to the south of the Eastern Study Sector, far from the extreme Saudi
territorial claim. Despite the competition between the international oil companies, no big
new oil-rich structures are expected to be discovered in the future, and the companies now
rate the country's oil prospects as only moderate (AOG Directory, 1993: pA.98).
As this section shows, the operations of oil companies in the Eastern Study Sector
have been affected by the boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In terms of
hydrocarbon potential, this sector seems likely to be more significant than either the
Western or Central Study Sectors, and this should be taken into consideration when the
economic potential of the frontier region is raised in discussions about the subsequent
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management of the boundary between the two countries, following a boundary
settlement.
5.4.2 COMMERCE AND EMPLOYMENT
Commercial activity
 in the Eastern Study Sector is principally between A1-Harah market at
Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir on the Saudi defacto border and those people living in the area who
cross the Saudi defacto border to visit it. There is no cross-frontier commercial activity
like that of the Western Study Sector because of the absence of a Customs Office at the
informal Al-Kharkhir checkpoint. This means that the only goods which may be taken
across the Saudi de facto border are those for personal use only. Petrol is the commodity
most commonly required by the people crossing the Saudi defacto border.
Table 5.21 shows that 56.6% of all respondents were livestock herders. They buy
barley to Iced their camels and other livestock from Al-Kharkhir market. In 1994 the price
of 50kg of barley at Al-Kharkhir was US$4, whilst the price of the same quantity in
Yemen was US$15, and it was only available in the major cities, and not in the frontier
area (Al-Manahil sheikh's statement at Al-Kharkhir market, 1994). The remaining 43.3%
of respondents were officials in the Saudi, Yemem, UAE, and Qatari Governments, the
majority of them employed by the armed forces. However, of the Saudi respondents,
most of the officials worked for Al-Kharkhir Emirate.
The average annual income of all the respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir
checkpoint was between US$320 and US$3,000, the same as that of the respondents
interviewed in the Western Study Sector (see Section 3.4.2). This similarity was despite
the fact that 43.3% of all the respondents in the Eastern Study Sector were officials, and
45.2% were able to read, representing a more educated sample of people than the Western
Study Sector respondents (Author's field survey, 1 July - 10 September, 1994). The
same, relatively low level of income perhaps reflects the fact that most of the officials
were in low ranking positions, and although many were able to read, few were well
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educated. This may also be the reason why the average income for the Saudi respondents
was well below the average national income per capita (see Section 3.4.2).
Table 5.21 Occupations of respondents interviewed
at Al-Khaithir checkpoint
Students --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Traders --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Farmers --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Officials	 109 41.9	 61	 56.5 40	 50	 6	 12 216	 43.3
Labourers --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Unemployed--	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Drivers --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Herders	 151	 58.1 47	 43.5 40	 50	 44	 88 282	 56.7
Other --	 -	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --
Total	 260 100 108	 100	 80	 100	 50 100 498 100
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sep. 1994
5.5	 The De Facto Border Area
Defining the de facto border area is a key objective of this thesis as was previously
mentioned. The de facto border area in the Eastern Study Sector is extremely significant
due to its proximity to the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen boundary tripoint.
A special characteristic of the Eastern Study Sector is the high number of border
guard posts. There are 17 posts altogether of which eight are on the Saudi defacto border
and nine on the Yemeni defacto border as Figure 5.14(A) shows.
Starting in the west of the sector between Al-Fuhud Yemeni guard post to the south
and Al-Ma'atif Saudi guard post to the north, the de facto border area runs eastward until
it narrows near the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen de facto tripoint (Figure 5.14(A)). Figure
5.14(A) also shows the distance between the Yemeni and Saudi border guard posts in this
sector, the greatest distance being 100km between the Saudi position at Umm A1-Malh
and the Yemeni position, Armah. In general, the defacto border area in the Eastern Study
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Scctor is wide, for no obvious reason. There is, however, a very clear reason for the
narrowness of the defaczo border area in the east of this sector. This is due to the very
active territorial dispute over the area adjacent to the Oman boundary, and disagreement
over the location of the boundary tripoint. A Saudi news agency report on 8 December
1994 stated:
The source added that concerning what the responsible official at the Yemeni
Foreign Affairs Ministry mentioned about the creation of observation points (the
area of Dahyah, Uruq lbn Hamudah, Uruq A1-Kharkhayr and Dukakah in Mahrah
Governorate), and the building of roads in Yemeni territories to which he referred,
and despite the fact that the concerned Saudi .authonties had affirmed that some
constructions were inside Saudi territory... (SWB, 1994a: pp. 15-6).
Where the defacto border is at its narrowest, the distance between the Saudi and Yemeru
border guard positions is between eight and 26km as Figure 5. 14(A) shows.
Figure 5.14(A) also shows that most of the de facto border area lies south of the
extreme British claim, making it very likely that the location of the de facto border area
will affect the outcome of discussions about the boundar y in this sector.
Figure 5.14(A) shows the position of all the border guard posts in the de facto
border area. On the Saudi side there are eight posts, all of which are located in shiqaq or
'uruq. On the Yemeni defacto border there are nine posts, most of which are located at
the entrance to wadis: Al-Fuhud and Khashm Al-Jabal posts in Wadi 'Aywat Al-Say'ar,
and Jabal Al-Hwaq post in Wadi Khadrah, Khasfa post in Wadi Qanab, Armah post in
Wadi 'Aywat Al-Manahil, and Al-Harajah post in Wadi Armah. There are also three posts
near the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen de facto tnpoint which are located in shiqaq and
'unsq.
Most of the Yemeni Border Guard posts use their geographical advantage to control
the movement of people and to provide good visibility of the frontier. All of the Yemeru
posts in this sector were built by the former South Yemen. Most of the guards who work
in the posts are from the Yemeni sections of the local tribes of Al-Say'ar, Al-Manahil, and
Al-Mahrali (Al-Manahil sheikh's statement at Al-Kharkhir, 1994).
201
CHAPTER 5
A number of factors lead the author to the conclusion that a compromise boundary
is likel y to be based on the dej'acto border area (shown in Figure 5. 14(A)) in this sector.
These factors are the location of border guard posts and the difficulty that is likely to be
encountered persuading either country to relocate its posts; an historical analysis of the
1958 dispute in which pressure from the British forced the Saudi-sponsored oil company
Aramco to withdraw from the frontier (see Section 5.4. 1 on minerals and hydrocarbons);
and the tension between Saudi Arabia and Yemen over the boundary tripoint.
5.6	 Distribution of Tribes on the Frontier
The method used to locate tribal boundaries in this sector was the same as that used for
the Western and Central Study Sectors. Figure 5.15(A) shows the tribes of the Eastern
Study Sector. Al-Manahil and Al-Mahrah tribal lands cover most of the sector, together
with Al-Say'ar tribe which has land in the west. Most of the Al-Say'ar tribal lands are in
the Central Study Sector: Sharurah town and the village of Al-Wadi'ah on the Saudi side
of the frontier and the village of Al-'Abr, and Raydat Al-Say'ar on the Yemeni side
(Central Study Sector, Figure 4.8(A)).
Figure 5. 15(A) also shows the areas of apparently overlapping tibal claims between
Al-Manahil tribe, and Al-Mahrah and Al-Say'ar tribes. The land of all three tribes is
divided between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Regardless of the wishes of the sheikhs, as
stated to the author during his field survey in 1994, it would be impossible for all of these
tribal lands to be under Saudi control as part of the area in question lies to the south of the
extreme Saudi claim as Figure 5.15(A) shows. For further information about the
genealogy of the tribes see Appendix 2.
There are Saudis and Yemenis from all three tnbes living in the area of the Eastern
Study Sector. The loyalty of the members of each tribe is divided depending on the
nationality of the individual members. This is despite statements made by shiekhs of these
tribes that those individuals living on the Yemeni side of the frontier would prefer to live
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undcr Saudi control because of the better future a wealthy country like Saudi Arabia is
likely to offer them (Sheikhs' statements, Saudi side of the frontier, Author's held
survey, July, 1994).
Table 5.22 Political loyalty of tribal people in the Eastern Study Sector
I i1L
Al-Mahrah	 -	 Sunni	 MahriyaJArabic	 Saudi/Yemen
Al-Manahil	 S unni	 Arabic	 Saudi/Yemen
Al-Saar	 Sunni	 Arabic	 Saudi/Yemen
Source: Interviews with sheikhs in the Eastern Study Sector. My 1994
In addition, Kelly (1964: p.68)) indicated that Al-Manahil tribe were loyal to Ibn Saud.
Philbv (1939: pp.59 and 144) made the same observation of Al-Sayar tribe. However,
Philby
 and Kelly visited Arabia many years ago and the loyalty of tribes is always
changing. Moreover, it is not always easy to ascertain tribal loyalty (Walker, 1994:
p.173). In the past, tribes tended to be loyal to the stronger authority who would be in a
position to offer them protection. More recently, however, the tribes of the Arabian desert
tend to be loyal to the state with the better economy which is able to offer its citizens a
better quality of life.
From the facts presented in this section it is clear that the tribal boundaries do not
coincide with the defacto border area, or either the Saudi or British extreme territorial
claims. It would therefore not be practical to use the tribal boundaries as a basis for a
future compromise boundary
 between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in this sector. This may
create problems on the frontier, resulting in tension between the two states and damage to
relations between the tribes and the states.
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5.7	 Conclusion
The key to a possible compromise boundary in the Eastern Study Sector is the de ftzcto
border area and the southern margin of the Rub' Al-Khali which the British were willing
to consider in March 1937 (Schofield, 1994: p.21. see Chapter 6 for more details).
There are two main reasons for the territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia and
Yemen in the Eastern Study Sector. Firstly, there is the existence of the Oman-Saudi
Arabia-Yemen tnpoint in the sector. Secondly there is the potential for significant
hydrocarbon discoveries in the frontier area; Figure 5.13(A) shows a number of
abandoned wells in the de flicto border area and gas and oil on the Yemeni side of the
frontier.
The continuing boundary dispute has had an impact on a number of aspects of the
Eastern Study Sector. Firstly, hydrocarbon exploration activities have been impeded by
the uncertainty. Some companies who have been awarded the rights to blocks in the
Eastern Study Sector are offering these blocks (Nos.30, 36, and 39) to other companies
as a result, as Figure 5.13(A) shows. Secondly, the unwillingness to develop checkpoint
facilities which will then prove difficult to relocate has resulted in the informal nature of
Al-Kharkhir checkpoint, which in itself has affected the number of people passing
through the checkpoint, particularly Yemcnis. Thirdly, the fact that all the routes in the
area are only rough tracks as Figure 5.12(A) shows is, on the Saudi side of the frontier at
least, a result of the fact that the boundary dispute has delayed the road building
programme in the area (Saudi Ministry of Communications' archive, 1992).
Despite all this there is tribal movement across the frontier, especially of Al-Manahil
tribe (most of the respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint during the author's
1994 field survey were members of this tribe) which is spread throughout Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, and Yemen. The paramount sheikh of Al-Manahil tribe lives on the Saudi side
of the frontier in the Eastern Study Sector, and members of the tribe from all three
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countries visit him for guidance (Al-Manahil sheikh's statement, July 1994). Because of
the active boundary dispute in this sector there are no privileges afforded the frontier
tnbes by the Saudi Government as there are in the Western Study Sector.
The satellite image (Figure 5.14(A)) shows that most of the Yemenis' border guard
posts are in strategic mountainous locations allowing them to monitor the movement of
people and the de facto border area under Yemeni control. It is unlikely that they would
want to give up these locations in any compromise over the location of the boundary in
this sector.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1	 Conclusions
Figure 1.3 presents a conceptual framework for the investigations conducted for this
thesis. It shows how the defacto Saudi-Yemeni border in operation today provides a
logical basis for settlement of the territorial dispute in the region. A defacto border such
as the Saudi Yemeni case which is the product of a long period of dispute and uncertainty
represents the distillation of geographical influences. In some senses it is already a
compromise because it reflects the balance of power, what the parties have found to be
possible without serious conflict or outright compromise. The previous chapters have
described in detail how the defacto border was identified and mapped, perhaps for the
first time ever. That border conforms with a number of geographical and human divides at
least very broadly, and can be regarded as the crucial starting point for a properly adjusted
and negotiated boundary. As Figure 1.3 also shows, the thesis considers seven major
groups of factors in testing the suitability of the recommended boundary. The following
paragraphs briefly summarize their relevance to the delimitation of a just and rational
boundary. Not all the factors carry the same weight. Thus Figure 1.3 distinguishes
between those factors (geographical, historical, tribal, and administrative) which will be
critical in the delimitation process and those (social, economic, and behavioural) which
will powerfully influence the acceptability of any boundary compromise.
6.1.1	 GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES
Topographically, the Saudi-Yemeni frontier region consists of mountains, plateaux,
wadis, and dune formations consisting of shiqaq, uruq, and rain/at (see Section 4.2 for
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definitions), whilst the principal geological periods represented along the frontier are
Permian. Quaternary, and Tertiary. The Logical Boundary uses mountains. shiqaq, and
plateaux as boundary marks on the proposed boundary line (see Section 6.2,
Recommendations, below)
Data on the varying depth and productivity of water wells in the frontier region was
used as an indication of the relative accessibility and availability of water resources in the
area. The maximum productivity of wells in each sector was as follows: 420 gal/mm at a
depth of 61m in the Western Study Sector, 600 gal/mm at a depth of 505m in the Eastern
Study Sector, and 560 gal/mm at a depth of l,105m in the Central Study Sector.
Although there is relatively little difference in productivity, the depth to which wells have
to be drilled to achieve these flows varies considerably between the three study sectors. In
terms of accessibility of water resources, the Western Study Sector is therefore the most
valuable area. Although all the available data is for the Saudi side of the frontier, the
author expects the situation on the Yemeni side to be similar. This variation in the
accessibility of water resources should be an important consideration if trade-offs are used
to secure agreement on a compromise boundary. The exact location of ,
 the aquifer in
relation to the frontier should be established, and if necessary a groundwater treaty should
be agreed in order to avoid problems relating to water resources arising between Saudi
Arabia and Yemen in the future.
The climate of the area has surprisingly little influence on the frontier and activity
across it, except in the Eastern Study Sector where frontier crossings are affected by the
occurrence and location of rainfall which results in the growth of pasture. In the Western
Study Sector the timing of frontier crossings is not affected at all by summer
temperatures. This is because of the overriding influence of the rights and privileges of
the frontier tribes in this sector. Climate is however responsible for the sparse population
in the region because of the shortage of water and opportunities for cultivation. The
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shortage of population makes boundary delimitation more straightforward than in
populous frontier regions.
The privileges of frontier tribes, mentioned above, are granted by the Saudi
Government and apply only to those tribes living along the Saudi-Yemeni frontier in the
Western Study Sector and the Treaty of Taif boundary. Members of the tribes are allowed
to cross the frontier without a visa using only a statement as a means of identification, and
they may export a certain quantity of goods without paying duty. The Saudi Government
grants these privileges as part of its commitment to Article 4 of the Treaty of Taif (see
Section 3.2.3). By contrast, the Yemeni Government grants no comparable privileges to
the frontier tribes. This is a particular problem for those members of the Wa'ilah tribe
who cross the frontier weekly as they have properties and relatives on both sides of the
frontier. This lack of privileges may be for political reasons as the Yemeni Government is
unhappy with the presence of approximately 5,000 Saudi citizens living on the Yemeni
side of the frontier in Wadi Al-'Atfayn. The Yemeni Government clearly would prefer
these individuals to hold Yemeni, rather than Saudi citizenship.
6.1.2	 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
The distribution of population in and close to the frontier zone has no direct effect on the
location of the Logical Boundary. This is principally because the population density of the
area is low. The Western Study Sector is more densely populated than either of the other
sectors and here most of the population lives in, or near to the towns of Najran on the
Saudi side and Sa'dah, San'a', and Marib on the Yemeni side.
6.1.3	 CROSS-FRONTIER INTERACTION
The interaction of population across the frontier zone was evaluated by analysing the
responses to interviews conducted with samples of people crossing the frontier at two
checkpoints, Interaction was found to be taking place primarily for four purposes: visits
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to relatives, markets, and properties, and access to grazing and wells. The most important
influence on frontier crossings is the existence of individuals o/ning property and having
relatives on both sides of the frontier. Such a situation exists in the Western Study Sector
where all of the 361 Saudi respondents in the author's sample, most of whom were from
the Wa'ilah tribe, owned property and had relatives on both the Saudi and Yemeni sides
of the frontier. Also, in the Eastern Study Sector 27.7% of the 260 Saudi respondents had
properties and relatives on both sides of the frontier. All of these individuals were from
Al-Manahil tribe. These two cases are taken into account in the location of the Logical
Boundary (see Section 6.2. Recommendations).
No Yemeni respondents in the author's sample admitted to owning property on the
Saudi side of the frontier as Saudi law does not allow other nationalities to own property
in Saudi Arabia. whilst in Yemen this is a matter for tribal administration (see Section
3.3.1.3, Visits to Properties).
Saudi-Yemeni cross-frontier interaction is therefore complicated, and perhaps not
fully understood. It seems desirable to compare this pattern with models derived for other
troubled or stressed boundaries. Three such models were identified. First, Soffer (1994)
has built a model which attempts to explain the link between the level of interaction across
hostile boundaries and the size of the minority group divided by the boundary, based on
the case of the Israeli borders with Lebanon. Jordan, and Syria (Soffer, 1994: pp.182-
91). Secondly, Foucher's paper presented at the 1989 International Boundary Research
Unit's (IBRU) conference on 'International Boundaries and Conflict Resolution' in
Durham includes a theoretical geopolitical model of cross-border interactions known as
the 'Land Border Game', which demonstrates various types of situation and international
land boundary problems including cross-border interaction. Foucher's work is, however,
difficult to apply. Therefore, the most suitable model of borderland interaction for
application to the Saudi-Yemeni frontier is that presented by Martinez (Figure 6.1) at
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Figure 6. 1: Models of borderlands interaction
A: ALIENATED BORDERLANDS
Tension prevails. Border is
functionally closed, and cross-
border interaction is totally or
nearly totally absent.
Residents of each country act
as strangers to each other.
B: CO-EXISTENT BORDERLANDS
Stability is an on and off
proposition. Border remains
slightly open, allowing for the
development of limited binational
interaction. Residents of each
country deal with each other as
casual acquaintances, but
borderlanders develop closer
relationships.
C: INTERDEPENDENT BORDERLANDS
Stability prevails most of the time.
Economic and social complementarity
prompt increased cross-border
interaction, leading to expansion of
borderlands. Borderlanders carry on
friendly and cooperative relationships.
D: INTEGRATED BORDERLANDS
Stability is strong and
permanent. Economies of both
countries are functionally
merged and there is unrestricted
movement of people and goods
across the boundary.
Borderlanders perceive
themselves as members of one
social system.
Source: Martinez 1994 p3
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IBRU's 1991 Durham conference on international Boundaries: Fresh Perspectives'
(Martinez. 1994: p.3). An attempt to apply his ideas to the Saudi-Yemeni frontier follows
below.
6. 1.3.1	 Western Study
 Sector
Population interaction in the Western Study Sector conforms most closely to Martinez's
model of 'interdependent borderlands' (Figure 6.1, Model (C)) the characteristics of
which include 'Stability most of the time' (Martinez. 1994: p.3). Stability existed in the
Western Study Sector even during the period of the 1990-1 Gulf War when the Yemeni
Government's pro-Iraqi stand caused tension with Saudi Arabia. During this period
Yemeni expatriates working in Saudi Arabia lost their special privilege of exemption from
Saudi sponsorship and visa requirements, as a result of which thousands returned to
Yemen (AI-Qbba, 1992; p.288-9). However, the interaction of the frontier tribes was
unaffected and the rights and privileges of these tribes remained unchanged.
Model (C) also suggests 'Economic and social complementarity prompt increased
cross-border interaction'. The only economic interaction between the two countries in the
Western Study Sector is commercial trading from both sides. Yemenis crossing the
frontier import consumer goods including coffee and honey to sell on the Saudi side.
Social interaction between the tribes along the frontier is strong, especially among family
members. Those living on the Saudi side of the frontier are generally more wealthy than
their Yemeni relatives and are therefore able to offer them accommodation when they
visit. People on either side are free to cross the frontier to visit their relatives at any time
they want.
Finally, according to Martinez, in interdependent borderlands 'Borderlanders carry
on friendly and cooperative relationships'. In general, friendly and co-operative
relationships exist between the people on either side of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier.
However, those questioned by the author crossing from the Yemeni side had experienced
213
CHAPTER 6
some bureaucratic difficulties crossing the frontier (see Section 3.3.2.1, Time Spent at the
Checkpoint).
6.1.3.2	 Eastern Study
 Sector
Population interaction in the Eastern Study Sector conforms quite closely to Martinez's
model of 'coexistant borderlands' (Figure 6.1, Model (B)), the characteristics of which
include Stability is an on-and-off proposition'. At times the situation in the vicinity of the
Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint is very unstable. Tension is created by both civilian
and military tribal members who work in the Saudi and Yemeni Border Guard posts in
this area.
Model (B) also suggests that the 'Border remains slightly open allowing for the
development of limited binational interaction'. The status of Al-Kharkhir checkpoint in the
Eastern Study Sector as an informal checkpoint affects trans-frontier population
interaction. The frontier is slightly open allowing the movement of Saudis and Yemenis
across the frontier to visit relatives, markets, properties, grazing and wells, but the
crossing procedure is complicated, which limits interaction.
Finally, according to Martinez, 'Residents of each country deal with each other as
casual acquaintances, but borderlanders develop closer relationships'. Most of the frontier
crossings in the Eastern Study Sector are made by borderlanders and they develop their
relationships on both sides of the frontier. In general however, interaction in this sector is
limited by the informal nature of the checkpoint, the difficulty of acquiring the documents
required at the checkpoint, the lack of asphalt roads, the sparse population compared to
the Western Study Sector, and the fact that the boundary has not been agreed or
demarcated.
6.1.3.3	 Central Study Sector
Population interaction in the Central Study Sector conforms quite closely to Martinez's
model of 'alienated borderlands' (Figure 6. 1, Model (A)), the primary characteristic of
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which is that Tension prevails'. Tension prevailed in 1969 when there was fighting
between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen at A1-Wadi'ah, but since 1970 the frontier has
been stable in this sector.
Model (A) also suggests that the 'Border is functionally closed, and cross border
interaction is totally or nearly totally absent'. There is no cross-frontier interaction in the
Central Study Sector. This is due to a number of factors: there is no checkpoint on the
frontier in this sector: there are no Saudi citizens living under Yemeni control as there are
in the Western Study Sector and, to a lesser extent, in the Eastern Study Sector. Also as
mentioned the previously cold relationship between Saudi Arabia and the former South
Yemen due to the Yemenis adoption of Soviet Marxist policies greatly inhibited
interaction.
Finally, according to Martinez Residents of each country act as strangers to each
other'. Residents on the Saudi side of the frontier have relatives and property on the
Yemeni side (see Sections 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.3), but because they cannot cross the
frontier they are unable to develop these relationships and they therefore remain relative
strangers.
In general, therefore, population interaction on the frontier between Saudi Arabia and
Yemen conforms to Martinez's models. Three of the four models are represented. Model
D. 'integrated borderlands', is not currently represented. even when the Treaty of Taif
Study Sector is taken into consideration. However, the model implies that a boundary can
progress from one stage to another as relations between the neighbouring states improve
or deteriorate. It can therefore be expected that in time Model D will be represented on the
Saudi-Yemeni boundary once the two countries settle the boundary dispute beyond the
Treaty Study Sector.
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6.1.4	 LOCAL PERCEPTION OF THE LOCATION OF THE
FRONTIER
People living along the Saudi-Yemeni frontier use their own landmarks to indicate where
they perceive the frontier to be located. These landmarks include checkpoints, border
guard posts, the routes of round-the-clock border patrols, mountains, and the shiqqat.
uruq, and rainlat dune formations. The author found that certain prominent physical
features used by the local people can be incorporated into the Logical Boundary. Al-Buq'a
checkpoint, Al-Rayyan mountains, Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir, and 'Uruq Ibn l-Iamudah are
some of these features (see Section 6.2, Recommendations).
Most of the respondents in the author's sample agreed that the de facto border had
begun to be established during their lifetimes. Since World War II when the oil companies
began to compete to gain concessions, boundary disputes in the Arabian Peninsula began
to appear.
6.1.5	 HYDROCARBON POTENTIAL
Although hydrocarbon exploration is more active on the Yemeni side of the frontier, this
is not indicative of a lack of hydrocarbon potential on the Saudi side. Most of the
companies operating in or near the frontier zone are profoundly affected by the frontier
dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. However, most of the currently active oil and
gas fields are beyond the extreme Saudi and Yemeni claims.
6.1.6	 THEDE FACTO BORDER
Defining the location of the defacto border is an important objective of this thesis as it is
the key to the location of the Logical Boundary. The location of the de facto border is
affected by geographical, historical and political, social, tribal, economic, behavioural.
and administrative factors.
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Some parts of the defacto border overlap with historical boundary proposals
such as sections of the 1914 Violet line and the 1955 Saudi Declaration line. Elsewhere
it coincides with tribal boundaries and the southern edge of the Rub' A1-Khali.
6.1.7 TRIBAL BOUNDARIES
The suggested boundary line on the tribal maps (Figs. 3.14(A), 4.8(A), 5.15(A) and 6.3)
is often represented by a firm line between two tribal border marks. This is to assist
in the practical understanding of the logical boundary, which is represented in Fig. 6.3.
On the ground, of course, no line exists; despite that, there is actually a clear
understanding between the tribes as to which tribe owns which land, whether
inhabited or not. These tribal lands, and their bounds, have of course changed
from time to time, following conflict or development in relationships or simply
a change in the balance of power. The two states must recognise this fact,
inconvenient though it may be, if they are to avoid the mistakes made by the
British and others in boundary demarcation in the past, which have failed to
take account of tribal movements. The reality of this, and overlap between
tribes , has to be acknowledged and understood, without letting that unreasonably
affect the boundary line determined between the two states.
One sensible way to achieve this is to ensure that, despite the formal agreement
of a precise line, movement of and interaction between people who can be shown
to have well established interests on either side of the border is encouraged rather
than prevented.
217
CHAPTER 6
The largest tribal territory on the Saudi-Yemeni frontier is that belonging to
Al-Say'ar tribe which borders most of the territories belonging to the other
frontier tribes. Most of the existing tribal boundaries arc unsuitable as a basis
for the proposed Logical Boundary, with the exception of the boundary in the
Western Study Sector between the Yam and the Wa'ilah and Dahm tribes
(see Figure 3.14(A)).
This conclusion will not be welcomed by the sheikhs of the local tribes
who have land to the south of the southernmost extreme Saudi claim (the 1955
Saudi Declaration line) as they want all their land to be under Saudi control
(Interviews with key people, Author's field survey, 1994).
A number of tribes who have territory along the frontier, such as Al-Manahil,
Al-Mahrah, and Bul-'Abeid (Al-Kurab and Al-Briak), have been affected by
the conflict in the area and as a result some of their members have gone to
live elsewhere in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and in some cases, as far afield as.
Qatar and the UAE.
6.2 Recommendations
The main aim of this thesis, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is the proposal of a new,
Logical Boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. This Logical Boundary is the
result of the carefuLly reasoned analysis of all the factors which have contributed to
the location of the current de facto border, and which could lead to the peaceful
emergence of an internationally recognised boundary. The following section looks
at the location of the Logical Boundary, the basis of the proposal, and its advantages
and disadvantages for Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
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6.2.1	 LOCATION OF THE PROPOSED LOGICAL BOUNDARY
The location of the proposed Logical Boundary runs as follows:
6.2.1.1	 Western Study Sector
A line starting from Jabal Al-Thar at the point 4422'E 17°24'N. which was mentioned in
the 1934 Treaty of Taif as Border Mark Number I between Saudi Arabia and the Imamate
of Yemen in the Najran area. From here the line follows the tribal boundary between the
Yam and Wa'ilah tribes running through the following points: Jabal Sanam 442O'E
I7l9'N. Harshaf 4424'E 17°19'N, Makwa 44°30'E 172l'N. Al-Buqa 4438'E
172O'N, Madrak 44°38'E 17°lO'N. and Tabt Al-Ism 4438'E 17°05'N which is the
tribal boundary tripoint between the territories of the Yam, Wa'ilah, and Dahm (Figures
6.2 and 6.3).
From here the borderline continues along the tribal boundary between the Yam and
Dahm tribes through the following points: Jabal Hadbah at 44°58'E 17°02'N and Jabal
Al-Twilah at 45°16'E 165O'N. from where it runs eastward through Ramlat Yam and
Ramlat Dahm to Jabal Al-Rayyan at 462O'E l643'N. Jabal Al-Rayyan is a well-known
landmark on the tribal boundaries of four tribes: the Yam, Dahm, AI-Sayar, and 'Abidah
(Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
Thence the line runs south in a straight line coincident with the line shown on the
MSD-SAR (1967) Yemen Arab Republic map and part of Philby's 1937 line to Radm Al-
Amir at 4621'E l61O'N. This section of the line is also approximately coincident with
the boundary between the Yam, Dahm. Al-Say'ar. and 'Abidah tribes (Figures 6.2 and
6.3).
6.2.1.2	 Central Study Sector
From Radm Al-Amir the line runs north-east to Al-Murassas at 47°18'E 16°37'N. Here
the line is coincident with part of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line and the defacto border
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(Figure 6.2). Thence it runs further north-east coincident with both the 1914 Violet line
and the defacto border to Al-Fuhud at 48° 1O'E 17°36'N (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
6.2.1.3	 Eastern Study Sector
From Al-Fuhud the line runs east-north-east in a straight line to Shiqqat A1-Kharkhir at
51°08'E 18°48'N. This sector of the line is approximately coincident with the margin
between the sands of the Rub' Al-Khali and the gravel plains to the south, upon which the
1937 Aden Government Concession line was also based. The line runs through territory
that is currently no man's land between the two countries (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
From Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir the line runs east to the point 52°OO'E 19°OO'N which is
the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint. This sector of the line is coincident with part of
the 1955 British Declaration line (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
6.2.2 THE BASIS OF THE LOGICAL BOUNDARY IN THE
WESTERN STUDY SECTOR AND ITS ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND YEMEN
In the Western Study Sector the Logical Boundary follows the recommendation of Article
4 of the [934 Treaty of Taif that tribal boundaries should be used as the basis of the
boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Imamate of Yemen on their Eastern Frontier:
it then bends (the borderline I eastwards until it ends, on the edge of the
boundary between those of the Hamdan-bin-Zaid, Wailah, &c., who are outside
Yam, and Yam. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.424) (see Section 3.5.3 for more
details)
Figure 6.4 shows that many tribes are descended from Hamdan bin Zaid, but along the
former Imamate of Yemen-Saudi Arabia non-Treaty section of the present Saudi-Yemeni
frontier the only relevant tribal boundaries are those between the Yam, Wa'ilah, and
Dahm. This section of the Treaty can therefore be interpreted as meaning the tribal
boundary between the Yam on the Saudi side of the frontier and the Wa'ilah and Dahm on
the Yemeni side, as shown in Figure 6.3.
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The main reason for using the tribal boundaries mentioned in Article 4 of the Treaty of
Taif as a basis for compromise along this sector of the border is the commitment of both
countries to the Treaty of Taif as stated in Clause I of the 1995 Saudi-Yemeni
Memorandum of Understanding:
The two sides tSaudi Arabia and Yemeni affirm their commitment to the legitimacy
and binding nature of the Ta'if accord signed on 6th Safar 1353 AH, corresponding
to 20th May 1934; its appendices, known as the Ta'if accord. which will be referred
to hereafter as the accord. (Text as reported by the Saudi News Agency, SWB,
1995: p.15: see Appendix 3 for the full text of the memorandum)
The author used extended interviews with tribal sheikhs to define the location of the tribal
boundaries and determine in which areas tribal claims overlap, such as Ramlat Dahm.
Ramlat Yam, and the end of Wadi Al-'Atfayn which are all claimed by both the Yam and
Wajlah tribes (see Sections 1.6.3 and 3.5.3).
Philby's line (1937) which was also based on tribal boundaries, is the nearest
historical line to the Logical Boundary in this sector, especially the part between Jabal Al-
Thar and Jabal Hadbah (Figure 6.2). A number of the marks which were used by Philby
were also used by the sheikhs to describe their tribal boundaries to the author, namely
Jabal Al-Thar, Madrak, Tabt Al-Ism, Wadi Al-'Atfayn, and Jabal Al-Rayyan (for the full
text describing Philby's line, see Section 2.4.1). The author used these marks to define
the tribal boundary between the Yam and the Wa'ilah, and the Yam and the Dahm along
this sector of the frontier (Figure 6.3).
The sector of the Logical Boundary between Jabal Al-Rayyan and Radm Al-Amir is
based on three factors: first, the tribal boundaries between the Yam, Dahm, Al-Say'ar,
and 'Abidah; secondly, sections of two historically proposed lines: Philby's line (1937)
and the line shown on the MSD-SAR (1%7) Yemen Arab Republic map; and thirdly, the
defacro border. Jabal Al-Rayyan was also used as a tribal boundary mark by the Aden
Government in the 1949 proposal which became known as the Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan
line (for the full text of the Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line, see Section 2.4.2.5; Figures 6.2
and 6.3).
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6.2.2.1	 Advantages for Saudi Arabia
a	 Some territory which is currently in no maris land and some under Yemeni control
(approximately 3.691km2 ) would fall under Saudi control (Figure 6.3).
b	 The value of the land to be gained is good from the point of view of water resources
and agricuLtural potential. compared with land along the rest of the frontier (see
Section 3.2.1).
c	 Some members of the Wa'ilah tribe living in Wadi A1-Atfayn would come under
Saudi control.
d	 That part of the Yam tribal territory which is currently under Yemeni control
(approximately 3.000km2 ) would fall under Saudi control (Figure 6.3). This is a
long held ambition of the Yam tribe.
6.2.2.2	 Disadvantages for Saudi Arabia
a	 The abandonment of the claims indicated by the line shown on the MPMR-KSA
(1983) Arabian Peninsula map and a section of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line
(Figure 6.2).
b	 Some members of the Wa'ilah tribe of Saudi nationality would be living on the
Yemeni side of the boundary. These cases should be dealt with individually and the
owners of property should be compensated by the Yemeni Government.
6.2.2.3	 Advantages for Yemen
a	 Saudi Arabia would abandon the claims indicated by the line shown on the MPMR-
KSA (1983) Arabian Peninsula map and a section of the 1955 Saudi Declaration
line (Figure 2).
b	 The currently active oil fields would be unaffected as most hydrocarbon operations
are located far from the Logical Boundary (Figure 6.3).
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c Oil companies would be able to explore for oil and gas on the frontier without
receiving warning letters from the Saudi Government. especially in the north of the
\larib field (see Section 3.4. I).
6.2.2.4	 Disadvantages for Yemen
a A number of Yemeni Border Guard posts would have to be removed, namely
'Abasah, Eastern Al-Adhrain. and Western A1-Adhraln which are located in the
vicinity of Al-Buqa (Yemeni) and Al-Khadra (Saudi) checkpoints, and Al-Bramah
near Jabal Al-Rayyan and A1-Mutashakkhirah near Radm Al-Amir. between the
Western and Central Study Sectors (Figure 6.2).
b The abandonment of some land which is currently under Yemeni control
(approximately 3,691km2) and which has a good potential from the point of view of
water resources and agriculture (Figure 6.3).
The removal of border guard posts from the defacto border is a particularly difficult issue
for both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. However, the proposed compromise boundary
involves a trade-off: both countries would have to abandon some established positions. In
return for the Yemeni positions abandoned in the Western Study Sector, the Saudis would
have to remove two border guard posts in the Eastern Study Sector (see Section 6.2.4.2
on the Logical Boundary in the Eastern Study Sector). The abandonment of these posts
would not involve the loss of considerable capital outlay.
Unfortunately, the location of the proposed Logical Boundary will not satisfy the
Wa'ilah tribe as both the sheikh and the respondents from this tribe want all their land to
be under Saudi control. However this would not be logical as the 1934 Treaty of Taif
states that the Wa'ilah tribe should be on the Yemeni side of the boundary. Both
governments should help to persuade the Wa'ilah of this fact. The process should be
assisted by the Saudis continuing to allow the exercise of rights and privileges for frontier
tribes, and by the Yemenis introducing similar privileges.
226
CHAPTER 6
6.2.3 THE BASIS OF THE LOGICAL BOUNDARY IN THE
CENTRAL STUDY SECTOR AND ITS ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND YEMEN
The location of the proposed Logical Boundary in the Central Study Sector is based on
two factors: the defacto border and various historical proposals.
The location of the defacto border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the Central
Study Sector was affected by the fighting between Saudi Arabia and the former South
Yemen at Al-Wadi'ah in 1969. It would therefore be virtually impossible to suggest that
either country should retreat from their de facto border positions here. Fortunately.
however, the defacto border also coincides with the location of several historical border
proposals. The author therefore proposes that in the Central Study Sector the Logical
Boundary follows a section of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line and a section of the 1914
Violet tine (Figure 6.2).
6.2.3.1	 Adva ntages for Saudi Arabia
a	 Some of the present no man's land area (approximately 2,111km 2) would fall under
Saudi control (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
b	 Part of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary would be coincident with the 1955 Saudi
Declaration line (Figure 6.2).
c	 Yemen would have to abandon its claim indicated by the western section of the
1955 British Declaration line (Figure 6.2).
6.2.3.2 Disadvantage for Saudi Arabia
a	 The incorporation of a section of the 1914 Violet line into the Logical Boundary,
when the Violet line has never been accepted by the Saudi Government. However,
that section of the Violet line which is used has been incorporated into the proposal
because it is effectively coincident with the defacto border (Figure 6.2).
227
CHAPTER 6
6.2.3.3	 Advantages for Yemen
a	 Some of the present no man's land area (approximately 2.578km 2) would fall under
Yemeni control (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
b	 Part of the Saudi-Yemenj border would be coincident with the 1914 Violet line, far
north of the corresponding section of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (Figure 6.2).
6.2.3.4	 Disadvantages for Yemen
a	 Yemen would have to abandon its claim indicated by the 1955 British Declaration
line in this sector.
b	 Part of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary would be coincident with the 1955 Saudi
Declaration line (Figure 6.2).
All things considered, the relative territorial and political advantages and disadvantages to
each country of the proposed Logical Boundary in the Central Study Sector are well
balanced.
There is no legal interaction between the tribes along the frontier in the Central
Study Sector. This is because there are no checkpoints and the de facto border acts as a
barrier to movement in this sector, even though members of the same tribes and families
live on either side of the frontier. The author therefore recommends that checkpoints
should be established on both sides of the frontier in the Central Study Sector with the
aim of encouraging tribal interaction and improving commercial activity in the area.
Oil and gas operations on the more active Yemeni side of the frontier will not be
affected by the location of the Logical Boundary, except that a small part of Block 11 of
the Western Concession will fall under Saudi control (Figure 6.3). There are no wells in
this area, the concession licence for which is held by Elf Aquitaine. The potential of the
region is unknown.
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As in the Western Study Sector, the Location of the proposed Logical Boundary
cannot satisfy local tribes, in this case Al-Sayar and Bul-'Abeid (Al-Kurab and Al-Briak
sub-tribes) living on the Saudi side of the frontier as they want all of their land to be under
Saudi control. This would not be logical or justified as much of their land lies beyond the
1955 Saudi Declaration line and far south of the defacto border. As in the Central Study
Sector, both governments should help to persuade the tribes that it is inevitable that their
land will be divided and support them by introducing similar rights and privileges to those
available to the frontier tribes in the Western Study Sector.
6.2.4 THE BASIS OF THE LOGICAL BOUNDARY IN THE
EASTERN STUDY SECTOR AND ITS ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND YEMEN
The Logical Boundary in the Eastern Study Sector is based on three factors; the location
of the no man's land between the Saudi and Yemeni defacto borders, the southern margin
of the Rub' Al-Khali upon which the 1937 Aden Government Concession line was
roughly based, and a section of the 1955 British Declaration line running from Shiqqat
Al-Kharkhir to the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint at 52OO'E 19OO'N (Figure 6.2).
6.2.4.1	 Adva ntages for Saudi Arabia
a	 Land already under Saudi control (approximately 5.948km2) in practical terms, but
beyond the Saudi defacro border, would officially fall under Saudi control (Figure
6.3).
b	 The acquisition of part of the oil concession Block 11. the licence for which is held
by Elf Aquitaine Petroleum By. There are, however, no wells in this area, and the
potential of the block is unknown (Figure 6.3).
c	 Yemen would have to abandon its claims indicated by the 1935 Riyadh line, a
section of the 1955 British Declaration line, and part of the 1914 Violet line (Figure
6.2).
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6.2.4.2	 Disath'antages for Saudi Arabia
a	 Two incomplete oil exploration wells drilled by Aramco in 1958 would fall under
Yemeni control (Figure 6.3).
b	 Saudi Arabia would have to abandon the claim indicated by the 1955 Saudi
Declaration line in this sector, which is coincident with the 1935 Hamzah line
(Figure 6.2).
c	 Two Saudi Border Guard posts at 'Uruq lbn Hamudah and Dahyah would have to
be relocated on the 1955 British Declaration line, near the Oman-Saudi Arabia-
Yemen tripoint (Figure 6.3).
6.2.4.3	 Advantages for Yemen
a	 Land already under Yemeni control (approximately 15,000km2 ) in practical terms,
but beyond the Yemeni defacto border, would officially fall under Yemeni control
(Figure 6.3).
b	 The recognition of the point 52e00E 19°00'N on the Oman-Saudi Arabia border as
the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint, as this represents the extreme Yemeni
claim.
c	 Saudi Arabia would have to abandon the claim indicated by the 1955 Saudi
Declaration line in this sector, which is coincident with the 1935 Hamzah line
(Figure 6.2).
d	 All the wells which have been drilled in the frontier zone, including those which
Aramco attempted to drill in 1958, would be acquired by Yemen (Figure 6.3).
6.2.4.4	 Disadvantages for Yemen
a	 Yemen's claims represented by a section of the 1914 Violet line, parts of the 1955
British Declaration line, and the 1935 Riyadh line would have to be abandoned.
These areas are already under Saudi control (Figure 6.3).
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b	 The abandonment of part of the oil concession Block ii, the licence for which is
currently held by Elf Aquitaine Petroleum (Figure 6.3).
In the Eastern Study Sector the location of the proposed Logical Boundary creates more
disadvantages for Saudi Arabia than advantages, especially from the point of view of
hydrocarbon potential. Figure 6.3 shows that a number of wells have been drilled in the
de facto area, including those abandoned by Aramco in 1958. The location of the
proposed Logical Boundary would mean that all this activity would fall on the Yemeni
side of the boundary.
Yemen's potential losses in the Eastern Study Sector may been seem as a trade-off for the
gains which the Saudis would make in the Western Study Sector. Conversely, Yemen
stands to gain in the Eastern Study Sector but lose in the Western Study Sector. In terms
of area alone, the proposed Logical Boundary represents a total gain to the Saudis of
11,750km2, and 17,578km2
 to the Yemenis, representing a net gain of 5,828km2 to
Yemen. This may not satify all the parties concerned, but if a successful compromise on
the boundary is to be achieved, it is extremely important that both states are convinced that
a true trade-off is taking place. Scarcely any other proposal would bring the parties as
close as this. It should be remembered that the political gains in the form of permanent
peace and greater co-operation may far outweigh territorial losses.
Of the 260 Saudi respondents interviewed by the author in the Eastern Study
Sector, 27.7% who were members of the Al-Manahil tribe had properties on the Yemeni
side of the frontier. The Yemeni and Saudi Governments might compensate those Saudis
whose properties fall on the Yemeni side of the Logical Boundary, and which have to be
abandoned following a boundary agreement.
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As with the Western and Central Study Sectors, the location of the proposed
Logical Boundary will not satisfy the local sheikhs. in this case of AI-Say'ar, Al-Manahil,
and Al-Mahrah tribes, because they want all their land to be under Saudi control.
However it is not possible to make the Logical Boundary in this sector coincide with tribal
boundaries. As in the Central Study Sector, everything should be done from both sides to
persuade the tribal sheikhs that it is necessary to divide their land between the two states.
Some incentives might be considered and both governments should give the frontier tribes
in this sector similar rights and privileges to those currently given to the tribes in the
Western Study Sector by the Saudi Government.
The Eastern Study Sector also needs formal checkpoints to be established on both
the Saudi and Yemeni sides of the boundary. The present informal checkpoint at Al-
Kharkhir does not encourage interaction between the tribes across the frontier. The
introduction of formal checkpoints is part of the fourth and final stage of the development
of a boundary, the Administrative Stage (see Section 2.3.3)
Returning to the hypothesis which was mentioned in Section 1.4, the author proposed
that the Saudi-Yemeni defacto border in the study are would be located far from the
extreme claims of either state, and the Logical Boundary would be largely coincident with
the defacro border along its length. In the course of this study, the author has concluded
that the reality differs considerably from the above hypothesis. In the Western Study
Sector the defacto border is close to the extreme Yemeni claim and the Logical Boundary
is coincident with tribal boundaries, rather than the defacro border (Figure 6.2). In the
Central Study Sector the de facto border is mostly coincident with the Saudi extreme
claim and the Logical Boundary is coincident with the de facto border, which itself is
coincident with part of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line and part of the 1914 Violet line
(Figure 6.2). In the Eastern Study Sector the defacro border is near to the 1955 British
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Declaration line, and the Logical Boundary is coincident with no man's land, the
southern margin of the Rub' Al-Khali and part of the 1955 British Declaration line. In
conclusion, the de facto border tended to be close to one or other extreme claim rather
than midway between them. Furthermore, the Logical Boundary tended to coincide as
much with tribal boundaries, historical boundary proposals, and geographical features
as with the de facto border. It was not therefore possible to prove the author's
original hypothesis.
The author re-emphasises that implementation of the proposed Logical
Boundary would require compromise and the abandonment of territorial
claims on both sides. Undoubtedly, this would not be an easy process, but the
author believes that the end result would be beneficial to both countries.
In the event that Saudi Arabia or Yemen are unhappy with the proposed
Logical Boundary, it is hoped that this thesis will still contribute to the
peaceful resolution of the boundary dispute by providing a source of academic.
information concerning various aspects of the frontier such as geographical
features, historical proposals, population interaction, tribal distribution,
economic opportunities, perceptions of the frontier, the checkpoints, and the
de facto border. If the proposals outlined here are rejected, the alternatives
need to be seriously considered; almost any other agreement will include
provisions unpopular with one or other party.
Should it in fact be difficult for the recommendations in this research
to be accepted, the concept of shared or neutral zones or zones of restricted
activity might provide a temporary solution for questions of economic
development. Such solutions have successfully provided relief at potential
flashpoints in the past, and their application in the areas under discussion
perhaps deserve a more thorough evaluation than they have so far received.
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Whilst such temporary measures may be feasible for economic development,
having an agreed zone within which free (or freer) movement of designated
people is allowed could become a permanent solution. This would not only
help the few people involved, but would provide sound evidence of
cooperation between the two states and should assist environmental
management in the area.
In Ajman-Oman, Shazjah-Oman and Fujaiirah-Shaijah - within the United Arab
Emirates - the concept of shared political space has arguably proved effective,
at any rate judged by durability. This principle of shared space, which can be
applied both on land and sea, could still prove to be of use in maintaining future
regional peace. (Blake 1994 p.210)
Such solutions indeed have an attraction, but the author believes it is largely
the superficial attraction of allowing states to appear to solve a problem
without addressing the basic long term issues. As long as there are nation
states with separate identities the necessity for delimited boundaries exists
and will continue to do so; in essence the boundary defmes the state.
The author recommends the use of his framework model as a means of
studying other territorial disputes similar to that on the Saudi-Yemeni frontier,
and also as a route to the peaceful resolution of boundary disputes elsewhere,
for example at some points between Morocco and Algeria.
63 The Future
In 1987 Prescott (p.61) presented a model of the procedures of boundary negotiations
and the various options open to state negotiators. Adler (1995: p.18) has also presented
a schematic diagram of boundary creation in his study Positioning and Mapping
International Boundaries'. However, the author has chosen to use Prescott's model to
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attempt to forecast the outcome of the Saudi-Yemeni negotiations. as it fits better with the
observed stages of negotiations (Figure 6.5).
The negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen began in Geneva
on 5 July 1992 and resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on 26
February 1995 (Asharq Al-Awast, 1995b: p.3).
Three important objectives concerning the boundary dispute were attained with the
signing of the Memorandum:
a	 Saudi Arabia and Yemen both affirmed their commitment to the 1934 Treaty of Taif.
b	 It was agreed to form a joint committee to negotiate the land boundary from Jabal
Al-Thar to the eastern end of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier (the stretch of frontier that is
the subject of this thesis).
c It was agreed to form a joint committee to negotiate the maritime boundary (SWB,
1995: p.15; see Appendix 3 for the full text of the 1995 Saudi-Yemeni
Memorandum of Understanding).
It is the outcome of the negotiations over the Saudi-Yemeni land boundary to the east of
the Treaty of Taif boundary (mentioned in (b) above) which the author will use the
Prescott model to predict.
Prior to the start of negotiations in 1992. and during the period 1992-5 before the
signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, each state was acting unilaterally, making
claims and taking a defensive attitude, resulting in the favouring of a de facto border
(Figure 6.5).
Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in February 1995,
Saudi and Yemeni actions became bilateral in nature. As Figure 6.5 shows, there are a
number of potential outcomes to negotiation when countries are acting bilaterally, but the
author expects the negotiations to result in a compromise boundary either directly as a
result of agreement, or indirectly as a result of disagreement, followed by arbitration and
acceptance (Figure 6.5).
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Figure 6.5(A): Model of boundary negotiations
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A small modification has to be made to the nature of the arbitration in Prescott's
model to make it fit the circumstances of the Saudi-Yemeni negotiations. Clause 3 of the
Memorandum of Understanding states:
The current committee formed by the two countries will continue its work
including agreement on means of arbitration in the event of differences between the
two countries (Text as reported by the Saudi News Agency, SWB, 1995: p.15).
The author anticipates that if the negotiations reach this stage, Saudi Arabia and Yemen
will opt for Arab arbitration by Egypt and Syria. This is because both countries are
acceptable to the negotiating parties as they successfully mediated during a period of
tension between Saudi Arabia and Yemen prior to the signing of the Memorandum of
Understanding in 1995 (Asharq Al-Awsat, 1995a: p.1 and Independent, 1995: p.11).
However, the author believes that both governments will do everything possible to avoid
arbitration. Meanwhile the international community awaits a peaceful resolution to one of
the world's longest disputed land boundaries with considerable interest and anxiety.
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MAPS
[MPMR-KSAJ Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (1983) Arabian Peninsula.
Scale 1:2.000.000. Saudi Arabia. Riyadh.
[MSD-SAR1 Syrian Military Survey Department (1967) Yemen Arab Republic. Scale
1:500.000. Syria, Damascus (unpublished).
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1934 Treaty of Taif
Source: Scho field (1993) Aiabia.n Geopolitics RegionalDocumentary
Studies: South- WestArabi Volume 2: pp.422-64.
Source for Annex 4 (translated by the author): Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1977a) Collection of
Documents andAgreements 1922-51: pp.193-8.
Treaty of TaJf
In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate
Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood, between the Saudi Arab
Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Yemen.
HIS Honourable Majesty the Imam Abdul AzAbdurrahman-a1-Feysa1-a
Saud, King of the Saudi Arab Kingdom, on the one part, and His Honourable
Majesty the Imam Yahya-bin-Muhainmad Hamiduddin, King of the Yemen, on the
other part:
Being desirous of ending the state of war unfortunately existing between them
and their Governments and peoples;
And of uniting the Islamic Arab nation and raising its condition and
maintaining its prestige and independence;
And in view of the necessity of establishing ru treaty relations between
them and their Governments and countries on a basis of mutual advantage and
reciprocal interest;
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And wishing to fix the frontiers between their countries itnil La O$tfll)liSh
relations of " Bois-Voisinago" and ties of Islamic friendship between them
and to strengthen the foundations of leace and tranquillity between their
countries and peoples;
And being desirous that there should be a united front against sudden
mishaps and a solid structure to preserve the safety of the A nib I'eiiimiula,
Have resolved to conclude a treaty of £siainw friernhdii1i ;tiid Arab brotlicrhtood
between them and for that purpose have nominated the following rcprcanitaLivee
plenipotentiarics on their behalf :-
On behalf of Ills Ilonourable Majesty the King of
his Royal highness the Arnir ((baud Abclul Azix,
Acting President of the Council of Ministers,
And on behalf of His Honourable Majesty the
Excellency Sayyed Abdul.bin-Ahmcd-al.Wazir.
Their Majesties the two ICings have accorded to their above mentioned
representatives full powers and absolute authority; and their abovc.incntioned
representatives, having perused each other's credentials and foutid theni iii prtiiet
form, have, in the iiamc of their Kings, agreed upon the following articles
Awrictt 1.
'rho state of war existing between the Kingiloni of the Yeniten and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be tcrmiiiutcd as (ruin the inotiiuiit itt signature
of this treaty, and there shall forthwith be established between their Mnicsties
the Kings and their countries and peoples a state of purpetual ,ic*u, firm (tiend-
ship, and everlasting Islamic Arab brotherhood, inviolable in wholu or iii Part.
The two high contracting paes undertake to settle in a spirit of tilTiectioti and
friendship sli disputes and differences vliich may arise butwccn them, and to
ensure that a spirit of Islamic Arab brotherhood shall dominate their relations
in all states and conditions. They call Cud to witness the goodness of their
intentions and their true desire for concord and agreement, both secretly and
openly, and they pray the Almighty to grant theni ntl their successors anti heirs
and Governments success iii the CuntiiiUanee of this proper attitude, which is
pleasing to the Creator and honourablo to their rnce and religion.
Awr1cL 2.
Each of the two high contracting parties rccogniscs the (till and absolute
independence of the kingdom of the other party anti his snvcreigiity over it. Hi
Majesty the Imaxn Abdul Aziz .bin-Abtliirral,mnu-al• Feysal-al-Satid, King. of the
Saudi Arab Kingdoni. admits to His Majesty the titiani Yahya iiiitl his lawful
descendants the full and absolute independence of the Kingiloiii of the Yemen and
his sovereignty over it, and Ills Majesty the frnam Yahiya-hiu-Miiitniiimad
Itarniduddin, King of the Yemen, admits to His Majesty the linaut Abdul Azis
and his lawful descendants the full and absolute indcpenslanco of the Saudi Arab
Knigdosn and his sovereignty over it. Each of thorn gives up city right lie claimed
over any part or parts of the country of the other arLy beyond tho fcoiit.icri, flxed
and defined in the text of this treaty. Ills Majesty the litiam King Abilul Aziz
abtinclotis by Liii. treaty any right of protection or occupation, or tiny tither right,
which ho claimed in the country, which, according to this treaty, beinaigs to the
Ycmcn and which was (formorly) in the possession of Lito Idrisis anti others. Ills
Majesty the Imam Yahya similarly nhnduns by this treaty any right ho claimed
in the name of Yenisni unity or otherwise, in the country (formerly) in tim
possession of the Idrisis or the AL Aidh, or in Najrun, or in the Yatti country,
which according to this treaty belongs to the Saudi Ar:th Kingdom.
AtrrIcLc 3.
'tito two hih cotttr.teting parties agree Lu conduct their relations and
conimunications in such a manmier as will secure the illtercnts of both enrties
auth will cause no harm Iu either of them, proviilcd that ni-itlior ot the high
P15081	 0 4
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contracting parties shall concede to the other party lou than he concedes to &
third party. Neither of the two parties shall be bound to concede to the other
party more than he recesves in return.
Aaricz.s 4.
The frontier line which divides the countries of the two high contracting
parties is cxplatncd in sutlicient, detail hereunder. This line is conideret1 as a
fixed dividing boundary between the territories subject to each.
'rho frontier hue between the two kingdoms begins at a point half way
between Medi and Al Musim on the coast of th Red sea, and (ruu) UI) tO the
mountains of the Tihania in an easterly direction. ft then turns uuorLhwurds
until it ends on the uio.th .w.t.st boundary between the lheui Juna'a and (the tribes)
adjacent to them on the north and west. ii. then bends cast. until it. ends at a
point between the limits of Naqa'a and Wa'ar, which belong to the \Vaila tribe,
and the limits of the Yam. It. then bends until it. reaches the pass of Marwan and
Aqaha litfada. Ii then bends eastwards until it cuids, on the cast, on the edge of
the boundary between thos, of the Ilaundan-bin-Zaid, Waila, &c., who are outside
Yam, and Yam. Everything on the right hand side of the above .mcutionud line,
which runs from the point mentioned on the sea shore tip to the end ct the
borders on all sides of the mountains mentioned, shall belong to the Yemen, and
everything on the left of the abova .mcntioued line shall belong to the Saudi Arab
Kingdom. On the Yemen side are Mcdi. Ilaradb, part of the Tlarth tribe, Mir,
the Dhahir Mountains, Shada. Dhay'a, ivart of the Abadil, all the country and
the mountains of Razili, Mauubuh, with Arwa .al-Anishuaykk. all the country and tho
mountains of Icni Jaman, Sahar.ash .Sluuun, Yalnul itini its neighbourhood,
the Maraisagha area of the Sahar . aih-Sluim, the whole of Suhur, Ninpi'zi, W&ar,
the whole of Wails, and also Far with Aqabat Naluiqi, the whole of Uamdarn.
bin.Zaid. which is outside Yarn and Wad'a Dhahran. These inci.tioncd, and their
territories within their lcnowu limits, and all bctwecn the Saul directions and
their vicinities, the names of which arc not nientinuied and which were actually
subject to or under the eouitrol of the Yemcui Kingdmn before tho year 1352, are
on the Ycmeni side and belong to the Yemen. On the heft hand side are Musain,
Walan, most. of tho Ilarthi, the Kliuba, the Jabri, most of the Abadil, all Faifa,
fleni Malik, Ilcni hans, the Al Tahid, Q;ilitau, Dhunliran, Wadi'a, all the Wadia
Dhabran, together with the pass of Marwauu, and Aqaba llifacla, and the area
lying beyond on the east and north of Yam and Naran, hlndhim, 7.ur Wadis, all
the Wails in Najran, and all below Aqaba Nuhw 1a, up to the wig.es of Najran
and Yam on the cast, all these, and their territories within their known Limits,
and all between the named directions antI their vicinities which have not. boesi
mentioned by siame, and which were acunihly subject to or uuiulcr the control of the
Saudi Arab Kingdom before the year 1352, nrc ou the left of the said line and
belong to the Saudi Arab ICingdorn Everything tuentioneil negsuding Yarn.
Najran, Iladan. Zur Wad'a, and all the Walk in Najruiu, is in atxordasuce with
the decision (Tahkirn) of his Majesty the imant Ynhya La hTi Majesty
King Abdul Axis as rugrinils Yam, niud tho judgineuit (ltukm) of hhia Majesty
King Abduut Axis that all of it should belmig to the Saudi Arab Kingdom; and
while the Iladan and Zur Wad'a and the Wada iii Nnriuii buhemg to Waila, and,
except in so far as has been uticuitionuth, do not. come within the Saudi Arab
Kingdom, this shall not. prevent. them nor their brothers of Waila from enjoying
mutual relations auid intercourse and the tusimi suuuth customary vo .operntion. l'huis
hint then extends from the end of the alsovemmitioned limits l,cttvewi the edges
of the Saudi Arab tribes and of those of the I Iauudiim.bin.Zaid, anti all the Ycuncuul
tribes who are outside Yarn. All the borders and the Yemeni LernitOulca UJ) to
the end of the Yenicusi frontier in all directions beluusg to the Ycuuucni Kiui'doin;
and all the bordeus and territories up to thu enil of their Isiniutiarics, in all
directions, belong to the Saudi Arab Kingdom. All points mentioned in this
articlo, whether north, south, east or vest, aic to he consitinred iii :uceordiuico with
the general trend of the frontier line in the directinuus imhui;atctl; olteut obstacles
cause it to bend into thn country of one or other kiiugtlouui. As regards the
dctermiuiatiou and fixing of the said line, the scfeu;uting out •'( u he tribes and the
sculuincuit of thueir diras in the best manlier. i.hicsc shall he cliceteul by ;i colninittea
brined of all equal iuuinher of 	 from the twu parties. in a triendhy and
brotherly way auid without prejudice, ;iccordimug to tribal usage aimit custom.
243
APPENDIX I
AWtICLZ 5.
In view of the desire at both high contracting parties (or the continuance of
peace and tranquillity, and for the non-existence of anything which might disturb
the thoughts of those two countries, they mutually undertake not to construct any
fortified building within a distance of 5 kiluni. on either side of the frontier,
anywhere along the frontier line.
Anrtci.s .
The two high contracting parties undertake immediately to withdraw their
troops from the country which, by virtue of this treaty. becomes the pos,ession
of the other party, and to safeguard the inhabitants and troops.
Aavcx.s 7.
The two high contracting parties each undertake to prevent their people from
committing any harmful or hostile act against the people of tho other kingdom.
in any district. or on any route; to prevent, raiding between the lleclouin on both
sides; to return all (property) which is established by legal investigation, after
the ratification of this treaty, as having been taken; to give compensation for all
damage, according as may be legally necessary, where crimes of murder or
wounding have been committed; and severely to punish anyone proved to have
committed any hostile act.. This article shalL continue operative until another
agreement, shall have been drawn up between the two parties as to the manner of
investigating and estimatiug damage and loss.
Awncia 8.
The two high contracting parties mutually undertake to retrain from
resorting to force in all difficulties between them, and to do their utmost. to settle
any disputes which may arise between thorn, whether caused by this treaty or the
interpretnuon of all or any of its articles or resulting from any other cause, by
friendly representations; in the event. of inability to agree by this means each of
the two f)a&ttes undertakes to resort to arbitration, of which the conditions, the
maimer of demand, and the conduct are explained in the appendix attached to this
rcaty. This appendix shinU have the force and authority of this t.reaty, aiid shall
be considered as an integral part of it..
AnricLi i.
The two high contracting parties undertake, by all moral and material means
at their command, to prevent. the use of their territory as a base and centre for
any hostile action or enterprise, or preparations t)ierelor, against. tho couuitry of
the other party. They also undertake to take tho following measures immediately
on receipt of & written demand from the Government. of time other party :-
(1) If the person endcavouring to foment insurrection is a subject. of the
Government which receives the application to take measures, 1w should,
after the matter has been legally investigated and established, receive
a deterrent. punishment. which will put. an end to his actions and
prevent their recurrence.
() If the person. endeavouring to foment. insurrection is a subject. of the
Government making the demand fur measures to ho take,,, lie should be
immediately arrested by the Government. a1iphicd to and handed over
to the Government. making the demand. I he Government asked to
surrender hun shall have no right to excuse themselve, from carrying
nut, this demand, but. shall be bound to take adequate stops to prevelit
the flight of time person asked for, antI in time event of Lime person asked
for being able to run away, the (ovcrtimcut. train wiunso territory lie
has fled shall undertake not to allow him to return to its territory, and
if he is able so to return, shall arrest him and hami hint over to his
Government..
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(3) If the person endeavounng to foment insurrection is a subject, of $ third
Government., the Government. to whom the demand is made and who
finils the person in its territories, shall immediately asid (lirOCtly after
the receipt of the demand of the other Covermuoni, take steps to oxpel
him (ruin its country, and Lo consider Imiuui as nuudesirablo and to
provont hina from returimin there in future.
ARTICLE 10.
The two high conLiactin parties agree not to receive mumyono who has ed
from the jurisdiction of his Lsovernmncnc, whether he be grctt or snmall, official or
non.olflciai, an individual or a group. laclt of the high contrnet.ing parties shall
take adequate and effective administrative or military nacaslires, &c., to prevent.
these fugitives entering within the borders of its country. If one or all of them
ucccods in crossing the frontier and entering its territory, it. shall ho bound to
disarm the refugee awl to arrest. him and hand him over to the tovornmcnt of
of the country from which he lied. In the event, of its being unable to arrest him,
it. shall take adequate steps to drive hint out. (ruin the country which he has
entered into the country to which ho belongs.
ARTICLE 11.
The two high contracting parties mln(IertaIce to prevent their Amirs. Amils
and olhciaIs from interfering in any way whatsoever, either diris:tly or indirectly,
with the subjects of the other party. They undertake to taku (mall incusures to
prevent the occurrence of tiny disturbance or iusisunderstanding as a result of such
actions.
AImcLz 12.
Each of the two high contracting poEtics recognises that. the people of all
areas accruing to the other party by virtue of this treaty lire subjects of that.
party. Fitch of them undertakes not to accept. us its subjects any person or
persons who are subjects of the other party except. with the coumsomsi of that. party.
The subjects of each of the two parties. when in the country of the other party,
should be treated in oceortlancu with local law.
Airrici.g
 13.
Each of the two high contracting parties umumilertakes to announce a fulL and
complete anuiicst.y for all crimes and hostile acts which may have been couummnittcd
by tiny person or persons who are subjects of the other party, but. resule in its
territory (i.e., in the territory of the party issuing the amnesty). Similarly, each
of them undertakes to issue a full, general aint complete amnesty to those of its
subjects who may have gone, or taken refuge, or in any manner joined themselves,
to the other party; for all crimes; and for the property which they may have
taken from the limo whoa they caine to the other purty immutil their return,
whatever its nature and whatever its amount; and not. to aihlow any sort of injury,
punishment or constraint, to be made upon t.hcm on account of their luiving taken
refuge or joined themselves, or of the manner iii which they did so. If either
party has any doubt of the occurrence of anything contrary to this undertaking,
this party entertaining thic doubt. may apply to time other jsarly to convoke a
meeting of the representatives who sigimed titus treaty; if it. is inmpomsilmlu for any
one of them to attwul, ho may depute another fully authoriscul and enupowcrcd
person, well acquanited with tho localities anti who is anxious to effect. a mettle-
went. between the iinrtles and to carry out. the rights of both, Lu aittoiid to
investigate thu matter, so t.hiat. no injustice or dispmmt.e may arise. 'l'hmu (lecision
of these vcpresunta'ivcs shall be considered as binding.
Airricm.z 14.
Each of the tw,o high contracting varties mmndertakeis to return the property
of those of its subjects whom it. pardons, auth to humid it. over to thetis or their heirs
usa thea r return to times r country, iii ohed icumee to thu law of thea r country. I ho
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high contracting patties similarly undertake not to retain any of the goods and
chatteli which belong to the subjects of the other party, and not, to create
obiacics to their free use or to the disposal of them.
AItT1CLZ 15.
Each of the two high contracting parties undertakes not to interfere (sic:
treat with] with a third party, whether at. be an individual, a group, or a
Government, or to agree with him in any matter which may injure the interests
of the other party, or which may harm its country, or which may raisu problems
and diffleultics, or which may expose its welfare, interests or existenco to danger.
Aa'rTcLa 10.
The two high contracting parties, who arc bound by talainic brotherhood and
Arab origin, announce that. their two nations are one nation, that they do not
wish any evil to anyone, and that. they will do their best to promote the interest
of their nation, in the shade of tranquillity and quietness, and will exert their
best. endeavours in all ways for the good of their countries and their nation,
intending no hostility to anyone.
AnTicis 11.
In the event of any oitcrnnl aggression on the country of ono of the two high
contracting parties, the other party shall ho boutid to carry out. the following
undertakings
(1 To adopt complote neutrality secretly and openly.
(2 To co.operate mentally and morally as far as possible.(3 To undertake negotiations with the oilier party to discover the best. way
of guaranteeing the safety of the country of that party and of
preventing its being harmed, said to tefrain from any net which might
be interpreted as assisting that external aggressor.
AarucLz 18.
In the event of insurrection or hostilities taking place within the country of
one of the two high contracting parties, both of ilium .uutuidly titidertake as
follows
(1) To take all necessary effective measures to prevent the agglussors or the
rcbets from making use of their territories.
(2) To prevent fugitives from taking refuge in their countries, and to Lund
them over or oxpei them if they have enterctl, as explained in articles 0
and 10 above.
(3) To prevent its subjects joining the aggressors or rebels, and to refrain
front encouraging or supplying thorn.
(4) To prevent assistance, supplies, arms and amnatinitioll reaching the enemy
or the rebels.
Awricz.s 10.
The two high contracting parties announce their desire to do everything
1ossmble to facilitate iostuiI and telegraphic services, to increasu the Lomiflunica-
tiotus between the two countries, and to facilitate the exchange of commodities
and agricultural and counnacremal products between theta,; to utitlurtake detailed
negotIations, in order to condude a customs agreement to safeguard the economic
interest of their two cowitries, by unifying customs ditties throughout the two
countries, or by special regulations designed to auccure thu advamitage of the two
sides. Nothing in this article shall restrict the freedom of either of the two high
cuuuiz'actitig paritci in any mauuaer until the cuitcitustuut of the agucetuent referred
to has beeta aixomnhislic.l.
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Awricut '20.
Each of the two high contracting parties declares its readiness to authoriss
its representatives and delegates abroad, if such there be, to roprcscnl the other
party, whenever the other pa
	
desires this, in any Iivattcr or 	 'Y time. It
m understood that. whenever represont.aLiVes of both parties are together in one
place they shall collaborate in order Lu unify their policy to nuinOLe the iliteresLs
of their two countries, which are one nation. It. is understood that this article
does not restrict the freedom of either side in any manner whatsoever in any
of its rights. Similarly, it. cannot. ho interpreted as limiting the freedom of
either of them or of compelling either to adopt this course.
Aivricz.x 21.
The contents of tho agreement signed on the 5th Shaban, 1J50, shiiihl in any
case be cancelled as ho,n the date of ratification of this treaty.
AIITICLE 22.
This treaty shall ho ratified and confirmed by Their lionourable Majesties
the two Kings within the shortest possible time, having regard to tho common
interest of the two sides in this (being done): It. shall come into force u from
thu date of the exchange of the instruinemits of ratification, except as regards what
has been laid down in article 1, relative to LIIO ending of the stat.o.of war
immediately after its signatmne. It shall continue in force for a period of
twenty (20) complete lunar years. It may ho renewed or modiiiod during the
six months preceding its expiry. If not so renewed or modified by that date,
it shall remain in force until six months after such time as one party ha. given
notice to the other party of his desire to modify it.
AaTIr.r.K 23.
This treaty shall be called the Treaty of Taif. It has been drawn up in
o copies in the noble Arabic language, each of the two high contracting parties
being in the possession of one copy.
In witness whereof each of the plcuipotcutiarics htims ailixcil his signature.
Written in the city of .lcthla(') on the siLh day of the month of Safar
thirteen hundred and flfty4hrcc.
KITALI D.flIN.A13flt11 AZIZ.AS-SAUD.
ABDTJ LLAII.IIIN.AIIMED.AI ..WAZIR.
() lbs 1,5.17 wig signed 51 T.il end "Jedd. - is probeWy ouly e clip.
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itrbitrag io,, Coeenant bawean the Saudi drab Kingdom and th.
Kinudoni 0/C/ic Ycmcn.
Whereas thuiv Majesties the [mama King Alulul Asiz, King of the Saudi
Arab Kingdom, and King Yabyn. King of thu Yemen. lnivc agreed in accordance
With artiCle S 'of thU 1' icaty of I 'ea:u, Ir ship anti (toud 11 ndcrstanding,
known as the Treaty of Taif. signed on the situ Sn(ir. 1353, to refer to ftilJILrat.lon
any dispute or diffvciictj which may aiic out of the relati,tns betweemi them, their
Governments and countries, when all friendly reprcscntat.iOns fail to settle it,
the two high contracting parties undertake to cifect arbitration in the manner
shown in the following articles
AIrTICLE 1.
Each of the two high comitracting parties undertakes to accept reference of
the question in dispute to arbitration within one month of the date of receipt
of the other party of a demand for arbitration.
ARTICLx 2.
The arbitration shall be undertaken by a. committee composed of an equal
number of arbitrators, half of whom shalt be selected by each of the two parties.
A chief arbitrator shall be selected by mutual agreement between the two high
contracting parties. If they do not agree in this respect, each of them shall
nommnnto a person, and if either party accepts the person nominated by the other
tho person in question shall become chief arbitrator. If even this cannot
be agreed upon, tho eluef arbitrator shall be chosen by ballot, on the unmlerstanding
that, the ballot shall only be drawn on persons acceptable to both parties. Tue
person chosen by ballot shall become the head of the arbitration committee, and
entitled to settle the case. If, however, a4reemeimt cannot be arrived at. on the
persons acceptable to both parties, negotiations shall be carried on until the two
partie. agree on this point..
ARTICLE 3.
The selection of the arbitration committee and its chiuf shall be completed
within one month of the date of the end of the month fixed for the reply of the
party whose acceptance of arbitration was requested by time other party. '['he
arbitration committee shall meet at a. place to be agreed upon within a period
not exceeding one month after the oxpiry of the two months provided for at
the beginning of this article. The arbitration committee shall give its award
within a period which, in any case, should not exceed one month as from the
expiry of th. period fixed for the meeting to take place. '['lie award of the
arbitration committee shall be givemi by a majority of votes, and shall ho ()nsi(lered
binding on the two parties. Its execution immediately after its issue and
communication shall be considered obligatory. Each of the two high contracting
parties may appoint a person or persons, as ho desires, to defemul hi c:ise before
the arbitration committee and to produce the necessary evidnc and arguments.
AnTICLE 4.
The charges in regard to the arbitrators of each party shall be chargeable
to their respective parties. '['Ito charges of the chief arbitrator shah be chargeable
to both parties equally, as well as the expenses of the other investigations.
ARTIcLE 5.
This covenant shall be regarded as an integral part of the Treat y of 'mit
signed this day, the 0th Safar, 1353, and wilt remain in force during the period
of tIme validity of the treaty. Written in Arabic, in two copies, of which each
of the two high contracting parties is in possession of one.
Signed on the sixth day of Satar. thirteen hundred and hifLy.thrce.
KI{ALII) . BIN-Afll)UL. AZIZ.ASSAUD.
ABDULLAII-IJIN-AIIM !tl).AL.WAZIfl.
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In the Hame of God the Merciful,the Compassionate
(32)
Annex to Taif Agreement for the demarcation of Borders between the
Kingdom of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Thanks to God wio has united the moalias, and Peace and Prayers
be upon our chosen Prophet Mohammed, his Pamily and Companions.
We Tahya Bin Hameedden King of Yemen; pursuant to the previsions of
the last paragraph of Article 4 of Taif Agreement concluded between
us and our brother, His Majesty King Abdul isis Bin Abdu]. Rahman
Alfaisa]. Al Saud King of Saudi Arabia on 6th of Safar 1353 Hijri
which provides for:
"The demarcation and definition of the aforesaid line, and the proper
separation of tribes and definition of their homeland shall be
accomplished through a committee comprising members representing
the two parties equally. The committee shall ca.rry out its business
in a brotherly impartial manner in accordance with tribal practices
and traditions."Two joint committees have been set up for the actual
demarcation of borders between the Kingdom of Yemen and the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, the first to demarcate borders in Tehams and the
other in the mountains etc. The Tehama committee .appointed by us
comprised Mohammed BinDhaifullaBin Ghathaya, Mohammed Bin Kassim
Hajmuldeen and Abdulla Bin Othman. The committee appointed by his
Majesty for the demarcation of borders in Tehama comprised Mohammed
Alsulaiman Bin Turki, Abdulla Kadhi and Abdulla Bin Aqeel. The
committee appointed by us for the mountain areas comprised Abdulla
Bin Mona, Ruler of Saha.r, Abdulla Aighabiri, Ismail Bin Hasan, Wali
of Haznadan and Mohammed Bin Hasan Alwadi'ee, Head of Sakeen. The
committee appointed by His Majesty for the demarcatio; of Borders
in the mountains comprised Abdul ahab Bin Mohammed Abu Milha,
Abdul Asia Bin Abdu]. Raiunan Althamiri, Ibrahim Bin Zain Alabedeen,
ulaim Abu La'aths, Ilusain BLn Nustafa and alat Vlata. These conini:ee
agreed on the demarcation of Borders. The joint committee for the
demaxecation of borders in the mountains prepared one report on
the 21st of Shawwal. 1354 signed by the represntatives of both pa.rt.es .
The report contained individual border locations in the mountains
etc beginning with Jabal. Althar and ending with Jawr Alwsdafa.
The joint committee for the demarcation of borders in Tehams
prepared three reports signed by the representatives of both
parties, the first signed in Ramadhan 1354, from the Sea Quay
at Ras Almiwaj to Maloos. The second report was signed on the
27th of Shawwa]. 1354, from Low Meer Alys Wadi sides to the bottom
of Jabal Souda from the East. The third report was signed on the
21st of Aiqids 1 345, from Malas Souda and ending along Aiwadif.
The reports indicated individual Border locations for Tehama. The
following is the text of the four reports:
249
APPENDIX 1
n the tTame of God the Merciful, the Compaosi..nats.
Border Demarcation Retort
Between .he Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kingdom of Yemen
(a)
On the 25th of Sha'baa 1354 Hijri, a meeting was held in
Dhahran between the two committees signing below, appointed
by His Majesty loam Abdul Asia Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia
and by His Majesty loam Yahya Bin Hameeddeen, King of Yemen
to deteine the border line between the above-mentioned
Kingdoms in accordance with the provisions of Article 4
of Taif Agreement.
Demarcation began from ti'e adjacent areas in the East to the
last point in the West where the Tehasna committee will accomplich
its task. It was agreed to place the first border mark at -
Rae Jabai. Aithar - between the tribes of Waila and Yarn. Concerning
the Wasteland called (Stlah) and the adjacent area to the East
which is under dispute between the tribes of Waila and Yam we
have decided to leave it as it is without placing any marks.
Should there be any dispute thereupon in the future, it should
be settled in accordance with God's Sharia and the provisions
of Tai Agreement.
The arias separated from SilaJi to the South should be given
to Wails tribe and the like and the separated areas to the
forth should be given to Yarn tribe.
The above-mentioned committees held several meetings until
this report was prepared or the above-mentioned purpose.
The meetings wire attended by the chiefs of the adjacent
tribes. After investigations and with the apprcval of the
chiefs of tribes and without any coercion the border
demarcation process was carried out. The bordcrs were
determined, defined and diutinCuished by the famous and
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unchgngeable names of mountains, hills and valleys. These
names iill be mentioned in detail later on. Those names
have been mentioned in minutes written at different dates
and approved by both committees. Each committee kept a copy
of the minutes. The two committees appointed trusted men
who went to put stone marks along the border line every
other .].ometer pending the erection of posts &t a time to
be specified by Their Mejesties the two Kings. They also
will appoint the persons who would carry out the work and
the expenses involved.
Each tribe has been given a statement approved by the two
committees defining its borders with the ad3acent tribe to
prevent any excuse or confusion, so that every one should
know his limits and adhere thereto and refrain from crossing
and ofending adjacent lands for the feeding of animals
or otherwise. Offenders shall be punished by their respective
governments as a deterrent for other offenders.
The following are the Border locat.on List from the East to
ne West:
Starting of Border line between Saudi Arabia and the i.ingdcm
of Yemen after Silah waste-land.
1 - Jabal Althar
2- Jabal Alaseeda
3 - Rac Markoos Anban
4 - Thera'a Alsharia
5 - Qa'a Atheetha
6 - Ras Alabla
7 - Rae Alkawkab
8 - Ras Alsabr :overloo}:ing th. plain extend.ng to Maaa
Jaheemi provided that the a.0 should save access to the
water available at aso Ja:he.rni as usual.
9 Altukhdain
10- Rae Arabs
11- Has Aqaba Nahuga
12- Ashars
13- 7ara Vadar
14- Jabal Thafera
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15 - laze Dag)una
16 - Magbara Al Thula
17 - Magashi
13 - Rahwst Za.rak
19 - Jabal Marashaha
20 - Qahr lard
21 - Shahat Alghane.ra
22 - SaLfa
23 - Jabal Alatm
24 - Rae Jabal Hadhadh: what runs to the South for Waila, and
what rune to the Uorth for Wadia, what runs to the East
for Ya. Here the limit ends between Waila and. Yam.
25 - Rag Aihanka )
26 - Jabal Mr 
3 
two limits between Waila and Wadia
27 - Malaqat Albamad)
e	 ) Two limits between Bani Hadhe.fa - 3ani
	
- A..jadaliya	 ) Jan*a'a and Wadia
29 - Jabal Wa'wa - Sukhaira shall remain unchanged, i.e. what
belongs to iba Khair shall be his, apart from that
according to the tradItions shall be in the possession of
Ibm IChair as usual and his successors and shall pay one
seventh of the output to Salim Bin Damnan and his
successors.
30 - Al shu'ba )
	
31 - Dharawiya 
3	
are two limits between Sahar Alohasn and Wadi&
32 - Jabal Faredh Airaka	 )
	
. Jabal Adhad	
3
34 - Jabel Pareedh Asa.r	 These limits are between
35 - Jaba.l Pareedh Almubdeth 3 
Sahar Alsham and Wadia
36 - label Sabahtal	 )
37 - Almurairia: what runs to the West belongs to 3ahar Alaham
and what runs to the !a3t belongs to Wadia.
38 - Sha'ab Aiqoum
39 - Rae Jaba.l Alab
40 - Alshath%: what run: to the 7ot belc1w3 t Al asr ct S:&r
Aisham ar.d what run: to the £.ct and to the forth belcIIZS
to Wadja.
41 - Madta Aihinka (i.e. Ras Bin Mualla) provided that Al Mahadh
and Sanhaii and Al Uaar shall retaIn their property rights
in Alrahwa vLllae as in the past and re:ent.
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£2 - Alsabsab
43 - Naleed h..]jcaal: The North s.de t. Al Mahad.. froti. Wadia
and the South side to Al ?asr rort .
	 ar Al3h:..
44 - Jbal Al Mahadh: what runs to ti,e North for Al flair, the
other sides for al Mahadh from Wadja and here ends the
limit between Sahar Aishais and Waiia.
45 - Wadj Airabidha in Alasna: The outh side for Al flair
from Sahar A1Sham. The other sides Zc. Sanhan from lCaht&n.
46 - Khashm Alalcla in Kha.rq: The diving line between
Al Saeed of Sanhan and Bani Jaoa'a afer that the dividing
line between Al Taleed and Dani Jasna'a begins, extending
from East to South-West.
47 - Taleed Eashba: The North and We3t sides to Al aleed
and South and Vast sides to Bani Jaaa'a.
48 - Wadi Mujaa'a AlEardh: The No:t1. and West sides for
Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jana'a.
49 - Ras Alhasmara: North and west sides to Al Talsed and
South and East sides to Bani Jana'a.
50 - Açs Aiwakif North and West sices to Al Taleed and South
and East sides to Bani Jasna'a.
51 - Ras Aishathina: North and West ides to Al Talced and
South and East sides to Sani Jama'a.
52 - Jabal Al3ash: North and Vlest :ites to Al Taleed irA
Suth and East sides to Bani Jana'a.
53 - Sail Al3awa: North and West sides to Al. Taleed and
South and East sides to Bani Jama'a.
54 - ) ah.r Naaisa : North and West sides to Al Taleed and
South and East sides to Bani Jama'a.
55 - Jabal Shafa Alzubai:: North and West sides to Al Taleed and
South and Last sides to Bani Jama'..
56 - Jabal Alajrama: Uorth and West sides to Al Talied and
South and East sides to ani Ja.naa.
57 - Jabal Arab : North and West 3id 	 to Al Ta.leed and
South and East sides to SaM Ja.ia'a.
- N..d Alsheryani : crth and We:: sidel to Al. Ta.leed and
South and East sLdes to 3ani ana'a.
59 - Wadj Alrase.fi.: North and West :jdss to Al Talsed and
South and East sides to DaM Jaina'a.
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60 - Qama Maaroob	 Originally Waddi Dafa from Urn Za.rad
to Qama Maaroob and to Alraseei is shared between Altaleedi,
Alhabsi and Altr.abiti tribes.
Prom Wadi ata Northwards belongs to Al Thabit and Al Taleed,
Westwards and Southwards belongs to Ahi Habs and Al Yahya
of Bani Malilc and Eastwards to Al Thabt. Al Thabit Al Taleed
and A] Qahr have agreed that Jaal Thahran belongs to them
all jointly. They can use it as usual.
61 - Jabal Mnkalaha: Westwards and Southwards to Al Yahya
and Al Habs f Bani Malik and !astwards to Al Thabit of
Bani Jamaa.
62 - Need Jalal	 westwards and Southwards to Al Yahya
63 - Need Alsahaya	 and Eastwards and Northwards to
64 - Need Alrafsa 	 __
65 - Jabal Alareef - ctending from the North to the South
from Need Alrafsa to Katf a. It is th. dividing line between
Al Yahys and Ah]. Hanba. The western side belongs to Al Yahya
and the eastern side to Ahi Hanba. Each tribe has been given
a document showing its property according to the other tribe.
66 - Jabal Alseim: North side to Al ahya of Bani Maijic and
South side to Ahi Jalha of Bani Y.holi.
67 - Hart Ainsheena: North sid. to Al Tahya of Bani Malik
and South side to Ahl jaiha of Sani Kholi.
68- Need Alnachtaf : North side to Al Yahya of Bani Malik
and South side to Ahl Jaiha of 3ani Kholi.
69 - Need Altaseeh: North side to Al Yahya of 3ani Malik
and South side to Ahi Jalha of 3ani )holi.
70 - Qilat Urn 3ahaa: North side to Al. Yahya of 3ani Malik
and South side to hl Jaiha of 3ani holi.
7 .- Jabal Alrnijdar: Tbrth side to Al Yahya of 3ani Malik
and South side to Ahi Jalha of 3ani Kholi.
72 - Saqiyat Urn Manteet: No:t side to Al Yahya of Bani Ialik
and South side to Ahl Jalha of 3ani Kholi.
73 - Wadj Urn Sharifa; North side to Al ahya of an !aik
and 3outh side to Ahi Jalha o ani Kholi.
74 - agil iltafa: rest nd :;orth sides to Al Zaidan, South
and Seat sides to SaM Kholi and Al Sabola shall retain their
houses and properties in Jabal Shandan as usual.
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75 - Need :haxrna: West and North sides to Al Zaidan
Al Tahya of Bani Malilc and South and East sides to A Jaiha
of Bani ICholi.
76 - Hiyad Alradha: West and North sides to Al Zaidan Of
Al Tahya of Bani Malik and South and East sides to Ahi aJha
of Bani Tho3.t.
77 - Sir Alsharh: West and North sides to Al Zaiden of
Al Yaliya of Bani Mai.ilc and South and East sides to thl Jalha
of Bani Eholi.
78 - Need Sarma: West and North sides to Al Zaidan of
Al Tahya of Bani Malik and SG4th and East sides to Ahi Jaiha
of Bani lieu.
79 - Need Alwalca..r 	 East and South sides to Al Ayya:h, North
80 - Need Alfarb
	
and West sides to LI Saeed of 3ani Malik.
81 - Need Althar'a But Al Saeed shall have access to Jura'a
water in Need AltazO as usual.
82 .. Mu3nib Albehar East and South sides to Al Ayya:h and Uerth
83 - Alhankax	 and West sides to Al Khaiid and Al Izzat
of Bent Malik.
84 - Wadi Al arash'	 East and South sidsi to Al Allahab
85 - Qarn Mekhala	 and Al Urn Dosha. North and flest to
86 - Need Shou3can	 Al Khalid and Al Issat of Bant .lalik.
87 - Gabbas
88 Alkharq.	 South side slanting to the West to
89 - Tabri the Tharnila Bani Urn Sh.ikh, and North and 1est sides
90 - Jour Aiwadafa	 to Al lialid and Al Izzat of Bent Malik.
Here the borders between Bent Malik and Bent Jan&' a and Bent
Munabbih end.
These are the last borders determined by the two or.nitties
sir.ing on thi3 document. The areas situated n te ::o?th
of this 3order line belo to Saudi Labia and tho:s on the
South to the irden of enen excludinG certain berde: points
tnclLned to the East and West accordinG to the inclination
of the border line direction as shown it. details açanist
each point.
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To announce the abc,ve-mentioned this decision has been
made and signed by th. two committees. This document ii
written in dupl.icate in the venered Arabic language and
a copy was handed o each committee. Written in Dhahran in
the twenty first day of the month of Shawwal of the year
one thousand and tee hundred and fifty four, 21st Shawwal
134 Hijri.
Border Demarcation committees between the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Kirdom of Yemen.
Committee Appointed by the ingdom of Yemen:
Ismail 3m Hasan, '7ali of Hamadan, member.
Mohammed Bin Hasan Alwadi'ee, Head of Sakeen, chairman.
Abdulla Bin Mana, 1tu3.er of Sahar,member.
Abdulla Aighabiri, member.
The committee appointed by Saudi Arabia:
Abdul Wahab Bin Mohammed Abu MUha, chairman.
Abdul. Aziz Bin Abdul Rahman Althami:i, member.
Ibrahim 2am Alabedeen, member.
Vuliam Abu La'atha, member.
1usan Bin Mustafa. member.
Talat Vista, member.
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Since the records illustrated by these lists from ?lo. (1) to
Uo. (64) according to the statements, beginning from Almughyala
to Al3ouda are the separating borders between Alharth tribe,
subjects of his Majesty King Abdul Aziz Bin Saud and ATharth,
Barii Dahli and Bani Sayah, subjects of his Majesty Isiam Yahya,
all that is on the West and forth of the line belongs to the
overriment of His Majesty King Abdul Azia and all. tnat is on
the East and South belongs to the Government of Imam Yahya. The
villages under dispute with intermingled fa.rms divided by the
border line firstly such as A.l.magbadh and Alma.laheedh and then
between Mabrouka, Almajham and Majda'a,those farms shall belong
to their villages and the Zakat Tax shall be paid to the Government
of that village as well as the ta.rm belonging to Ibm Ghashi in
the village of Almueen and entered into the borderu of Ubad
Janada village belonging to King Abdul Azia, the Zalcat Tax of
thos, lands shall belong to Almueen.And since these drawings
were drawn by the two committees and th. trustees and became the
separating borders between the two lcingdoms under the supervision
of all and after considering the borders thoroughly and after
everybody listened to the answers of the tribe chiefs of the two
Governments, this decision has been made and on God we depend.
27th of Shawwal 1354 '4i3'rJ.
The Kingdom of Yemen committee:
Mohammed Bin Dhaif Allah Bin Ghathaya, member
Mohammed Bin Kassim flajmuldeen, member
Abdulla Bin Othman, chairman
The lingdom of Saudi Arabia committee
Monainmed Alsulaiman Bin Turki, member
Abdulla Kadhi, member
Abdulla Bin Aqeel, chairman
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The borders shown above have been distinu.and and drawn between
the Kingdom of Saudi A.rabia and the Kingdom of Yemen Motawailiya
by drawing the line in the borders of the above-mentioned tribes
from b. (1) to (72), from the beginning of the borders of
Abade]. tribes related to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Alat
Wakeesh related to the ):ingdom of Yemen Motawakiliya going
towards Abadel tribes and those oppoiste 3130 ais and Bani Harees
and those opposite such as Al Masheekh, Al Zohour and Al Ateef
through the chiefs of tribes related to the two governments and
the trustees accepted by all under the con3ideration of the border
committees. The areas on the west and north belong to the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia and the areas on the south and east belong tO the
Kingdom of Yemen Motawakiliya. With regard to *iat Ateef tribe
related to Yemen and Alat Ateef under Hamad 3m Shoga related
to Saudi Arabia, whose lands are
	 eziningled, th. borders have
been defined in such a manner that some of Saudi oubject3 became
situated within the Yemen borders but they are still Caudi subjects
and their names are Ahised Bin Shoga, Yahya Bin Shoga. Yahya Bin
Ahsned Bin Shoga. Balm Shaye', Jabi: Jabran and Jabran Shaye'.
Likewise a number of Yemen subjects became situated within the
borders of Saudi Arabia but they remain the subjects of Yemen
utd their names are: As'ad Bin Hasan, Jabran Acad and Sulaiman
Asad. every one of those persons shall retain his farmlands and
their Zakat Tax shall be paid to their respective governments.
Likewise the lands belonging to the tribe of Al Mohammed are
intermingled. Therefore, the borderline has been drawn in such a
manner that whatever falls inside Saudi Arabia belongs tc them•
and 'whatever falls inside Yemen belongs to them and each of them
shall retain his lands and the Zakat Tax shall be paid to their
respective govrnmen'.:, excopt Hasan Bin hhmed wh falls wtthiri
the Saudi Arabia borders. He shall be a cut'ject cf Yemen and shall
zetain his fanlnds. After de)iburatior. ansi interviewo thi3
decision was made with the agreement of the committees and may
God guide th. steps of all. 21 Aiqida 1354.
The Yemen committeet
Mohammed Bin Kassim Najmuldeen member
Abdulla Bin Othman, chairman.
Mohammed Bin Dhaifulla Ghathaya, member.
The Saudi Arabia committee:
Abthilla Kadhi, member.
Abdulla Bin Aqiel, chairman.
Mohammed Alsulaiman Bin Turki, member.
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Having considered .nd carefully a:udied the aforesaid rpors
we have approved them md ratili 	 them totally in all Vd
singularly in every a.rticle and paragraph. We also approve and
ratify them and make a truthful r,ya1 promise to implement their
contents with the will of od and respect them faithfully and
trustfully and in the name of God,we shall not allow a breach
thereof in any way as long as we are able to do so and to enhance
the truthfulness of whatever mentioned therein we have ordered our
seals to be placed on this documeit and we have placed :ur
signatures thereon and God is the Best of Witnesses.
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1934 Treaty of Taif
Annex 3
[Author's numberingi
To Tail	 ree,nent concluded
ete en
the Kd'm of Yemen
and the Kingdm of Saudi A.rabia
wing to an error made y the wo committe3, the levent:. tla
.as placed upon Rae Açabat flaiouga and since Agabat aioua
belongs to the Yemen Mawkiliya in acccrdance with A.tls 4
3f the	 Agreement, ind 3ince the flag indicates the urr
'.me between the two Kingdoms that flag chal3. be placed ur.ãer
Agabat tlahouga. In order to correct the error in accordance with
.The Agreement this corier%dum has been i3ued.
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1934 Treaty of Taif
Annex 4
[Author's numbering]
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(1 977a) Collection ofDocumentsandAgreements 1922-51: pp. 193-8
(Arabic, translated by the author).
General Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and the Kingdom of Yemen for a resolution of the issues
facing the people of the two kingdoms.
In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate.
Both Governments believe that it is beneficial to establish rules governing
the resolution of claims, problems and issues facing the people who live on the
frontier.
Furthermore Article 7 of the Treaty of Taif requires the drafting of an
agreement concerning the manner in investigating damage and loss, including murder
and injury, between tribes on the frontier.
Furthermore the text of two letters which are appended to the Treaty of Taif,
dated 6th Safar 1315 between His Majesty Prince Khalid-bin-Abdul Aziz and Seyyid
Abdullah Ahmed al-Wasir agree that rules should be established between the two
Governments concerning movements between the two Kingdoms for the Hajj
[Pilgrimagel, trade, and others.
His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin Abdurrahman al-Feysal-al-Saud, King of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and His Majesty Imam Yahya bin Muhammad
Hamiduddin, King of Yemen agreed the Articles as follows:
ARTICLE 1
To facilitate procedures between the people living on either side of the
frontier the representatives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will be the Emirs of
Jezan, Abha, and Najran, and on behalf of the Kingdom of Yemen, the Governors of
Al-Sham and Harath, Meedi, and Wa'ilah to address the problems and claims which
are between groups or individuals on each side of the frontier.
ARTICLE 2
In the event of a letter passing between the representatives mentioned in the
previous article, the Emir or Governor should take action as quickly as possible. If
the problem is administrative he should try to find a solution and implement it. If
the problem is legal, it should be taken to a judge and treated according to religious
law. If the problem is moral and a solution can not be found by the representatives,
it should be treated according to Article 5 below.
ARTICLE 3
If a judge has such an issue before him he should not delay it. If the case
requires witnesses he must estimate the period necessary for the witnesses to be
brought before him and he must request this from the Emir of Governor. The letter
of confirmation from the Emir or Governor is an adequate form of identity for the
witnesses if they have no formal documents. The decision of the judge will be sent
to the Emir or Governor.
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ARTICLE 4
Any decision made by the religious judge is final and will not be discussed
further.
ARTICLE 5
Where there is an administrative problem the Emir or Governor must try to
make an objective and fair judgement and he should explain the procedure which he
followed to the other Emirs and Governors. If after a lot of effort a solution has not
been found the following procedure should be used:
(1) A meeting between the Emir and Governor who are dealing with the
issue.
(2) A committee set up with an equal number of representatives from
either side. The Emir and Governor and other individuals may be
Chairman or members of the committee.
(3) If following the above procedures a satisfactory agreement has not
been reached, the arbitration should be according to the Treaty of Taif.
ARTICLE 6
Because of the advantages of warm relations between the Emirs and
Governors, which will satisfy both God and their Kings, they agree to have a
meeting (according to Article I from the General Agreement) at least once a year
(more frequently if necessary) to examine the issues and collaborate to find solutions
to administrative problems as mentioned in Article 5 of this Annex. The meetings
will take place alternately on the Saudi and Yemeni sides of the frontier.and the time
of the meeting will be decided by the Emir and Governor. Decisions from the
meeting will be presented to the Government for approval. Ratification of the
decisions must not be delayed more than three months after the final day of the
meeting. The decisions must then be implemented without delay.
ARTICLE 7
Any person who wants to cross the boundary must obtain formal documents.
Any person who does not get the permission of the Emir or Governor of his area
will be arrested, and he may be sent back to where he came from. The rules
governing the formal documents are as follows:
(1) People who have business on the frontier such as those crossing the
boundary for grazing, agriculture, and visits to markets may continue
as usual until an arrangement is made in the future. In an emergency it
is possible to restrict crossing by requiring formal documents.
(2) People who cross the boundary to visit the Central Government or
other places far from the frontier in either country must obtain formal
documents.
(3) Pilgrims, tourists, and traders who cross the boundary must obtain the
formal documents or they will be arrested and sent back.
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ARTIcLE 8
The formal documents which are mentioned in Article 7, Clauses 2 and 3 are
as follows:
(I)	 Valid passport from Saudi Arabia or Yemen.
(2) Document from the Emir.
(3) Identity paper from any governor stating destination.
(4) Letter of introduction from the travellers' local Emir to the Emir of
the destination.
ARTICLE 9
Traditional rights to grazing and wells are guaranteed by the Treaty of Taif.
If a dispute arises between those involved with the grazing and wells it should be
brought before the Emirs. If the Emirs are unable to resolve the dispute it should be
presented to the committee mentioned in Article 6.
If there is still no agreement the issue should go to arbitration according to
the Treaty of Taif.
ARTICLE 10
Because the carrying of weapons in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is forbidden
according to the Rule of Organization published on 13/7/1354 (10 October 1935),
Yemenis wanting to cross the boundary must hand over their weapons, whether
firearms or knives, to the customs point or the Emirs on the frontier. On returning
to their country their weapons will be returned to them. When those crossing hand
their weapons to the customs officials they should be given a receipt so that their
weapons may be returned to them on their return. Anyone found crossing with
weapons will be punished according to the Rule of Organization.
If Yemen wants to establish a similar system for weapons for those crossing
from Saudi, there should be a similar procedure.
ARTICLE 11
It is forbidden to take goats across the boundary avoiding the customs point.
Anyone guilty will be punished for smuggling.
ARTICLE 12
Anyone having a claim relating to the frontier must have the claim endorsed
by their Eniir.
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Ja1am
Banii-Sallmaan	 Banii-Qhhal
:::'
aal-Sidraan
Banii-AIii
aal-Mstanir
aal-Tauuq
aal-Asuufii
aaI-Matiraf
aal-Murra
aal-Mandiy
aal-Raziq
BaaI-kjaarth
aal-Abaattjiin
Appendix 2.1: The genealogical tree of the Yaam Tribe
APPENDIX 2
Yaam
Macijkar
aal-Faatma	 Uaam-waajid
Nabra	 aal-wa'Ia	
- aal-Hasan -
aal-Saalim	 [j— aal-Su I iimaan - Lasluum
aal-Faadl	 L aal-Haamid
aal-Mabmd
	
banii-Fadaal	
- Wallad
aal-Saiid	
Abdaala 1
akaahiil
afriit
aal-Jam'aI
aaI-haarmaan
aal.sAbaas
Waadia
aal-Qdaan
aal-Qaarbaan
aal-Saaad
aal-Aaamr
aal-Khadra
aal-Mifla!j
aal-Qurii1
aal- aI-imiiry
Banni-Hmiim
Source: Author's Field Survey. 1 October - 10 December 1994
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aI-baraat aal-Husiin aal-Aabuujubaara	 al-Maqaaij
aaI-Hafa
aal-'Abiis
aal-'Ajbaan
- aal-Sanaa'
aaI-FaaaI
L_L
L aal-MiqbaI
I	 I
aal-Suuiidaan	 aalAbiid
aal-Ja'far Ibn Haady	 aal-Ahmad
aal-Naajii	 aaI-Qamtia
Manuur	 L_ aal-Mamlluuk
APPENDIX 2
Appendix 2.2: The genealogical tree of the Waai1a Tribe
Waa ha
aal-Allhuum	 aal-Miqran
aal-Sallmaan	 aal-hamIIan
aaI-uuaab
	
aal-Saalma
aal-Farwa
	 aal-Swaad
aal-Ju'raan
Source: Author's Field Survey. 1 October - 10 December 1994
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Appendix 2.3: The genealogical tree of the Dahm Tribe
Dahm
Dhw Husalin	 Dflw Muhammad
aal-Shuuiia
aal-Zahra
aal-Hazm
aal-Sabtaan
aal-Nuhiita
aal-'Akiimii
aaI-'Jaraaf
aal-Jad'aan
Phw Ghiilaan
aal•Suliiiraan
Banli Nuwf
al-Mahaahmma
aal-Saalim
aal-'Amaalisa
aal-'Amaar
aal-hwy
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 October - 10 December 1994
Note:
Dresch 1989 and STCS 1978 has indicated to the genealogical
tree of the Dahm tribe as well, hut its different from the author's
proposal. This may he because they used various sources.
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Zubaan
Alii
Kbariis
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Appendix 2.4: The genealogical tree of the a1-Saiiar Tribe
aI-Saar
'Amrw	 'AIii	 Mubmad
Kaslaan	 Maslam	 l^hahiim	 Hamiij
Mubark
aI-Kab
aal-Mabrab
aal-Sadwn
aaI-bamiiI
T
Qar aat
Baqii
r
L__j_ aal-Makuum
L aaI-Mazrwa
Eaa1Abdah1a
[J-
aal-Askar
L aaI-KhahiidaI
aI-Masaadsa
Kanda
aal-BaaI-Ijaarth
[JaaI-Qaauid-
Siidaan
F
L aal-Jaghaam
Auun
Suliimaan
aI-Da'aalijah
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 October - 10 December 1994
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Appendix 2.5: The genealogical tree of the AI-Manaahiil Tribe
aI-Manaahiil
Balit Sabuula
Baiit 'Abdaallah Sabuula
Baiit Natjiir
Balit Samiih
Baiit Tamiim
Baiit Hamdan
Balit aI-Bsiiry
Baiit Asaan
Baiit Glaatniin
Bailt aI-DwiiIa
Baiit Qadiim
Baiit amuur
Balit Kaziim
Baiit iaaanm
Baiit Barakaat
Balit aI-Hamaady
Baiit al-tiin
Baiit aI-'hdaq
Baiit Nbaa
Baiit aI-Mkiiraas
Baiit al-Mas'uud
Baiit aI-Manhi'
Baiit al-Qafila
Baiit al-Ma'flany
Baiit Anaany
Baiit Haatuu
Baiit AI-Baqiia
Tamaan
Baiit Saalmiin
Bailt al-Quuiinsa
Baiit aI-Rahuuh
Baiit 'Auudaan
Baiit MsHam
Baiit Maazbaar
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 July - 10 September 1994
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Appendix 2.6: The genealogical tree of the al-Mahara Tribe
al-Mahara
Bait Saalh
	
aI-AaflrrwaaIi
Bailt KaIaat
Baiit 'Aamriitt
Balit Tauu'aar
L Baiit Qamiit
Baiit Rfiit
Baiit Mabaat
Baiit Salaamt
Balit Kadah
Balit Ibn AIii Maqdam
Baiit Sahiil
Baiit Qaiidaii
Baiit umaada
Balit R'fiit ham tjahhatiii
Source: Author's Field Survey. 1 July - 10 September 1994
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1995 Saudi-Yemeni
Memorandum of Understanding
Source:Text as reported by the Saudi news agency SPA, Riyadh in Arabic
at 0148 gmt on 26 February 1995 translated in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
(SWB) ME'2238 MED/15 [34]
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.
A memorandum of understanding between the governments of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Republic of Yemen.
Out of their desire firmly to entrench and bolster ties of brotherly relations between
the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabial and Yemen, the two sides have agreed on the following:
Clause 1. The two sides affirm their commitment to the legitimacy and binding
nature of the Ta'if accord signed on 6th Safar 1353 AH, corresponding to 20th May
1934; its appendices, known as the Ta'if accord, which will be referred to hereafter as the
accord.
Clause 2. A joint committee will be set up, composed of an equal number [of
people] from each side, within a period of 30 days. Its task will be to re-establish the
[border] signs in accordance with the border reports appended to the accord - those
[border signs] still existing and those which have fallen down - starting from the border
point "Rasif al-Bahr, precisely from Ra's al-Mi'wajj Shami to the Radif Qarad outlet"
[Arabic: rasifal-bahr tamara ra' s al-mi'wajj shami Ii manfadh radif qarad] between Maydi
and Mawsim, to the last point previously demarcated in Jabal al-Thar. Modern scientific
methods are to be used to establish the signs by agreeing with a specialist company, to be
selected by the two sides, to execute the task. The company will carry out its task under
the supervision of the committee.
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Clause 3. The current committee formed by the two countries will Continue its work
to decide on the required measures and the steps leading to the demarcation of the
remaining parts of the border, starting from Jabal al-Thar to the end of the two countries'
border, including agreement on means of arbitration in the event of differences between
the two countries.
Clause 4. A joint committee will be formed which will negotiate on determining the
sea border in accordance with international law, starting from the border point on the Red
Sea coast mentioned in Clause 2 above.
Clause 5. A senior military committee will be formed by the two sides to ensure the
prevention of military incidents, movements or other [activitiesj on the border between the
two countries.
Clause 6. A joint ministerial committee will be formed to develop economic, trade
and cultural relations between the two countries, and to boost aspects of cooperation
between them. This committee will start its work within 30 days from the date of signing
this memorandum.
Clause 7. A joint higher committee will be appointed to work on realizing the
aforementioned, facilitate the tasks of the aforementioned committees and remove any
obstacles or difficulties that may obstruct their work.
Clause 8. Each of the two countries affIrm its commitment not to allow itself to be
used as a base and a centre for aggression on the other, or for carrying out political,
military or information activities against the other.
Clause 9. In order to continue the maintenance of an amicable and appropriate
climate to ensure the success of the talks, each side will undertake not to carry out any
propaganda against the other.
Clause 10. There is nothing in this memorandum that includes an amendment to the
Ta'if accord or its appendices, including the border reports.
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Clause 11. Everything that is discussed by the aforementioned committees will be
checked and recorded in minutes, which will be signed by officials from both sides.
This memorandum was signed in Mecca aI-Mukarramah on Sunday 27th Ramadam
1415 AH, corresponding to 26th February 1995 AD. It will come into effect on the date
of exchanging the ratification documents.
[Signed] For the government of the Republic of Yemen: Deputy Prime Minister and
NI mister of Planning and Development Abd al-Qadir Abd al-Rahman Bajammal.
For the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Personal Adviser to the
Servant of the Two Holy Places [King Fandl ibrahim Abdullah al-Anqari.
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Frontier Tribes' Duty-Free Allowances
Source: Saudi Customs Office at Al-Khadra Checkpoint, 1994
(in Arabic, translated by the author)
3	 sacks of sugar
3	 sacks of rice
3	 cartons of dried milk
3	 cartons of liquid milk
6	 sacks of flour
6	 sacks of cornmeal
6	 sacks of barley
6
	
drums of fuel
10 cartons of motor oil
3	 sacks of livestock feed
3	 cartons of cooking oil
every 3 months
every 3 months
every 3 months
every 3 months
every 3 months
every 3 months
every 3 months
every 3 months
every 3 months
every 3 months
every 3 months
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A Recommended English Transliteration System
for Arabic
Source. Niblock and Dick Ins (1994), Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic
Studies, University of Durham
A RECO1ENDED ENGLISH TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM FOR ARABIC
CONSONANTS
	
VOWELS
1-'	 /	 z	 L9	 q	 a
b	 t.Y
	 $	 k
tL	 sh
	
J
	
1
S
	
I
j	 (J	 d	 n	 (long)
t
	
0
	 h
	 L	
aa
z
	 3	 V	 ii
6	 y	 uu
I
	
c-i
	
f
	
O
	
a ( at inconstruct state)
	
JI	 aL- (article)
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The Structured Interview
Interview No:
Nationality: a Saudi
	 L I
	
b Yemeni	 E]	 cUAE [I	 dQatar [1
Sector:	 a Western	 F I
	
bEastern	 [I
Checkpoint: a Al-Khadra [1	 b Al-Kharkhir H
Part 1: The Checkpoints
Which of the following is the most important reason for you to choose this
checkpoint rather than another?
a
	 Close to your residence and relatives 	 [1
b
	
Close to your relatives 	 [ J
C
	 Provides a good service	 H
d
	
Safe from the Yemeni side 	 [1
e
	 Safe from the Saudi side 	 H
f
	
Good road from the Yemeni side	 []
g	 Good road from the Saudi side	 F]
h
	 Other(please specify)
	 [1
2
	
Is this checkpoint the one that you usually use?
Yes [1	 No [I	 If no, see question 3
3	 Which other checkpoint of the following do you usually use?
a	 Al-Khadra	 [1
b	 Al-Kharkhir	 I]
c	 Other(please specify)	 [I
4	 Where do you live?
a	 Name of City
b	 Name of Tribe
c	 Name of Province
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b
C
d
e
f
g
h
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How far is your home from
Less than 1km
1-2km
3-5km	 I
6-8km	 1
9-11km
12-14km	 I
15-17km	 1
18-20km
21-24km	 I
iis checkpoint?
j
k
m
n
0
p
q
r
25-29 km
30-3 9 km
40-49 km
50-59km
60-6 9 km
70-79km
80-89km
90-99km
Over 100km
6	 How long does it take to get by car to this checkpoint from your home?
a	 Less than 5 minutes	 [1	 f	 26-30 minutes	 I I
b	 6-10 minutes	 [I	 g	 31-40 minutes	 [1
c	 11-l5minutes	 [ ]	 h	 41-S0minutes	 II
d	 16-20 minutes	 [1	 1	 51-60 minutes	 [I
e	 21-25 minutes	 El	 j	 More than 1 hour	 [I
7	 What type of road do you use to get to this checkpoint?
a	 All asphalt	 El
b	 Part asphalt	 [I
c	 Dirtroad	 [I
d	 Other(please specify)
	 [I
8	 What type of transportation did you use to get to this checkpoint?
a	 Onfoot	 [I	 e	 Taxi	 [I
b	 Private vehicle	 [I	 f	 Donkey	 [I
c	 Friend'svehicle	 H	 g	 Camel	 El
d	 Bus	 [1	 h	 Other(please specify) [I
9
	
Do you think the waiting time for getting permission from the checkpoint is:
a
	 Reasonable [I	 b	 Unreasonable	 [1 If unreasonable, please explain.
10 Are the waiting place and rest area at the checkpoint adequate?
a	 Morethanadequate	 H
b	 Adequate	 [I
c	 Less than adequate
	 [I
d Donotknow	 H
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Part 2: Social, Cultural, and Economic Standards
11 What type ofjobdo you do?
a	 Student
b	 Trader
c	 Farmer
d Official
e	 Labourer
H	 f[1	 g
H	 h[1
Unemployed
Driver
Herder
Other
[1[1[1[1
12 Would you mind telling me what is your monthly household income in Saudi
Ri ya Is?
a	 Less than 100
b	 1,000-2,999
c	 3,000-4,999
d	 5,000-6,999
e	 7,000-8,999
[1	 f	 9,000-10,999	 []
El	 g	 11,000-12,999	 El
H	 h	 13,000-14,999	 []
15,000 ormore	 [1[I
13 What is your educational level?
a
	 Illiterate	 El
b	 Reading only	 El
C
	 Completed elementary/preparatory school
	
LI
d
	
Completed middle/intermediate school
	
[I
e
	 Completed secondary school
	
El
f
	
University degree	 El
g	 Other(please specify)	 El
Part 3 Population Interaction
14 Why are you crossing the boundary? Give reasons in order of priority.
First priority	 Second priority	 Third Priority
a	 Visiting markets
	 [1	 [1	 [1
b	 Visiting relatives	 [1	 [1	 [1
c	 Visitingyourproperty	 [I	 E]	 LI
d	 Visitinggrazingand wells
	 H	 [1	 [1
e	 Other(pleasespecify)	 []	 El	 H
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VISITS TO MARKETS
IS Where do you shop?
a	 Name of the markets
b	 Name of the province
16 Why are you going to a market on the other side of the frontier?
a	 It is cheaper	 [1
b	 Itisnear	 H
c	 It iseasytoget to
	 [I
d	 Alloftheabove	 [I
e	 Other(please specify)
	 LI
17 What are you shopping for?
a	 Petrol (please specify)	 [1
b	 Food (please specify)	 F]
c	 Other(pleasespecify)	 1]
18 How often do you cross the frontier to visit a market?
a	 Daily	 [ I	 d	 Yearly	 [1
b	 Weekly	 []	 e	 Other(please specify) [I
c	 Monthly	 [J
VISITS TO RELATIVES
19 Where do you have relations on the other side?
a	 Name of the settlement
b	 Tribe of relatives
20 Which relatives live on the other side of the frontier?
a	 Blood relatives	 [I
b	 Relativesbymarriage 	 El
c	 Both of the above	 El
d	 Other(please specify)
	 LI
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21 Which ways do you usually keep in touch with relatives on the other side of the
frontier?
a	 Byland	 H
b	 Byair	 H
c	 Bytelephone	 [
d	 By letter	 E I
e	 Other(pleasespecify)	 [J
22 How often do you visit your relatives on the other side?
a	 Daily	 [I
b	 \Veekly	 [I
c	 Monthly	 [1
d	 Yearly	 H
e	 Other(please specify) 	 [1
VISITING YOUR PROPERTIES
23 Where do you own property on the other side of the frontier?
Name of the place
Name of the tribe
24 What type of property do you own?
a	 Farm	 [I	 e	 Alloftheabove	 [I
b	 House	 f	 Tent and grazing	 H
c	 Well	 [I	 g	 Other(please specify) LI
d Grazing	 H
VISITS TO GRAZING
26 Where do you have grazing on the other side?
Name of place
Name of tribe
27 How often do you visit the grazing?
a	 Daily	 [I
b	 Weekly	 [1
c	 Monthly	 L I
d	 Yearly	 E I
e	 Other(pleasespecify) 	 [ I
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30 How many nationalities do you have?
a	 Saudi	 H	 d Qatar	 H
b	 Yemeni	 [1	 e Saudi andYemeni	 H
c	 LTAE	 []	 f	 SaudiandYemeniandother(pleasespecify) [1
31 What type of document do you use to cross the boundary to the other side?
a	 Passport	 []
b	 Statement	 [1
c	 Identity card
	 E I
e	 Other(please specify)
	 [1
32 When you are crossing the boundary are you usually alone, with another individual
from your family, or someone else?
a	 Alone	 El
b	 With your family	 [I
c	 With a group from your tribe	 [1
d	 Other(please specify)
	 [1
Part 4: Opinions About the Boundary
33 What kind of Saudi features do you use to recognise the boundary between Saudi
Arabia and Yemen?
a	 Mountains	 H	 e	 Shiqqat	 H
b	 Plateaux	 II	 f	 Uruq	 [1
c	 Wadis	 [1	 g	 Ramlat	 [1
d	 Checkpoints	 [I	 h	 Other (please name the features)
33 What kind of Yemeni features do you use to recognise the boundary between Saudi
Arabia and Yemen?
a	 Mountains	 [I	 e	 Shiqqat	 [I
b	 Plateaux	 [1	 f	 Uruq	 [I
c	 Wadis	 [I	 g	 Ram lat	 [1
d	 Checkpoints	 [J	 h	 Other (please name the features)
35 Do you think that the boundary has changed over the years?
Yes [1	 No [I
If yes, please specify:
Type of change
Time of change
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36 What is your opinion about the present boundary?
a	 Satisfied	 E I
b	 Dissatisfied	 [I
c	 Donotknow	 [I
Ifdissatisfied please explain
37 Do you have any proposals concerning the boundary between Saudi Arabia and
Yemen?
Yes [I	 No [1
If yes, please specify
Researcher's Remarks
a
b
C
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